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In writing this thesis entititd *TIMI Role 
Of th« United Nations for P—ttB UitH SpooisI Rsfsroneo 
to Usst Aaiaiif I hsvs bsen groatly bonofitid by ny stsy 
snd froqttont v i s i t s to ths United Nations as «y oeuntry 
representative in the Cenerai Aase«bly deesions and i t s 
aff i l iatsd Connittess sinoe 1966* I represented s i so ny 
eountry in othsr United Nations Conferenees at the HsQUSf 
Genevst Vienna and sove West Asian oapitaisi where 1 got the 
opportunity of studying Qn*the«epot the systeii of this world 
Organisation* This certainly gave no an insight into the 
problsMS of the United Nations* The present thesis i s s hu»bls 
atteapt to etudy the potentiaiitiee and problens oonfronting the 
United Nations with a view to analyee i t s role for eOMOiidating 
wtHrid peaee and progress* I regret ay inability to take up aore 
fully soMs Arab politioal questionSf which the United Nations hac 
to oops with suoh aa the problen of Timisian and flwrooan 
independenoOf Algerian struggle for liberation;,the Buraiai 
disputot etc*f on aoooimt of laotc of tiae snd epaee* t believe 
these oan be the subjeets of independent reeesreh* 
X aa grateful to the United Nations Inforaation 
Of flee and Officiale of Haanarskjold Ubrary in New Torky the 
United Nationa Oevelopaent Prograaae Office in ^tktn and Colleagui 
in the Riniatry of Foreign Affairs in ay countryt f^ople*s 
Oeaoeratio Republic of Tenon for rendering ae mioh help and 
(a) 
• • • U t a f i M oonctming i«p0v%«fi% tasMtoh Mtc t iaX t * I aa «l«o 
mieh QsaUful to «y Govatnaant and to tha Covarnaafit of I i^ ia 
partiouiavly tha foraar niniatar of Cduaatioiit Profaaaev S« NuruJ 
Haaan» for tha award of a ouXtural axehanoa aeholarahlp whioh 
finanoiaily aupportad aa vory auoh during ay atay in India* 
I offer alao mf thanks to a ntMriiar of frianda in 
Naw Yorkt Ganava» Vianna, Nay Oalhii Beirut and Cairo without 
aantioning thair naaaa aaparataiy for thair ayapathy and 
auggaationa* 
For tha ooaplation of thia work, I hava a dabt vr 
gratituda to ay Superwiaor* Profaaaor S«A«H* Haqqif Haadf 
Oapartaant of Pol i t iea i Soianoai and tha Oeant Faaulty of Saaiai 
Seianeaat Aiigarh Hualia Univaraityf Aiiparhf without whoaa 
guidanoat haip and eaaaalaaa enoouragaaant thia work would havo 
navor aoan tha l ight of tNi day* Hay in apita of hia pra-
oooupationa allowad aa to fraquantly anoroaah upon hia valuable 
t iaa and onoouraga aa in ay aoaanta of d i f f ieu l ty* I havo groat 
plaaaura in aoknouladging ay profound gratituda to hia for tha 
ooaplation and aubaiaaion of thia thaaia within tha ainiaua 
paraiaaible t i a a » l i a i t * 
I ahould alao axtand ay thanks to Hr n*A« Khan Af r id i 
for typing tha aanuaoript niooly and oarafully* 
And at laatf I ahould faa l gratituda to ay wifat 
Asaa, and ay ehildran» who auffarad on aooount of thia atudy 
but vary ohaarfully tolaratad tha hardship of ay baing away froi 
tiMia for a long t iaa* 
ANUCR nOHAMCO KUT8 
iiii) 
plmf if} ilM wfarlit s f faint mn4 %tm tmf im iihi«h i t tan 
mm% •ffveUvsiy te Mrf* to tttv* tUt putpotM for whioh i t 
••tabiistwil hay* bwm tlw stibjMt of mmii thougiit and #i«cHflwiM 
iMifor« •ml Aftef i t s iiiMPtion on 24 Ootobos f94S iiithiA ttio 
OfQafiiootiofi itoolf by Hoatoot Statoo oiui oMong tNo wovltf ptiiilie 
in Qonotoi* 
In tho iaot thirty yoorof tho Unitoii Notiono 
IMO 9mm tlurouQh aany vieiooitiMioo and ts»nof or«ationo» Tho 
four apsnaorins f^ owara of tho S«n ftaneiaoo Conforoneo 9f |i4S 
on tho oatahiiahBont ctf tho UnitoiS Mationo uoro eonvineotf that 
i t waa only on tho haaia of Big l^ owota oooporationt oontovinf 
in tho Sootifity Couneiii that intotnational poaeo and ao^itity 
in tho iioat«iiat iiotitf eoiiid ho aaintainod* Xn tho ioHodiato 
l>oat«iiat iforidf yat«ti«o ooe|io«atian ooon vaniahodt and 
idooiOQieal difforonooo fhirwiatad al l aapooto of intornationai 
affaiva inoiuding of ootitaOf tho wotk of tho Mnitod Mationa* 
Cvon thooghy in thio poriod of oaat^woot oonfrontationt a ntaiho 
of intotnationai eonfiiota and orohloiM uoro ooivad through tho 
offorto of tho tinitod Nationa* hutt unfottunatoiyi tho 
Qrganioation oa«o to ho ttaod soro ao a lOaoo for an idooiogioal 
atruggio and for infiuaneing tforid puhiio opinion than aa a aai 
for roaolving tho difforonooo anong natiano« 
U«) 
• ignif iMiit 9feup eHip«t»4 l«V8«ly of Asian eotifitfiM vMiOi 
Ms«n«4 i t««i f • • • f«re« rot oon«Ui««iaii mna ooeptraUon in 
int«tnftUan«i poiieioo* Thio third f oreo Jein«d toy wny 
eoMntfioo of Afriea and lat in Anatioa and ovon frea Cutopa> twd 
a oisnifieant veto in dafinin^ imsinativa prograaaaa fat tha 
Unitad ilatiQno in tHa Syai etioia of I9i6» in tlta Labanon 
aituation in %n$ and in tha Con^e in i960* Thaoa eoimtriao 
aiao holpad in ditaatint tha tinitad Nations away ffo« i ta 
pvavioua atavila dahataa touardo on awavanaaa of tha urgant on 
praatioai ioaiiaa of tadueint tha tiiitening gap iiatwaan thi 
davaiopad and tha davaiopin9 patta of tha wf»^ Xd• Thia gtoup 
uaa alao aaaantiai in t«anafoming tha Unitod Ration* into an 
agant f o» a paaoaful ehanga haaad on tha prineipia of aaif<*> 
dataminationt thtM giving tho l>nitad Nationa tha roid of a 
iiidMifo at tha hitth of mm nationa* 
Around l963t tha intarnotisnai aituotion aouid 
no longat ha tmdaratood in ta»»o af hi«poiar or tri*paiat 
w^Xd* Praviotiaiy» tha aoiid hioea of tha Caat and tha Maat 
hagan to ahow intamai diffmvtmomt* Idaoiagioai uniformity 
group aolidarity tiara gradually rapiaoad by matipi iaity of 
oantraa of pouara* Sarioua diopytao in tho Unitad Nationa 
davaiopad on eonatitutionai ctuaoUomi raiating to paaaa fcaa 
and i ta finaiHiingt and no ana group at otataa uaa otPihia ( 
i«poaing i ta i i i i l upon othar greupa that tha aagotiating 
U) 
IffoesaftM fOff pf(MfuoitiQ a oon»on«ut tmoam «Off« ooa^lfX* 
TtM Unilad Naliont i« a milti*pufpo»» i n t a f 
fiational ofganiaatioiit wlias* ae i iv i t iaa •xtond to a l l aspaota 
or intavnational l i f a * In i t a i n i t i a l pariod dutinQ tha tilQht 
of tha eold wat» tha Ot^aniaation aaeaad to ba prlaasily an aran 
for Caat"Uaat eonfl iet* In a la tar patiodf by foeuaaing world 
putilie opinion on tha danoar of tha grawing gapa in tha aoonoaic 
and aoeial eonditiona of lifm and liy taking tha laad in gwiding 
tha naw nationa in Aaiag Africa and tha Caribbaan to indapandani 
tha Unitad Matlona vividly intarpratad i t a raaponaibility for tl 
paaomfuX tranafonnation of intarnational ralatlona* baaad on 
Juatiea and walfara for a l l« Butt a t i l l tha Unitad Nationa haa 
to axart afforta in thia raapaet to f u l f i l thia alM* Rora 
raaantlyt tha Unitad Nationa haa baan oalled to axtand i t a 
soneam froa pol i t ioa l and aeononio iaauaa to quaatiomi ra lat ln 
to aoianea and taohnologyt outar apaea and aaa-bad* pi^mlatian 
and urbaniaationy youth and huoan anvironaent* 
Tha Unitad Nationa haa alao baeoKe inoraaaingly 
iaportant »B an agent for tha exaouting or inplomanting in 
tha f i a l d of tha daeiaiona of i ta lagialat iva organa* Tha ^nii 
Nationa peaoa kaapingt or obaarvation funotianot aupplaiiantad 
froa t ina to t iaa by aediation aot lv i t iaat ara aaan today in 
Cypvuat in Riddla Caatf in Kaahair* Soaa aay daplora tha 
waaknaaaaa and l ia i ta t iona of tha Unitad Nationa toddyt but th 
adait i t a aaaantial axiatenea aa tha baat hopa for (waanity* 
(vl) 
f^t Boiii«rlik«» tils AiQ«fian Foraign nini»t«r ami thtt Ptasiitont 
of th* Tyenty^inth S«s9icin of th« United Nations Gofioral 
Asaoablj^ oaid in Hit oponing spaoehi *Tli« Unitod Nationa eouid 
a t i l l bo imptmf4* H waa progroaaivoly roforsiing itaalf*" 
Apart ftm i ta iiwoitiata offorta to koep 
paaoo in apaoifio eonfiietod aituationOf tho United Nations 
has esassissslK triad to taekla ths undarlying problsM of 
intsrnational ordar* Oisaraanant in aXl i t s ranifioatiana haa 
froii ths outsst t>oan a oajor ofijeetiva of the Organiaation and 
haa rspreaantsdi in tsrms of affortt i:«rhap8f tha Aoat 
eontinuous activity of ths Unitsd Nations* Xtm faot i s that« 
whils tlw dsvslopasnt of new weaponay nuclear and convsntianal» 
continiMa tmabatad» diaaroiassnt nsgotiations in ths tinitsd 
Haticxns fraas-*work havs not ied to adsquete xaauit* Oiaaraassnt 
nsgotiatiomi outsids tNi United Nations ars also soiling vary 
sloyiy in eonparison to tha obvious psriia o^  ths world 
situation* 
During ths last fsw ysarsi thsrs has been 
inersaaing intsrest in ths ocmospt of nuclear frss lones 
and ths i«portanos attaehsd to ths* aa leaaaurea to control ths 
miolsar arms racs* Ths trsatiss rslating to the Antarctict 
outer s ^ e s snd ssa-bad havs in a ssnast satabliahsd nuclear 
frse xonss in thsir rsspsetivs uninhabited environssnts* Ths 
Trsaty of Tlatsloloo which orsatod a nuelaar frse sons for 
Latin Mssrioay ths only sons establiahed in a populated portion 
(vil) 
of th« earthf i* continuing to attract a gtOMing nunber of 
atthcrofits and tho Xaadora a^ otHor rogiona havo doelairod thoir 
intorssta in ainiXar arrang«»«nts« 
Thia thaaio has boon writtati with tha intantion 
to apark lioro liQht by finding additional information and facta 
about tha vary i«pc»rtant roia tha Unitad Nations have hid playad 
in acoordanoo to i te "'ohartev'* for aatabliahing and oonaolidatini 
world Peace and aaourity. The four chaptara of thia thasia aro 
doalt with tha iioat important topioa which tha Organiaation 
funotiona ainca ita incaptit^* 
Ctiaptar I daala briafly with tha Unitad Nations* 
(Nrigin and the prowiaiorta of ita Charter whioh bear eignifioant 
dutiae toyarda peace and ee^ririty* It ia an indieputable faet 
that during more than thirty yaara the Charter hae played and '^ 
a t i l l playing a poaitive role and hae demonatrated i te vi tal i ty 
and ita great poaaibilitiee for the exteneion and intenaifieatio 
of eooperation between atataa with different eoeial ayateme* The 
Charter haa certainly eraated tha eonditione for that eeoperatia 
to develop in peace and in acoordanoe with the generally 
reeogniaad prinoiplea of international law* Jiuat aa i t cannot 
iN» deniad that there are proviaiona of tha Charter whioh have 
etood tha teat of tima and managad to adjust to tha changing 
aapiratione of mankind« ao there are other proviaiona ti^ieh are 
obaolete auoh aa certain refarencea to "enainy atataa**t or othera 
which will aoon have aervad their purpose* auoh aa thoae relatin 
to the Truateeahip Counoil« and laatlyt aome whioh do not 
( v i i i ) 
l»0p«vl.y M f U e t th« ehangM whloh hav« oemirrcid on th« world 
flO«n« in Meant y»am • • « vsault of tht ineltioion in %tm 
wmmb9fHip of tNi Unitocf H«tian« of tho eotmtriao whieh hay* 
otitainad thaiv indapandanea ainoa t94S» 
Ciiaptat II daaia with tha rola of tha Canaral 
AaaaMbly for pvonoting wotld paaaa and aaaurity* Tha intantion 
hara ia not pvoeadurai Intt i t a avolution and proapaot of 
affaatitNinaaa* Tha Csnatai Aaaambly now haa a prapondaranoa of 
nawly foraad Third World Stataa* I t haeoKaa tha oantra of hloa 
eonfi iet* Hanoat i t a rola ia tmdotibtadiy vary aueh aignifieant* 
ftm adoption in 19S0 of tha "Uniting far ^aoa Haaoiution* 
providad a apaoifio prooadura for tranaforaing raaponaibiXy to 
tha SaFMral AsMM^iy ahawid tha Staurity Couneii f ind i t a a l f 
unahia to taka action baoatiaa of tha vato powar* Tha Canaral 
AaaaMhly raeantly atieoaadad to adopt vary inportant and 
h i a t w i e a l raaoltitiona i^ioh aoaa of tha Craat Powara eppoaa* 
Suoh tiM eaaa of raaolution 3379 (XXX) whieh daolarad Zioniaa 
ia a raoial novaiiant* U elmmtlf i l luatrataa that tha raeant 
Canaral Aaacn^iy i * ocMplataly ditt9fnt ftom tha typa that 
axiatad in t i M whieh eraatad tha Zioniat Stata* &ueh a ehan( 
raflaota tha changing airouMtanoaa of tha t iaa and pra* 
ooawpati'"^ of tha iMaharahip* Tha Oaalaratian on tha Crantii 
lt%tl9fmti49no» to Colonial Cowntriaa and ^eplaa by tha Canaral 
Aaaanbly in 1960 aignallad a naw Phaaa of anti-eolonial 
agitation in tha Unitad Nationa* Thia ia followad by anathei 
two Oaolarationa in 1970 eonoarning iaauea of intarnational 
( ix ) 
Stettrity mnd firidndXy B«latiofi» tt«Ofio SiateSf th» Oselsration 
of 0«fliiing Agr«ft«ian of 14 OttM«b«ft 1974* 
ClMipt«r n i intends t o t t a m v«vMon am) 
•volution about tha rola of tha United ttationa pavtieuiarly 
the Seaiitity Counaii fw eonaoiidatino paaoe and Saeurity ainaa 
I 94 i * Aa i t ia knowng tha f i r s t fay yaata of tha United Nationa* 
i i fOf the ajciatanea in tlia Soettrity Couneil and aapeeially tha 
Cenevai Aaae«biy of Majority of »e«tiera i ^ e h eould ba axpaotad 
to ayapathiaa with Ueatasn atfiUMnta in the eoid war* diapoaed 
tha yaatam powara partioyiariy the United Statee to Mke tha 
fu i iea t tiae of tha United Nationa to at ore pointa off tha 
Conmmiat Uerid and i t a polieiaa* HenoOf the United i tatea ef 
Aoariea aponaorad and oreated the "L i t t l e Aeae«biy* and tha 
"Uniting F(Hr i^aoe Heaolwtian" of November* f9S0* both deaigned 
to Make the General A«eeMbly in active operation to keep peaee 
and diapute-reeelvins organ in order to avoid the Soviet veto in 
the Seourity Council* But* thia role beoaMe no Mere workable 
with the adMiaaion of inoreaaing nua^ra of deooloniaed Afro-
Aaian States into the United Nationa in the late l95(Xa and early 
1960e. 
The United Nations in this respeet has involved 
i t e e l f la a nuMber of %aoe Keeping operationa in whioh a 
syeteMatie analyaia of four of eueh operationa in Lebanon in 
1950* in the Congo in 1960* in Waat Jrian and Cyprua* ia ^mtf 
Mueh uaeful for etudiea in thia Chapter* ^aoe keeping 
(K ) 
ofi«vatian« hava so far provsd •xtrvMljr ysafui in e«rtain 
eonfXiot • i tuat ion* Th«y « » » for tt)c««pX«» an in«ii«p«n««bX« 
patt of th« Mintsnanea of cii»ttngeQ«Mn% fweot aQraaMifit* ftnd 
ttM a«areh for tatt iaaant «• tfw <»•• noif in U«ak A«ia and 
Cyprua* But i t haa to te notadi howovaVf that tha Unitad Nationa 
paaoa-^kaaping ia a t i i i an ad hoe axpadiantt twabia only whan a l i 
tha partiea to a eonfliot aooopt i t * 
Chaptar IV ia ahottt tha Uaat Aaia laatia whieh 
haa baan kaot ainca 1949 unaolvad* I t ia about tye t»anafor«a* 
t ional hou ^ l e a t i n a uaa tranaforiiad into lataaX (or a Zioniat 
Stata) baekad an^ ehariahad by the Unitad Stataa and aana ^ i t a 
ai l iaoy and la ta t m by tha Unitad Haiiona i t a a l f • I t waa y i th 
tha Unitad Nationa raaolution oaXiinQ fist part i t ion of %iaatino 
that the reourrino oonfXiota Imtuaan tha ^raba and XaraaX atavtai 
Tha aaoond tyanafornation ia tha roXa of tha Saeurity CouneiX 
undar i ta raaoXution 242 of 22nd i^ovanbart 1967» fov gatting a 
Justi f ied aattXanant in order to bring a Xaating paaea and ordar 
in tha araa* Sut again* tha United Nationa repeated i ta error 
ytmn the roaoXution 242 ignorea the Xegiti«ate mnd inaXienabXa 
righta of the Arab peopXa of %Xaatine* The reaoXution 
Mentioned the f^iXaatiniana aa "refugeee" whiXe in faot» 
eonatitute the cere of the nain oonfXiet* The A tab eountriaa 
invoXved in the naeaa of Arab Unity and aeourity when they 
oppoead part i t ion and the creation of a Zioniat atate in 
l^Xaatine* Oppoaition in this reapeet net onXy eonea froii the 
(xi) 
Arab* iMit 0V»n fr iM ttw Jciw o«fttr«» a8poeiaXJ.y •mifwnt o»itlo» 
and aQholaf* «• Alfred U l i v n t h a l and Qmotgu Stalner* Tha la tar t 
mo9 said at 1966 anniMl. Anaviean lavaali dialogua In lasasif 
ifhoaa papara and disotiasiorai tiara puiiliahad in tHa Aaarioan 
3awi«h Bi-yaakly (Fab* 24t 1969| pp. t3-30)« "The axi«t«nQ« of 
la raa l" , bm ln«i«tad» "is not foundod on logiOf i t hao no 
ordinary i eo i t imey ) thera io naithar in i t a aatabliahMont nor 
praaant »oc^ any avidont Justioa • tiiough there may ba an uttar 
naad and wondaroua ful f i l«ant»" 
TtHMif i t ia v9tY elaar that alX ttm aoetMKilation 
of diaputaa and eonfiiota in Maat Aaian ration atoM f ro* tha 
part i t ion at Palaatina and tha nathoc of i t a raaiiaation from 
tha 1948 war* Tha war daatroyad tha very foundation of tha 
United Nationa reaoltitiona and hae been in inexhatiatibia aoyree 
1^ a t i i i unraaolved and ever euitipiyinQ dieputea over frontiers{ 
3eruaaleiif Suex Canai ete*» which have already ied to four ware* 
The eituation in the area roMaina threatenins world peaee and 
seeurity t i l l Israel withdrawe i t a foroee from the Arab*oeoupied 
ter r i tor iee of 1967 aggreeeiont and reeogniaee the righte of the 
%leetiniane to determine their own future* Theee two eonditiom 
are very essential for Geneva i^aoe Conferenee i f the United 
States and Israel mn wi l l ing to aee Juatice »nfi oaaae exiat in 
Ueet Aeia* 
(jcii) 
Thft ynitad Nation* rols for «8iabli«hing 
p«ae« 8lth«» in ti^ eat <^ »i«i c» in any pari of tha worX4 ia 
vary India pa naatiia and naada tha halp and f u l l oooperation 
of a l l tha atataSf althat oantbava in tha United Nationa or 
not« Tha hoiMi for atieh a eoofiaration ia graat and tha world 
opinion faaling touarda tha Unitad Nationa ia growing nora 
and Iter* avtry now and than* PaaeOf Juatioat and tialfara 
ara tfw (ribjaetivaa ti^ioh ana in thia world naoda to aehiava* 
The Unitad Nationa ia tha nachinary for which auoh aiiw aay 
bo f u l f i l l a d by nankind in tha futura* H haa to raaain« t ( 
Btrangthan and to beeoaMi an affaotiwi world paaoa 8»ehimiryf 
C H A P T t f t - I 
JHL CHH8T£R 
ORIGIN AHO PRQtfISIUW9: 
The fai lurs of tha Uagua of Nationa to avert 
a Second Uorld Uac did not destroy the belief of nany that 
imly by a one forn of General Urganlsatlcm of States could a 
syeten of oollaetlvo security tm achieved uhieh ucwld protect 
the international eomnunity from the scourge of war* "Paradoxically, 
aa with the League before it» war provided the inpulse for creating 
a neu organization for peace*" 
Uhen Hitler attacked ^olandt the Uague of 
Nations had aliiost lHio(»e a defunct body* There was practically 
no hope of getting the League back to l i f e* Both in Magnitude and 
intensi ty i idea of establishing a rww world organisatim which 
could inspire hope and confidence in the teening Millions of 
everlaeting peacui gained importance* 
On January 6§ I941t President F«0* Roosevelt in 
his annual message to the Congress referred to the oelebrated 
fout Freedams which had been the casual i t ies of the War* These 
are I freedom of speech and expressioviy freedom of every persmi to 
Worship God in his own way, freedom from fear and freedom from want 
1* H.G* Wieholae. The United Nations Aa A Po l i t i ca l 
Inst i tut ion, (Oxford University Press, 1971) p* i . 
(2) 
On August 9, 1941» ths President suggested to the 
British Prism ninister» Winston Churchill, that "it uould be well 
i f thsy oould draw up a joint declaration laying down i^rtain broad 
.2 principles which should guide our pol ic ies along the same road*** 
This suggestion was aooeptsd by the British Prime ninister and on 
the following day he outlined a tentative declaration which 
provided "the substance and s p i r i t of what cane to be called the 
•Atlantic Charter."•* 
Un August 12f 1941* President Haosevelt and 
Prine Minister Winston Churchill on board the * Prince of 
Wales* in the Atlantic Uoean signed the Charter which embody 
"certain coomon principles in the national po l ic ies of their 
respective ctKintries on which they base their hopes for a better 
future for the world*" The Atlantic Charter had contributed to 
the "establistoent of a wider and permanent system of general 
securityt" {wnding which the aggressor nations must be disarmed; 
and t h i s reference obtained the approval of some forty five 
nations upon the adoption of the Declaration of United Natione cm 
2* Winston Churchill, The Second World War! Jfj/i qufVA 
Alliance. Vol* III Uondon* n«d*7 p* 339* 
3* ibJikf P* 340 
4* ik&lio P* 346. 
5. For the text of the Atlantic Charter, See Ai^ricain 
jO|l£I&i> Vol* 35 (1941) p. 191. 
(3) 
January 1« 1942* The noseoy Oeoiaration oontained a note apociflc 
pltfdget that tiva four govvrnnents partioipatlng in the conference 
recognized "the necessary of ostabiishing at the ear l i e s t 
practicable date a general international organisation* based on the 
principles of the sovereign equality of a l l peace-loving states» 
and open to the newbership by a l l such states* large and snal l i for 
the maintenance of international peace and security*" 
Following up this pledge* delegates of Great 
Britain! the United States^ and the Soviet Union iset at 
Dumbarton C k^s in Uashington* August 21 to September 28| 1944* 
and adopted proposals for the establishasint of a gerairal 
ins t i tut ional organization* known as "The Oumbarton Oaks proposals*** 
The propc^als were then subnitted to the four governments for their 
approval* and were subsequently coaununicated to other states which 
7 
had signed tlw declaraticm by United Nations* On April 25* 1945* 
the United Nations Conference on International Urganizaticm net at 
San Francisco, and on 2una 26* after two ncNiths of labour* the 
s tates representatives at the Conference adopted the 'Charter of thi 
a 
United lilations* as a formal international treaty* 
6* For the text of the Proposals* see Ibid*. Uol. 39* (l945) 
p. 42* See Reports of the Coomiasion for the Study of the 
Organisation of %aoe* Pts* I and IV* See a l so n*u,Hudson, 
Charter of the General International Organisation* 
^MBgJOTn JPUgniJlt Vol* 38 (1944), p* 711, and itZJjLLf»upp. 
P* 216. 
7* For the text of the Declaration* see rt(ffey|c§n 3otfFniJL» 
Wol. 38 (l944)* p* S* 
8* Hambro and Goodrich, Phffigttff 9f tht. Mnllgct fi»^ti9n§' 
g«ffiffintffY and Qffgvmgntff* U>lorld Peace Faundation*Boston* 
• •4 
(4) 
The Praanble of the United Natione begins uords 
aodeXed upcan the opening words of the constitution of the 
United States *Ue the people of the United Nations** No epeoial 
Juridical character i s to be attached to tNi phrase» in as nueh as 
the various delegations were appointed by their respective 
governaentSf a nu«ber of which oould with di f f icul ty be said to 
be legal equivalent of **the peoples*" nor i s any special Juridical 
character to be attached to the varicHJs obligations proclaised in 
the preanble since these are sst forth in aore spec i f i c terms in 
the opening ar t i c l e s of the Charter i t se l f* 
According to tliohelbergert i t i s not by accident 
that the Charter of the U«N« begins with thB phrasesi *we the 
Peoples of the United Nations** instead of beginning with the 
phrase of the i^ague Covenant* *The high contracting parties*' In 
the f inal analysisi he saysi i t i s up to the statesmen and the 
pieople they represent to make a success of the U*N** 
According to Sohuaan» however* the phrase* 'ue 
the peoples of the United Nations* i s misleading* since thoee 
9. See Stett inius* fffpogt tiff ttm *^ft4tfintf where the 
background of the Charter i s given and ttHi text of 
*-he document i s printed side by side with the Dumbarton 
oroposale* Also Goodrich and t^mbro* and Anne 
CMytBf of t h i "f^<t< gPMjnl^rYMtnri PfffiUfMnliBt 
-*4 York* Columbia University ^reas* 1969)* 
MtNt Jh9 fiyat Titftnty Yt^Mi 
(Sterling Publishers Delhi*1966)* 
(s) 
who draftttd i t spoke for governoentst not peoples and established 
not a federation of peoples but a league of States* ful f i laent of 
the hopes of i t s founders required continuing cooperation aacmg 
I t 
great powers* With the advent at *cold war*» these hopes faded* 
Uhatever the interpretation of the Preanble night 
be» the fact remains that a i l l i ons of people a l l over this world 
are pined for a world organisation whioh wi l l Bt»utB peac» snd 
aeourity and that the charter re f lec ts the prevailing siood of 
nankind in spite of the many fai lures and frustrations which the 
organisatifMi suffered from tiaw to tine* 
Tiw purposes of the United Nations are sat forth 
in Article I under four heads: ( l ) To naintain peace and securityf 
which i s to be attained by "col lect ive neasures" to prevent acts 
of aggression and by bringing about tNi peaceful ssttlearant of 
international disputes! (2) To develop friendly relaticms "based 
CK1 respect for the principle of equal rights and self-deterninatioi 
of peoples'*f (3) t o achieve cooperation in solving internatiomil 
problene *of an eoononioi social* cultural , as hunanitarian 
character' and in pronoting 'respect for hunan rights and for 
fundaoental freedoms'; and (4) to be a centre for harnonising the 
actions of nations in the attainnent of these eoanon ends* 
11* Fredrick, L* Schunan, IptiynftUQn^l P ^ I I U M 
(International Student Edit ion/ , ((loGraw Hi l l , Tokyo, 
1958), p* 227* 
* • vd 
(6) 
The principles 8«t forth in ArtloXa 2 b«ar 
ohisfly upon the f ir»t of th« purposes of th« United Nations, 
the naintsnano* of pesos and security* The iRenibers of the 
organisstion pledge thenselves to s e t t l e their disputes by 
pesoeful nesfls; they agree to refrain fron the use of force 
against the t err i tor ia l integrity or po l i t i ca l independence of 
any s ta tes and they pledge thenselvss to give every assistance to 
the United Nations in Measures taken for the naintenanoe of peace 
and to refrain frcw giving assistance to any state against uhioh 
the United Nations i s taking preventive or enforcement action* 
tes t t ^ r e be any Misunderstanding as to the e f fec t of these 
principles upon the fundanental relationships of the aeabers of 
the United Nations under exist ing international laut the l i s t of 
principles begins with the statement that *ThB Organisation i s 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of a l l i t s 
w b . r . . * 1 ' Thl. p> i» . ip l . 1 . rutth.r .U.ngth .ned by t h . 
provision of the las t paragraph of the Art ic le , which provides 
12* yhsther the principle of **the sovereign equality" of 
the nenbers of the United Nations i s the sane as the 
principle of "the sovereignty and equality" of the 
sembors i s nc»e than a iKitter of wwds* out for the 
present i t i s only an acadeoic interest* The tern 
"Sovereign eouality" was interpreted at the conference 
to include I ( l ) that the s tates are Juridically equal 
(2) that each state enjoys the right inherent in fu l l 
sovereignty (3) that the personality of the s tate i s 
respected, as well as i t s t err i tor ia l integrity and 
po l i t i ca l independence) (4) that the etate ehould under 
international order oonply fa i thful ly with i t e 
internatitmal duties and obligatimui* See United 
!<flfeiOfia P^nfgygnfifty PP» 483 , 497, 548* 
. . . 7 
(7) 
that "Nothing eontainod in the present Charter shail authorise 
the United Mationa to intervene in aattere uhioh are esoentiaXiy 
within the domstio Jurisdietion of any state or shall require the 
13 
nenbers to subiiit suoh matters to settlenent**/ hut th is 
far-reaching provision i s qualified to the extent that i t shal l 
not prejudice t^ w applioation of enforoeoent loeasures under 
Chapter VXI. 
The Charter of the United Nations «akes a dist inct ion 
betiMon original neobers of the United Nations and States 
subsequently acbsitted to neoibership* Original nieiibsrs are s tates 
uhioht having participated in the Conference at San Francisco or 
having previously signed the Declaration by United N«tic»ia of 
January tt I942t have signed and rat i f ied the Charter* Provision 
i s nade that nsnbership shal l be open to a l l other "peace-loving 
states" uhich accept the obligations of the Charter and which in 
the 3udgei»nt of the organization, are able and wil l ing to carry 
out these obligatitms* Iha deternination of these conditions 
t3« This i s a highly debatable provisiont and i t was 
adopted <mly after long discussion and the conproaise 
of confl ict ing opinions* See Stettiniua Report. pp*42-4S 
Goodrich and HanbrOf jga* et^t*. p. 72* See United 
Nations Conferencef PP« i62» 499, S88 ff* 
14* The original ccmdition laid down in tiwi Dunbarton Uaks 
proposals was that menbership should be open "to a l l 
peace-loving states*" The condition obviously had 
po l i t i ea l rather than legal connotations* It nay be 
otoerved that at the eteeting of the Security Council on 
August 29, 1946, when the admission of Portugal, Eire, 
and other States was refused, the reason given had no 
relaticm to the "peace-loving" Character of those states 
a 
(8) 
ia t o tM by aooUion of the General i^aaambXy upon reeoMBendatlon 
of the Security Council* neinbership in the organization ie thue 
qualified and l in i tedt and i t ia thereforet for the t i«e tseing not 
ooterisinoue with the nenberahip in the comtaunity or faoily of 
nationat although the Charter clearly proapecta that in due t ioe 
a l l atatea u i l l iseoonNB n^mbere of the Organization* 
In accordance with the f irat principte of aovereign 
equality of a l l atatea» Bmnbera have been accorded equal 
repreaentation in the General Assembly and are ent i t l ed to 
equality of votea* But the preponderant role of the Big five in 
the Security Council ariaing out of their veto poumt ooaproniaea 
to a great extent the principle of aovereign equality of a l l atatea* 
As Nichelae obaerveai "The veto in the Security Council a t i l l 
proteeta the Great Pouera but at the expenae of heightening the 
diaparity between then and tim other neobera, not only of the 
General Asaembly but of the Security Council itaelf*"^^ 
The working of the United Mationa during the las t 
thirty yeara hae revealed that the caemitinenta of the aeiibera to 
f u l f i l in good fai th their obligations aa set forth in the Charter 
hae been and i s a pious hope* Aenbers have shc^ itn scant regard to 
th i s obligation being nore interested in the struggle for pOMir and 
in establishing s trateg ic frontiers* 
15. Quoted in H.C. Nicholas. Thg Mnittg %t49rtl ^i ft 
gffUtJlBiA IqjfcitUi^gn (second edi t ion, Oxford University 
Pressy l.ondon» 1962;, p. 3&« 
. . . 9 
(9) 
HcNMVcrt the Charter has drawn certain aethoda 
for th« pacifio settleawnts of disputes asiong flsflibsrestates* 
Tlwss ars 'negotiation^ enquiryi nediationt coneiliaticmy 
arbitration! Judicial settlanentt resort to regional agencies 
or arrangenentst or other peaceful neane of their own choice** 
For developing friendly relations aiiong nations i t i s eseential 
that the nenber-£»tates should make a aolumn pledge not to use 
force in order to s e t t l e a dispute in a particular uay* It i s 
a l so very necessary for the nesbers to respect the t err i tor ia l 
integrity and po l i t i ca l inchapendenoe of any state* 
The iflinediate and noet urgent; and in that sense 
the primary objective af international, as of nunicipal lay, 
muat consist in the preventicm of act of violence* Without that 
condition a l l progress in cooperation for preservation and 
pronotion of Gonman interests mum% remain at a s tandst i l l* Hencst 
in case of the Uorld %aoe and security9 the Charter of the United 
Naticms placed such primary responsibil ity upon the Security 
Council* The mmbers of the United Nations which are not members 
of the Security Council agree that the lat tert in carrying out i t s 
17 
duties in this reapectf acta on their behalf* The Charter meets 
the problem of peaces and security f i r s t by detailed provisions for 
the pacif ic settlement of disputaa* and secondly by equally 
detailed provisions for action by the Security Council in the 
events of threats to or breach of the peace* The parties to any 
16* Art. 33* 
17. Art. 34. 
13 
(1Q) 
di8put0v the oontinuanca of whioh i s iikaXy to endangvr th* p«ao0» 
agroe f i r s t of a l l t o ttek a solution by ono or other of the various 
procedure available*^^ On i t s partt the Security Council has the 
right to investigate any dispute in order to deteraine whether i t s 
continuanoe i s l ike ly to endanger the peace and i t has a l so the 
right at any stage of dispute» to reeooNBend appropriate procedures 
or methods of aettleraent*' In the event of a failuro of the 
parties to a dispute to s e t t l e i t by any of the various peaceful 
proceduresy tlwy agree to refer i t to the Security Counoili and the 
Security Council aay^ i f i t oonsiders that the ccmtinuancw of the 
dispute i s l ikely to enckinger the peaoe* intervene and either 
reooiMMind appropriate prooadure or suoh terns of aettlenent as i t 
20 
may oonaider appropriate under the oirounetances* 
Failing a sottlenont of a dispute between the 
partisSf i t remains for the Security CcMtnoil to determine whether 
tirm s i tuation cimstitutes a threat to the {%aee» and s o , what 
21 
neasuras nt^t be taken to oaintain thi peace? Provisional 
i^saaures isay be agreed upon and the Security Council nay ca l l upon 
22 
the parties to c(»ply with then* These failing* the Security 
Council nay decide upon neasures not involving the use of arned 
18* Art. 34* 
19. Art. 36. 
20. Art. 37. Hawbro and Goodrich, Ion. Cit* p. 140-1S4. 
See a l so C. Cagleton 'The Jurisdiction of the Security 
Council over disputes % 'Effigyigan,,PffMrna.l Vol. 40 (1946), 
513. 
21. Art. 39. 
22. Hrt. 40. 
11 
(11) 
foroas;^'^ but i f theaa •hould prov« inadaqtiats the Security 
Council nay than 'take auoh action by air» aea» or land forces as 
nay be naeessary to maintain or to teatora internationai peace and 
Security**^^ In this latter oaae the nenbers of the United 
Maticwa agree to nake available to the Security Counoilf on ita 
call in aeccxrdanoc with special agraanent tat agreementst the ar»ed 
forces» asaistancw and fac i l i t ies necessary to siaintain the peace* 
The agreenente referred are to govern the specific detaila of the 
foreea, asaietance and fac i l i t ies to be provicted; and they are to 
be negotiated as socm aa possible on the init iative of the Security 
Council and when so negotiated they shall be subject to 
ratificatiCM by the signatory states , in accordance with their 
2S 
respective constitutional procedures* National air force 
contingencies are to be held immediately available for urgent 
military meaaures* 
23* Art. 41* 
24. Art. 42. 
25. Art. 43. Art. 44. Attempts to aseure states which 
are net members of t ^ Security Council that their 
c(»itingents will not be improperly employed by 
requiring that the Council* before calling upon the 
member to provide armed forc»8t shall invite i t to 
participate in the decisions of tha Council c«icerning 
the employment of the contingents. 
26. Art. 45. 
12 
(12) 
A novttX fsatursa of the anforovtwnt provislona of 
tha Chartsr lo the oreation of a Military Staff CcMieittee which 
i s to advio« and a s s i s t ths Security Council on a i l questions 
27 
relating to the ar«»d forces islaeed at the disposal of the latter* 
It consists of the ehis fs of s taff of the permanent neoibers of the 
Security Couneilf although other nenbers of t)w United Nati(Mis May 
be invited to attend when the e f f i c i ent discharge of the ooamittee's 
respons ib i l i t i es so requires* The eowBittea i s given pouer to 
establ ish regional sub-cosmittes t subject to the approval of the 
Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regicmal 
28 
agencies* 
While the general obligations of a l l of the members 
of the United Nations etmoerning enforcement measures are the samst 
provision i s made that the Security Council may determine in each 
case which particulars are to carry out i t s decisions* Action may 
be taken directly or thrmjgh an international agency of which the 
29 
statas are members* In caaa the enforcement measures should 
enta i l economic hardship for a particular memberi i t may consult 
with the Security Council with regard t o a solution of i t s 
problema* r ina l ly , the Charter reserves to the raembere of the 
2T. ^rt* 47* 
20* This provision was accepted as a amendment to the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposalst and i t gives recognition to 
the role of regitmal groupSf which* in accordance with 
Article S3t are to be u t i l i t e d by the Security Council foff enforcement action where appropriate* 
29* Art* 48* 
33* Art* SO* This article had ite inspiration in the 
experience of the Uiague of Nations in connection with 
the sanctions applied against Italy in 1935* 
• ..13 
(13) 
United Nations 'The inhorent right of individual as ooii0ctiv« 
a8lf*dafane«* if an armod attack ahould occur against th«», until 
auoH tins as the Security Council has taken the neceaaary tteasures 
to naintain peace and security* ^ny ineasures were taken liuat be 
reported to the Security Couneil* ami SHtat not in any way i i e i t 
or qualify i t s responsibility to take such action as i t my deem 
31 
iaportant* 
International cooperation in tNi eccmoaiic» social 
and other sinilar fields i s referred to in general teriis in the 
Chapter (Xtf) dealing with the Geiwral Aas i^iihly and again «ore 
specifically0 in the Chapter (IX) dealing with "international 
economio and social cooperation*** Here the primary condition i s 
laid doiim that such cooperation shall be directed to the neinte** 
nance of peaceful and friendly relatiONie amoi^ } natione 'based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self"determination 
32 
ef peoplee'* "^  The condition ie a broad one and i t ia assumed 
31* Art* 51* It may be compared the detailed provisions 
of Chapter VXI of the Chartor with the eummary 
provisicms of «^rtiole 16 of the Covenant of the Uiague* 
Uhile the Charter does not contain a specific Quarantae 
to protect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the members of the United Nations 
against aggression as in the case of Article tO of the 
Covenanti i t assures such proteeticm indirectly* firet 
by the pledge of the individual members of the United 
Nations to refrain from the use of force and secondly 
by the measures which the Sscurity Council i s empowered 
to take to awet violations of these pledges* See 
Goodrich and HambrOf JBQL* sJXxt PP* 151-181* 
32* Art* 55* 
14 
(14) 
that i f reafrifn«d both th« principle of tho Sovereign oquaiity 
of states* prooiained in Artioia (2) and the prinoipXe of non* 
intervention *in natters yhioh are easentiaiXy yithin the doaeatic 
33 Jurisdiction of any state** Besponaibility for the disotarge 
of functions relating to tte fields of eocmoMio and social 
cooperation iSf as has been 8een» vested in the General Assenblyt 
and» under i t s authorityt in the &conoiiic and Social Council* The 
function of the Cconoaio and Social Council parallel those of the 
Goneral Assenbly in respect to the initiation of studies and 
reports and the Miaking the reoomaendations* Specific provision 
io laade that the Council AKI/ prepare draft conventions for 
suboisaion to the General Assembly» and that i t nay call an 
internaticmal conferences cm natters falling uithin i t s conpetence* 
The preparation of these draft conventions ia further evidence 
that the reocnnendatione of the Gerwral Assenbly are not to have 
the force of lawmaking agreenentSy but that in e l l natters uhioh 
involve the assunpticm of new legal obligations the proceifcire will 
be favoured of subnitting the proposed agreenent to the ratif ica-
tion of the nenbers of %tm United Aiatiwis in their character ae 
35 
ftgaayate fltattit 
33* This umild seen to confirn the inference that all 
reocnnendatione of tim Csnsral Assenbly yhieh have the 
effect of changing the rules of International law nuat 
be approved by the individual nenbers of the United 
Nations* 
34. Art. 62. 
35* Ho prwision i s mde in the Charter for deterninAng 
the minber of ratificatione rwcessary to bring a 
particular ctmvention into effectt thus leaving the 
Asaanbly free to decide that q(»etion according to the 
particular character of the convention* 
• • • 
15 
(IS) 
Tha functions of ths United Natlana ocncsrning 
the trusteeship agreenentsy to be entered into for all areas 
not deeignated as "strataglo"» are to be execolaed tay the General 
Aeaeablyy which ie to be assisted by the Trusteeship Council 
3fi 
operating under i t s authcnrity* Detailed provisions are se t 
forth in the Charter with respect to the various trusteeship 
agreeiwntsy the terr i tor ies to be placed under the trusteeship 
systeiBt the aanner of their adainistration and the duties of the 
37 
administering authority* ^oth the Gerraral Assenbly and the 
Council are authorized t o supervise the administration of the 
trust territcnaeet while the council i s called upon to formjlate 
questionnaire on the status of the inhabitants of each trust 
territory* upon the basis of which tNet administering authorities 
are to make annual reports to the General rtssenbly for the trust 
38 t err i tor i e s within ttw competence of the Assembly* 
A separate chapter of the Charter deals with a 
number of mis eel lane (Mis relations between the members and the 
Urganisation* In tiw f i r s t place* provision i s made for the 
36. Mrt. 85* 
37. A r t . 75-34. 
38. Art. 87-91. See R.a. Sunohe* IffyateglhAg ftOd Nftniliif' 
Uovarnino Territories in the Charter of tbm Unitad |!(aJut9£Uit COepartiaent of State Bul let in, Vol. XII i ; , 
p. 1037. See £.H. Aj^ matrong and U^F, CarQO* T ^ 
inauouration of the Truateeahio avetem nf tha United 
M i i l ^ Ifek*.. Wol. XVl, p. 511. 
16 
(16) 
39 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of t r a a t i s a with tha Secretar ia t * Instead of the 
provisicm in th» Covenant of the league of Nations that a t rea ty 
ehouXd not be binding unXeee so registeredf the Charter provides 
tha t a party t o a t rea ty or agreement that has not been registered 
may not 'invoke that t rea ty of agreement befiwa any organ of the 
United Nations** Seoondiy* i n the event of a c o n f l i c t between the 
obl igations of members under the Charter and t h e i r obligations 
under any in te rna t iona l agreement* the obligations of the Charter 
are to p reva i l * Thi rd ly* the organisation i s to enjoy in the 
t e r r i t o r y of each of i t s mewbers 'suoh l ega l capacity as may be 
necessary for the exercise of i t s function and the fu l f i lment of 
i t s purposes** as wel l as such pr iv i leges and immunities are 
fundamental for the fu l f i l amnt of i t s purposes* the l a t t e r provisia 
being extended t o the representatives of the d i f f e r e n t members and 
t o the s t a f f o f f icers of the World Body*^ 
The provisions of the Charter i n accordance with 
which membership i n the Organisation i s separate and d i s t i n c t 
from menbership in t t o eoeeiunity of naticms are accompanied by 
provisions for the suspension from the exercise of the r ights and 
39 . f^rt* t32* 
40 . A r t . 103. 
4 1 . Art * 104* 105* See I * Preuse* 'Immunity of o f f icers 
and Employeee of the United Nations for o f f i c i a l Acts: 
The Ranallo Case** Amariean Journal , Uo l . 41 ( l 9 4 7 ) , 
p* 555* 
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pr iv i lages of neaberahip i n the oaae of menbors against which 
preventive or enforcenent act ion has been taken by the Security 
Counoil*^^ SuapenaicNi i s e f fected by act ion of the General 
Asaembly upon the reconmendation of the Security Council* The 
exercise of r ights and pr iv i leges uhioh have been suspended may 
be restored by the Security Council* Roreovert i t i s fur ther 
provided that a nenber which haa ' f ^ r s i s t e n t l y v i o l a t e d ' the 
pr inc ip les contained in tim Charter »ay be expel led fron the 
Organisation by the General Aesembly upon recommendation of the 
Securi ty Council* This ia a fa r reaching proviaion« in as much as 
the pr inciples set f o r t h in A r t i c l e (2) are phrased in general 
t e rns i leaving much l a t i t u d e of i n t e r p r e t a t i t m * Protection agains' 
abuse of provision» houevert is to be found i n the voting 
major i t ies necessary in tfw Security Council and i n the General 
Assembly* 
The Charter i8» of course» a m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t y 
establ ishing the r igh ts and duties of tfm signatory states« i t 
42* Art* 5 . 
43* The provisions for the expulsion of numbers met 
with sharp opposition frc»i a mmbmt of the delegations 
a t San francisco* l%re suspension would s t i l l leave 
the 8»eber subject to the obligations of the Charter* 
whereas expulsion would leave to the s ta te ccMiplete 
freedom of act ioni and maasuree t o control i t s conduct 
would have t o be taken outside t^» frame work of the 
Charter* noreovert the necessity of expulsion i n a 
par t icu la r ease would suggest that the organisation dii 
not have wi th in i t s e l f ttm means to secure the 
Observance of i t s obl igat ions* See MoitaxLiilJLlaflft 
gpnfggBnoi* 537» S27* 
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la not* hoiAsvart subject to reservation or denunoiation« although* 
despite the absencn of a *uithdraual* clauae» i t may be essumed 
that legal ly a State can withdraw subject to i t s fulf i laent of any 
outstanding obligations* suoh i t s budgetory conmitnents* A 
withdrawal could* however* be p o l i t i c a l l y aiore d i f f i c u l t than in 
the case of the teagutt and i t i s probably true that exclusion from 
the United (Nations i s po l i t i ca l ly disadvantageous* th is i s 
synptofliatio of the relat ively oiore inportant role which the United 
Nations plays in international relations than did the League* The 
Covenant of the i-eague of Nations had nade provision for the 
withdrawal of a member after two years notice of i t s intention 
to do s o ; and i t was further provided that while amendments to the 
Covenant vavm not binding upon a particular member which eignif ied 
i t s dissent from the amendments* in such ease i t should cease to 
44 be a member of t ^ League* ^t the San Francisco Conference a 
number of delegations smght to prohibit withdrawal absolutely* 
others sought to permit withdrawal in the event of the adopticm 
of airandmnts which tNiy found i t impossible to accept; othere 
held that in tt% lat ter case the right of withdrawal could be 
implied from the kind of organisation that was being established?^ 
44. Convenant Hrts* 1 (3)* 26* 
45. See stettinius* £.R.* a*a, Rgffwt %9 the Pgef^dant 
m %M f^M9M,s, fff %im Hn fMnatoaft ^mfannoat 
Department of state Publication 2349 vyashington* 
194S)* PP« 47-^9« See Goodrich and Hambro* Xoc. Cit«» 
pp, 66*89, 
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It was finally agreed that no express provision should be made 
in the Charter either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal frotn the 
organisationt and a formal statement was made to that effect by the 
committee* The statement recognizes that 'exceptional circum-
stances' might make a member feel constrained to withdraw* Qn the 
other hand withdrawal or some other form of dissolution would be 
obviously inevitable if the organisation 'was revealed to be 
unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the expense of 
law and justice*' (lore serious from a legal standpointi is 
the right of withdrawal recognised in the event of the adoption of 
amendments to the Charter in which the particular state has not 
Occurred and which it finds itself unable to accepti or in the 
event that an amendment duly adopted fails to ensure the 
ratification necessary to bring the amendment into effect* These 
serious structural weaknesses in the Charter are to be explained 
by the paradoxical circumstances under which it was drawn upt the 
general recognition of the need of establishing an organisation 
while public opinion in certain countries was still influenced by 
the disasterous effects of the uar^ and on the other hand the 
mutual lack of confidence in an organisation established under 
conditions of urgency which precluded clarification of certain 
basic issues* 
46. Stettinious, Op*cit». p* 48* See United Nations 
Conference, pp* 506, 525, 578, 595* 
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The Ctiart«r ia a l so the basic constitutional 
docuaant of th« organiaation and* aa auoh* i t haa an inherently 
dynamic character quite unlit« the noiriRal multi lateral treaty* 
The Organisation created by tha Charter ia not a *super s t a t e ' or 
any thing resetabling a uorld Qovernnent* H ia f i r s t and formoat 
a co l lec t ive security systen for more centralised than the League* 
The Saourity Council can take decisions binding on the nembersi but 
in the laain, the Charter provides special forms of cooperation 
betueen sovereign states* supplementing the tradit ional nethoda of 
inter*8tate intercourse and extending into f ie lds of soc ia l and 
economic affairs yhich l i e outside a system of co l lec t ive securityi 
This reliance on cooperation c^ an be regfrded ao liiaitation on the 
powers of the urganisatiwi but i t i s at the same time be regarded 
as a characteristic of any organisation to which sovereign powers 
are not delegated by members* 
It follous» thersforsf that since each taembar remains 
80vereign« the organisation as such has no conpatenoe in matters 
within the domestic jurisdict ion of a state* Thus Article 2 (7) 
provides: 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter 
ehall authorise t i^ United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are esaent ial ly within the 
domestic Juriadiction of any state or shal l 
require t i^ Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but th is 
principle shal l not prejudice the appreciation 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII*** 
21 
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In rsviouing ttw praotioa uncfor thm above 
referred art io le cme finde the indication of the bi t ter 
eofitroversiee irhieh have arioen over the question of oonpetanoe* 
The Assenbly's reooRunendation in Oeeenber 1946 that Spain be 
debarred fron nenbership of any international organiaatlon or 
eonferenos under the auepioes of the United Matlone» the 
disouasion on the treatmnt of Indians within the Union of South 
Africa^ or on the policy of apartheid pursued by the governnent o 
the Union, the discussion of the Tunisian^ dorocean and Algerian 
questionsf and eventually of the Cyprus questionp have given 
forward strong protests fron the governmints concerned* HcHievert 
i t nayt of oourset be argiMd that discussion as such can never 
constitute 'intervention* and this therefore, not prohibited by 
47 the art ic le* Certainly an issue which threatens international 
peace and eeeurity would, ipsofaete, cease to be a natter of 
dtmestic a f fa irs i that i s clearly recognised by the proviso to 
Article 2 (7) regarding enforoeiient neasures* Equally where a 
s tate has asstunad treaty obligations with respect to a certain 
matter i t can no longer maintain that the matter i s exclusively 
within the domestic Jurisdicticm* But bey mid t h i s , the applicati 
47. Uuter Pacht, Lntsmatignfti^ ^M inti Huro^ n <^ lahfea (n*p« 1930;, p* 166 §ji» a,pq.* 
48* As in the Congo, the Security Council orders 
"Provisional Bwasures" under ^tt» 40, since these 
do not have the character of "enforcement action*" 
The proviso to Art* 2(7) does not apply the principle 
of non-intervention conetitutes a l imit upon tNi power 
of the Organisation* 
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of th« ar t i c l e ia aore a mat tor for po l i t i ca l Judgosiont than 
legal interpretation* Action by the Asaembly which night drive 
imBibera out of the Organiaation ia of queationable value although* 
i t nuat be aaid franklyt the Aesenbly ahould never decline to do 
i t s responaibility in taking up the matter ainply beoauae to do ao 
would incur the diapleaaure of a particular atate* The rmad here 
ia a proper balance to be adopted between the dutiea of the 
Aesenbly in order not to becooe a foruai in which onee atate «iay 
aeak to enbarraaa another with which i t haa po l i t ioa l differeneea* 
Another general l i a i ta t ion on the powera of the 
Organiaation appeara from the normal principle of the law 
treatieay the Charter# aa a treaty« can not bind non-nembera* 
Generally apeakingt the Organiiation nuat proceed on the baaia 
that the Charter obligationai where there go beyond the 
obligationa of general international lawf do not bind non-nenlMr* 
However9 in Article 2 (6) i t ia provided that) 
**The Organiaation ahall enaure that atatea 
which are not nenbere of the United Nationa 
act in aooordanoe with theae prinoiplea ao 
far aa nay be necxiaaary for the maintenance 
of international peace and aecurity*" 
Although thia doea represent a technical 
variation from the maxim stated above* the po l i t i ca l 
juat i f icat ion for aaserting the |»rimaoy of the intereata of 
the Organiaation in maintaining world peace and aecurity ia a 
recogniaed fact which ahould not be denied* 
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REVISIUW QF TfC CHAHT£«; 
Anot^lar featura of the Charter yhlch dsservss 
to nsntiofi is» the provision for i t s ravision by a General 
Confsrsn^ of the meaibers of the Qrganiaation* Thia provision 
was included for nesting the bel ief of aone of the delegates to th 
San Franciaoo Conference that the di f f icul ty of creating an 
international organisation under the eirounstanees then exist ing 
made i t favourable for re-exaaination as a whole at a later date 
in the l ight of experience that night be found in the tranaitional 
stage* The Aasembly 8»y ca l l such a conference upon vote of two* 
thirds of i t s nembers and by a vote of any seven nesbers of the 
Security Council* Alterations in the Charter nust be voted by 
two-thirds of the menbers of the Conferenoey and when so adopted 
they must be submitted for rat i f icat ion under the same conditions 
as amendments adopted by the AsQambly i t se l f* In order to flwet 
the desire of certain delegations to fix a spec i f ic date for the 
cal l ing of a conference to revise the Charteri provision was Mtde 
that i f such a conference should not tm held before the tenth 
annual session of the Asssnblyf a proposal t o ca l l i t should be 
placed on the agenda of the Assembly and the decision to ca l l i t 
shcHjld be by a majority vote instead of the two-thirds vote needei 
on other occasions* 
108 
Article/of the Charter provides for tiw amendment of 
the Charter* It sayss 
49. Arts. 1Q8, 109. 
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"Amandmanta to tha ptesant Charter shal l 
cosie into fores for a l l nembers of the 
United Nations uhan they have toen adopted 
by a vote of tuo thirds of the oeBbere of 
the General Aaasobly and rat i f ied in 
accordance with their respective oonetitu* 
tional processes by tuo-thirds of the 
reembera of the United Nations» including 
a l l the permanent sieaibors of the Security 
Council •** 
Butt the fact of the poss ibi l i ty of making a radical 
change to al ter the Chartert i s very d i f f i cu l t because issues 
are not Judged on their oun merits in this respect but are vlowc 
according to the interests of the rival blocs especial ly between 
the Super*pouer3» Thersfare> i t i s said that amending procedure 
of the Charter i s to be amended f i r s t before any general revisioi 
of the Charter* Cven at th is s tage; i t needs complete under-
standing and fu l l sfremmenta among the *Big Tive" who have the 
veto powers* Houever» since the Charter was signed on 26 3une 
1945t the following minor amendments were adopted< 
Amendments to Articles 23> 27» 61 of the 
Charter were adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 
1963 and came into force on 31 August 1965* The amendment to 
Article 103, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 196S 
and came into force on 12 ^une, 1966* 
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Th9 anendftant to Article 23 enlarges the 
Bembership of the Security Council fvcm eleven to fifteen* 
The anended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security 
Council on procedural matters shal l tm made by an affitmttive vote 
of nine nenbers (fornerly seven) and on a l l other natters by an 
affirorative vote of nine neMtwrs (fornerly seven)t including the 
concurring votes of the five permanent members of t t e Security 
Council* 
The anendntent to Article 61 enlarges the menbership 
of the £cononic and Social Council fron eighteen to tuentyeeven 
and later anmndmint to f i f ty four* 
The aiaendaent to Article ^09, which relates to 
the f i r s t paragraph of that Hrticle provides that a General 
Conference of flembsr States for the purpose of reviewing the 
Charter may be ii^ld at a date and place to t^ i fixed by a two 
thirds vote of the nembers of the General Aasembly and by a vote 
of any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council* 
Paragrotph 3 of the Article 109, which deals with the consideratiQ 
of a pCMisible review conference during the tenth regular session 
of the General Assenblyt has been retained in i t s original form i 
i t s reference to a *vota of any seven nembers of the Security 
Council** the paragraph having been acted upon in 19S5 by the 
General Aaeenblyt at i t s tenth regular ssssiont and by the 
Security Council*S3 
SO* The Charter^ (office of Public Information, United 
MationSy \IQU York, n.d»;» 
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However* owing to the admission of many s tates 
frcm the Third Uorld as eieiRbers of the United Nations after 
they succeeded t o achieve their national independence from 
colonial rulet tNi idea of reviewing the Charter of t\rm United 
Nations gains nore support which nade the General Assenbly to pass 
resolution 3349 (XXIX)* In i t decides to establ ish an Ad Hoc 
Ccmiaittee on t^ w Charter of tiw United NationSf consisting of 42 
aembers to be appointed by the president of the General Aasenbly 
with due regard for thm principle of equitable geographical 
diatribution» with the following a iost 
**(a) To discuss in detai l the observations received 
from Governoients I 
(b) To consider any additional , spec i f ic proposals 
that Qoverniaent nay make with a view to enhancing 
the ab i l i ty of the United (Nations to achieve i t s 
purposes; 
(o) To consider a lso other suggestions for the more 
ef fect ive functioning of the United Nations that 
laay not roquira anendiMrnta to the Charter! 
(d) To enumerate the proposal which have ensure partloula 
interest in the Ad Hoc Coswiitteet*^^ 
The resolution 3349 (XXXX) of 17 December 1974 
invited the Secretary Gsneral t o submit to the ^d Hoo Ccmmittee 
51* General Assembly o f f i c ia l records: Thirtieth Session* 
Supplement No* 33 (^1/10033) United Nations* See 
Appendix A. 
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his vl9y» as appropriats on ttm oxpsrieneo aoquirect in ilw 
application of ttm provision of thm Charter* * The Asssabiy 
aiso rsqtiastod ths Ag HOQ Comsittss to sub«it the report on i t s 
S3 
uork to the GeneraX Asaei^iy at i t s thirtieth sessicMi* 
nost of the Coonittee liofabers expreaaed their 
views on the doouMnt ^Ac 17SA«3 "views of the Secretary 
Cenerai on the experienoe acquired in the application of the 
pr<nriaion8 of the Charter with regard to the Secretariat*» 
prepared in aooordanos with paragraph 3 of resolution 3349(XXIX) 
eatabliahir^ this oo«Rittee» "is nore of an inventory of uork 
carried out than an official view of the Secretariat on the way 
in which i t s structures c^serate in serving the ocMaounity of mnl 
countries and achieving the lofty aia» of tha Charter* It i s 
therefore an in^sdequate and neutral domtaent which neither 
reaffirms car suggests the bast neans of achieving the beet 
results #"^ 
S2. (ft/ rtU ITS/ p. 3 and Cc»r* 1 and i^^ C 17S/L, 3 / 
Add« l ) * 
S3« HjaaRi .flf. %tm .^iaratagy ^gnaiai 9n fcrw MmrK ,«f fete 
^gaanlaaljiaili Ift J p t ,1^ 74.^ 75 jUM J ,g^ (Ceneral 
Aeeesbly Official Decords* Thirteith Sesaion 
Supplament Ho* 1 (A 13JJ1) United iiations)| p« 123. 
il^eneral Asseoblyt Off ic ial Records > Thirtieth s«asi 
Supplooent Mo. 33 (A« . / I0033) , P. 13# See Rilan 
SahoviOf *The U«M« Charter in 1977% in t^t^ Wftfieu i 
'"" tionaj ^ff^JKr 3an« S, 1977, (Oelgrade, 
ymm! ffmmliii)^ PP^ 39-40. 
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nortt than thirty years nou pasttvd sinoe the 
signing of ths Chartar* During thess years the United 
Nations and the world which i t ref lects and in which i t functions 
have undergone vast chants* First of a l l t^ME» expansion of the 
United Nations frcMB an organisation of Si ieistMr Siatee to <am of 
fltore than 140 fWmber States has been aooonpanied by an inportant 
change in the character of ths Organisation* The new neinbers uhc 
Joined the United Nations after 1945 are of two oain eategtnriesi 
Liberated Colonial torritoriesg and the 80*oalled "enemy states" 
of the Second World ^ar« The admission of these two categories 
of s tates has made the United Nations a universal Organisationt 
not one whose laain roots are in Europe and ttw Western henispher 
Thusf the aspect of the United Nations as an al l iance against so 
of the nefflbers of the international oonmunity has los t i t s 
relevancy* 
SecondlyI the world which the United Natione 
re f lec t s and in which i t functions has beeooe increasingly 
interdependent* Today not only are peace and security indivisil 
but the problens of eoononic developmnt* inflation^ environmin 
and resourcesi^ which have beooiBe matters of global concern* 
require global solutions in the frame work of the United Nation 
These two factorst t t^ universalization of the United Nations a 
the expansion of the relevancy of the United Nations t o ths Woi 
probleB»> necessitate the adoption of ths United Nations to the 
new situation and denonstrate ths need for added strength for i 
Organisation, without which the United Nations nay be bound to 
• • • < 
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failure* Thust ilw advooate* of reviewing ttie Charter tMLnk i t 
SS i s tiise now to do positive reappraisal. 
The States opposing the revieyal plead that 
despite the poss ib i l i ty of atnises in the application of i t s 
rules« the Charter has iwvertheless proved to be a eruoial 
bulwark in the defence of peace* In any case the Charter needs 
necessarily to be anended in order to create ntachinery to achievf 
i t s purposes* Such matters having been done by means of legal 
inatruraents such as oovenantSf declarations« definitionSftreatiei 
etc* Trwy (opposing s ta tes ) further pleaded that the only rec 
solution l ia s in establishing genuine cooperation anong nationst 
and th is cooperation can» of course^ cwne about through the 
• p o l i t i c a l wi l l of states."^^ 
Houevert the follouing points in the Charter 
are considered by nany s tates either of Ad Hoc Coreiaittee or 
55* Aaong the staunch supporters in the Hd Hoc 
CcMnmittee are Algeria, Argentina, China. Columbia, 
Congo, Iran, 3apan, Kenya, Spain, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Ruanda, Sierra^fone, Tunisia, Yugoslavia 
Zambia (See General Assembly Official Keoords. 
Thirtieth Session Supplement No. 33 (A/iOQ33i, United 
Nations. 
56* As those on decolonization 1514 (xu), Friendly 
relations 262S (XXU), strengthening of International 
Security 2734 (XXV^  and more recently, the definition 
of aggrssaion 3314 (XXIV) and the strengthening of th 
role of the United Nations 3282 (XXIX). 
57. jy^ bLdxt Among the opposers are I Cxeohc^lovakia,France 
German Oemooratie Bepublio, Germany (Federal Republic 
Italy , Mexico, Poland, Turkey, Union of Soviet 
Soc ia l i s t Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Nortrwrn Ireland, United States of America. 
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the GoneraX AaavMbJLyt Inheront dafeots which aXnost orippls 
the Organisation t o funotion for praaerving international peace 
and Securityt 
1« Chapter IX, on International. £conoiBic and 
Social Cooperation* does not ref iect tt^ new auarenesa of 
global inter-dependence and can not be an adequate meane of 
dealing with ecological deterioration* energy orieia or 
protection of the pricee of raw materiala and manufactured goods 
In th is chapter* international cooperation i s vaguely defined* 
Experience has a l so shtHiin that Chapter X* on the £oon(Niic and 
Social Council iRUst be reviewed so that i t can become a far more 
ef fect ive irotrunent of action* 
2* Chapters XI and XII of the Charter are fal l ing 
into disuas as a a s u l t of the general phenomenon of decoloniza-
tion and the emergence of the new nations* although there are 
articJUaa* such as Article 73* which are continually flouted by 
racis t mentality of asarthied* It i s* however* obvious that the 
Trusteeship Council i s a aoribund organ which ccKild be changed 
into a different forusi that cover a c t i v i t i e s which are now beyor 
the capacity of the E c^onocnic and Social Council* 
3* Chapter XIV leads many countries to consider 
that i t would be possible and advisable for the International 
CtHirt of 3ustice to play a lauch more active role and have greati 
enforcement powers in the aettlen»nt of disputes* 
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4* Chaptar XV, relating to the Saoretariat, 
suggests that i f th i s hody i s to have a iiore direct on the 
ooordinatitm and execution of aoononio and soc ia l programmes of 
international aasietanoe and eooperationi as advised by the group 
of experts which recently studied a new structure for the United 
Nations, such a change uould have to tie incorporated in the Charti 
i t ee l f« 
5« Unending ar t i c l e 4 by deleting t te words 
"Peace Loving*, ainoe i t ia asauned that a l l Statea uhich 
seek Menbership in the legal ooin»unity of the United Nations 
ipsofacto express their acceptance of t to goals of the 
organisation and the principles mi which i t i s based* f^ nd i t 
ia obvioua that the most inportant of a l l these, ie the 
etaintenance of peace* The Charter i t a e l f in Article (2) requires 
"good faith" in the fulf i lnent of the obligations accepted by the 
l^ embers of the Organiaation* Articles (s) and (6) are adequate i 
safeguard the principles and rules against violat ions of the 
Charter or disruptive influence which might endanger the 
organisation* 
6« Elininaticv) of Article 18, naa»ly, that of a 
two-thirds majority vote Ln the General Aasenbly and unaniiiity 
ancsng the permanent members of the Security Council required for 
the admission of a new State, s ince fflemi:wrship i s neither a g i f t 
nor a favour, but a fu l l right of a country which becomes a s tat 
Joins the organisation and accepta i t s principles and rules* 
(32) 
(7) Chapter VXX af the Charter deals with the 
various steps and measure to be taken by the Saourity Council 
in the event of threats to the peaae* breaohas of peace and acts 
of aggression* But practice shows tlwse provisions have been 
inadequate* The eatabliahnent of a "permanent peace-keeping 
force** i s very much needed* This wi l l nec»s®itate the drafting 
of an additional Statute to fora part of the United Naticms 
Charter* The definition of aggression should be included in the 
Charter either verbation or in summary f(»rm* 
(8) As a result of loss of appl icabi l i ty and 
rapid historical developoentsi Chapters XI, XIZ, XIU of 
the Charter have beooRte irreparable anachronistic* The 
Trusteeship Council should be converted into a new body to ba 
called the Husian Highta and Trusteeship Cmjncil* 
(9) Deletion of ^^rticle S3» which refers to 
"eneny states"* because the tern no longer has any real 
Justif ication* It i s a l so necessary to e l i s ina te Article 136, 
which refers to a transit ional s i tuation and establishes machine 
for consultations which has become obsolete as a result of 
developsents and the amendments which are being propened* ArticJ 
107 should a l so be deleted for similar reasons and because i t 
constitutes an undesirable link with the circumstances prevailit 
in 194S* Paragraph 3 of Article 139 should a lso be deleted 
because i t refers to an event which was due to occur 17 years 
ago* 
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d o ) Chapter Iv on advisory opinion (Artiolea 65 
to 68)f there ehould always be assessors and that the Statute 
should provide for the establishment of t is ie- l imits for summary 
procedures in the oase of advisory opinions on urgent matters« at 
the discretion of parties requesting an opinion* 
( l l ) Article 27 of the Charter either be abolished 
or modified* It i s t i«e for the Five i^rinanent Motabers to give 
up the 'veto* poyer in the interests of world oeace and security* 
Total democracy would prevail in the United Nations system withot 
the veto, because without i t the Security Council would cease to t 
the notorimis grave yard of United Hations General Assembly 
resolutions* 
Though the stated points suggested for amondments in 
the Charter are sound* the fundamental problem facing the Urganize 
t ion i s ttm lack of po l i t i ca l wi l l on the part of many of i t s 
(Members to comply s t r i c t l y and in good faith with the obligations 
they assume on gaining admission to the United Nations as i t i s 
eg 
expressed in the words of the Government of Hexioo* 
TH£ CUVENrifylT AND THE CH^ RT&R 
Though the Charter considers in a wide sense the 
s p i r i t and heart of a world Organisation which the 'diversity 
as well as the unity of mankind has gone into i t s making*, the 
obvious fact to state that i t i s resembling in objectives and 
58. (A/a746) United Nations. 9fi> 38-4Q. 
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osthodt* of plan and struotura the Cmivenant* Th« Chatar 
Inapicas to make tha Organization a sound machinery strongar 
than i ta predeoaesor for maintaining and preserving peace and 
security* The goals are the sane but the ii»ans to f u l f i l the« 
are to sone extent different* The sovereign s tate i s s t i l l the 
unit of membership* The General A88e»bly» in oonpoaitlon 
reaembles the teague Assembly over again* the forum which a l l 
the members are represented uith equal right of speech and vote* 
Schuman in th is respect has expressed the opinion 
that U*N* "is the League in a new guisst despite the several 
respects in which i t differs from i t s predecessor*" Hoi,«vsr» 
there i s an established fact that the Charter i s an improvement 
upon the Covenant* H clearly defines t^ w obligations of memberi 
who "undertake to make available to the Secruty Council* on i t s 
' c a l l and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements» 
armed forces> assistance and f a c i l i t i e s * including rights of 
passage necessary for the purpoae of maintaining international 
61 
i:iQace and security** The Charter provides for establishing 
59. H.G* Nicholas, J.Jm Mnit^ tf ^tJOfW ^9 ft f'oU%kB»i 
}m%LtiU%lm* J^ourth Editiont (Oxford University Presi 
New York, 1971), pp. 39-43. 
See: F.P. yalter , A H^atgyy qf t|TB »^t?fltig qf N^ti^ng 
Vol. 2 ( iondon,1952120-35. 
60* Fredrick U Schuman, Intflfnflfcj^onal ftUt4og 
(International Student Edition;, McCrchj Hi l l , Tokyo, 
1958), p. 37* 
See Gerard J. Rang one, A S^oyt Hjftfepyy pf IntflgfWtiS 
aroaniaatioiy. (flcCrow Hill Book Company, New York, 
p. 1954) , p* 5* 
See nandi Elmandjra, The United Nations Svati^jl 
Analysis (Faber and Faber, London, 1973) I?Q» 27-28* 
61* Art* 43* 
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an international armad fores which ahail function undar the 
direotitm of the Security Council uith the aasistanoe of a 
fi i l itary Staff Cosiinittea in aocordanoa to Article 47 of the 
Charter* The Miague iraohinery for the maintenance of 
international peace and aeourity waa ii»ak beoauae i t lacked 
artoed force and i t did not have a clear definit ion concerning 
the obligation of the oenber atatea* 
The Covenant had rather eti»epinQly allowed the 
League Aaaeiablyt l ike the Ccuneilf *to deal • • • • with any 
natter within the aphere of the League or affecting the peace 
of the world* (Article Hit paragraph 3)^ the Charter in th ie 
respect givea the General Asaenbly equally wide powers of 
discussion but sharply puts restr ict ions in the making of 
reoonoendations* On natters concerning peace and aacurityt the 
Security Council has the priority^ and the General Assenbly inay 
make reoodMBendationa only when the Security Council i s not dealing 
uith the question or uhen» for any reasont the Security Council 
requests the ^eneral Assembly to recoomend* 
The Charter enlarged the powers of the Assenbly 
due to the creation of two special ised councils , the ^cononic 
and Social Cmmcil and the Trusteeship Council» uith authority 
in ttwir CH^n spfwreSf and a lso owing the enornous expansion of 
intsrnatiwial ac t iv i ty in the soc ia l and eoononic f ie lds which 
contribute soundly in naking the United Nations to undertake nueh 
responsibil i ty in promoting world econonie and soc ia l welfare* 
.36 
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The Covanant in other hand sntrusted principal reapanaibility 
r«garding this nattsr to i t s Council* changing i t with the 
direction of th« LeagiM^a technical bodies and the supervision 
of the flandates Comniasion* 
In procedural natters the Charter of the 
United Nationa introduoBd an important novelty* It 
abandoned unaniieity principle which the League practiced 
to follow that caused i t in sore cases of international disputes 
fa i led to take any decision* The U«N* Assembly was enpcHieredt 
by contrast» to nake decisions by majority vote and in case of 
go 
ieiportant natters, by two thirds majority* Sini larlyt the 
Security Council reserves i t s veto far i t s Permanent lumbers; 
i f they concur an affirmative vote of nine out of i t s f i f teen 
oemiMirs* 
In the structural s idst tho Security Council 
c losely parallel i t s League predecessort with i t s core of 
permanent Great Powers members and i t s elected na«i*permanent 
members* It i s said that the League Council i s more f lexible 
to be changed in the ecmipoeition* The Security Council can onl) 
be changed by amending the Charter as It was done in 196S by thi 
amendments of Article 23 and 27 in order to enlarge i t s 
memberehip from eleven to fifteen* 
62* Art* 18* 
63* Art* 63* 
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Though ttitt Ctvirter feasisbles tfw Covenant in 
natters eonoetning the Secretariat which to serve a l l the 
United Hationa bodiee and provieionet but one s ignif icant 
exception deserves to Mention i t by referring to Article 99, 
which gives the Secretary •General an ex;)lioit po l i t i ca l role 
to bring t o the attention of the Seeurity Council any aiattsr 
which ftight threaten peace and security* 
The ^rsanent Court of International Justice 
was established in 1920 in accordance with direction Qiven 
in Article 14 of the Covenant but as laski said "that i t has 
been unduly restricted in i t s oonpetence by the powers conferred 
on the Council and the Assembly." ^ The San francisco 
Conference f e l t the inabi l i ty of ttm Court and decided to 
improve on the original nodel by forenlly recording that the 
new Court's Statute was based on i t e predei^ssor's* It seeMi 
the signif icant difference i s that the new International Court 
of 3uBti(» i s an integral part of the Organisation* All United 
Nations inembers are automatically enjoying i t s membership thoug) 
the nwifieiRbers are able to Join i f they wish* 
*%cifio settleinent of disputes* in Chapter tfl 
of the Charter i s devoted to an elaboration of the processes 
which give ef fect t e what the League had incorporated* The 
Charter does notf of oouraet any nore than %fm Covenant, gives 
64* H.a. U s k i , A Graatoar of Pol i t icff. (George Allen 
and Unwin, tondon, f w r t h Edition 1937 (Reprinted 
1951) pp* 647*46* 
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to the world orQanisation uida and stronQ power to Inpms a 
settlssiant of i t » wanbors disputes deapita i t eontaina proviaiona 
auffioient anough to create adoptabia machinery* but the fact ia 
tNat thara ia no organ of the United Nationa» not even the 
Security Counoiit ia enpouered to inpoae a deoiaion* The 
Security Council can only act uhan aerioua threat exiata againat 
world peace* but again not to iapoae a deoiaion* The United 
Natitma in factf ia not a world governfsei^ and aoat caaea i t 
atand^ helpleaa to do any thing apecially when differencea anwig 
the Big rive ^ouera exiat which oleae the door for any hope to 
atop the aggraaaion* 
The Chartery by eontraatt providflB a clear 
Declaration omioerning Non-eelf«Coverning Territoriea 
(Chapter XI) which ia oonaidared nore enforceable than tha 
Covenant*a ar t i c l e and at the aaeie tiawr revealed the developmint 
of t ^ ocmcept of International reaponaibility for dependent 
people aincMi 19t4« 
The Preamble to the Charter of the Unitmti 
tiationa reaffir«« '*faith in fundanental hunan righta, in 
t ^ dignity and worth of hunan peraont in the equal righta 
fiS 
of men and uoa^n and of nationat large and amall*" The 
Charterf by oontraat with Article XXIII in the Uiague Covenant 
aounda off widely the inportanoe of preaerving hunan righta and 
Article (60) provided to a i t up a aeparate ooffimiaaion for 
pronoting hunan righta* 
65. See alao Article 1 and /^rticlea 55, 56 of the 
Charter* 
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Th9 syataiB of ooIJlsotlvs oeeurity undsr tho 
Uniittd l4atiofi« Chartat goes fav bayonet anything in the 
Covaf»nt of the loiagua of Nationa* Under the latere nationa 
eould deoida individually uhethet the Covenant of the Uague 
haa taean violated* In oontvaatt under the Charter, thes 
Security Council "ahall deterinine the exiatenee of any threat 
to ttm paaoM>» breaeh of the P@aoe, or aot of aggreaaion and 
ahall Bake reeoMntendatiana» or deeide which i^aaurea ahall be 
taken •*• • • • • t o aaintain or roatare international peaoe and 
fi7 
aecurity** 
The Covenant of the League provided for voluntary 
withdrawal of Aeisbershipt with the reiHilt that tho neffibera ocHild 
withdraw at any time they uiah aa 3apan did in I932t Cemany in 
1933 and Italy in 1935* The Charter doea not provide auoh a 
right which n^kea withdrawal legal thcKtgh i t i s not pcwaible to 
force a nenber to renain with the organisation aa i t ia 
c lar i f ied later on in the 3an Franeiaoo fornal atatement * 
Exceptional circumatanoe* night Make a netaber fee l constrained 
to withdraw* Thia waa demonatrated by tt)B withdrawal of 
Indoneaia in January 196S, 
One ter«t« however, very aignifioant t o the 
character of the Charter* Thia ia the term "organiaation* 
which eaya "we the people of the United ^(ationa • •« • • do here 
56« Art* 16* 
67. **rt* 39. 
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by eatabllaii an intarnatlonajl organisation to be known aa tha 
United Nationa*" The emphaaia ia thua ahifted frcMS the High 
oontraoting fort ies of tfm League to the people of the United 
Nationa* In Artieie (2) i t ia *tiw Organiaation and i ta 
nenbers* who are to *act in accordanee with the foilouing 
principiea' and the *Organiaation' which 'ahail ensure* the 
non'-onober atatea act in accordance uith them aa ueii« 
Cioheiberger obaervea* *It ia not by accident that the Charter 
of tim United Natione begina uith phrase *ue the people of the 
United Nation* • • • • instead of beginning with the phraae of the 
League of Hationa* covenants the High Contracting partiea • . . « . 
In the fifwi anaiyaia i t i s up to the atatea*i»en and the people 
68 they repreaent to sake a auooeaa of the United Nationa*" 
It i e an indiaputabie fact that during the laat 
thirty two yeare since tha United Nations inoeptiont the Charter 
has played a posit ive role and has denonatreted i t s v i t a l i t y and 
i t s great pos s ib i l i t i e s for the extension and intensif icat ion of 
cooperation between states with different soc ia l aystens* But 
one can net say i t i s perfeot» i t i s in fact as Nicholas 
obaervesi "The Charter i s in fact an imperfect blue'-ptint for ar 
imperfect structure* Aa such| i t invites^ and deserves« 
cr i t io ien* But f i r s t of a l l i t has a right to be understood*" 
6e« Clark R* Eiohelberger, loc. C i t . . p. 12» 
69. H*G« Nicholas, Ioc» Git*. p«4C}* See a l so} St ceasing C* J^n, 
l^ ^IM Mf MUom CHand<»in House, Mew Tork, l96l) ,p* 334, 
A la 0, Crowley, P . , Itw J f^i<5Qr?ynti %9 gwyinfe, i^ff^iri (Raciaillan, Weu York, I966i, p* 31* 
Sea* Inis t* Claude, 3r* Suorda Int 
Handonn House, Weu York, 1964^, ppm 8-11 
e . . s o Ploi^hares. (3rd ed* 
c^KlPt0I' "• n 
f f f i WOL£ or THE S£W£RAL ASSCWBiY FOR P£AC£ AWD SECURITY 
Th« reX« of the General Aesenbly of the United 
Naticme fof pveMoting world peaee* eeononie and eoe ie l affaire 
during the las t thirty yeare ie very remrkabie and aignifioant* 
The intention in thie chapter la net to epeek aboyt the prooedure 
of the CerairaX Asaenbiy aa an internationei feruA for debate but 
the ooneern ia cmly to atate i t e pattern af ohanget probleiia and 
priuipeGte of effeotiveneaa* 
The aot iv i t i ee of the United Hationa during the 
laat thirty yeare aince i t * ineeption haa evolved fro« the SI 
nation asaooiation eloaely linked with the oireuawtanoea of the 
Seccmd Uorld War to tNi Morld Organiiationt whieht thia year with 
(H/er 140 fi^ MRberet wi l l be approaching univereality of eemberehip*" 
Legally epeaking, the Charter deeeribeo the General 
Aasenbly aa oonaiating "of a l l of the nenbera of the United Nationa 
each Mnbert houever» being Uni ted to f ive repreeentativee*^ 
Proviaiona are aade for regular annual aeaaic»iat and fcnr apeoial 
aeaaiona aa ooc^aion nay reguirof theae laat being omivcHced by the 
Secretary General at the requeat of the Seeurity Council or of a 
1» Secretary General Kurt Ualdhei»*a apeech. In M 
^Wlhlt fehgffltift^ftt Vol* XII (New York, United Nationa 
Offiee of Public Informationt Augu8t«<Septei»bert 197S)» 
p* 59, 
2* Art« 9, 
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najerity of fcha ••liber* of ttm Ceii»ral Aa«t«bly« A» in ttm e«»« 
of th« AasoAtoly of th« Uaeu« of Nations* th« pririQlpXa of th« 
equality of states i s osintalned in the provision that eaeh »e»ber 
of the General Aaeenbly shall have one vote* The rule of 
unanieity follQwed by the Assembly of the ieague of Nations has* 
however* been abandoned* The Chartsr drsMi a distlnetimi between 
"iiRportant qtieetione*** in respeot to which deeisione are to be 
eade by a twoHhirda najority of the awebere present and voting* 
ami **other qtiestiwis"* in respect to whieh deeittions are to be 
made by a aajcHrity vote* The experience of the teague of 
Nations appears to be responsible for tim provision* whioh 
deprives a aeaber of a vote in tNi Gerwral Assembly i f in arreara 
in rsspeet to the eontributi^w dtie from it* The General 
Assembly adopts i t s own rules of prootdure* eleots the '^sident 
for eaoh asssion* and may establish sueh subsidiary organs as i t 
fi deems neoessary for i t s functioning* 
3* Art* 18* ^or oomiwnt Upon the %inoiple of ''Qtm 
Hate* one vote"* See t«B* Sohn* *inultiple 
Representation in International Assemblies"* 
^mn99n JdyfMJLf voi* 40 (i946)* 
4* Ar t . I i * 
S* Art* 19* 
6. Art* 2t» 22* 
At ths meeting of the General Aasembly in 1947* a 
resolution was adopted on moticm of the United States* 
calling for the creation of a "Utt le Asssebly" to 
function during t te intervals between the regular 
sessions* The Little*^ssembly would be eompossd of 
representativee of a l l of the members sxeept those of 
the Soviet bloc whioh declared their intention to 
boycott it* 
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Suboffdinat« to th» G«n«ral Assftinbly and aetirHJ 
a« i t s agvnt in tNi discharga of oertain of i t s furtetiana ia 
tha Coonovic and Sooiai Couneilf which ia alaetad by tha GanaraX 
Aaaenbiyt but onoa alaetad i t axeroiaaa ita funotiona aora oir laaa 
7 imiapendantly* 
Tha Truataaahip CinmeiX iat iilca tha S^oononie 
and Sooiai Couneiif a apaeiai ecMmittaa oparating unda? tha 
8 authority of tha Ganaral Aseaabiy and raaponaibla diraotly to it* 
Ita amabarahip ia partly fixad by tha Chartof and partly alaetad 
by tim Sanaral Asu^nbly* It oonaiata of naaibara of tha Unitad 
Nationa t#hioh ara adisiniataring truat tarritoiki«9» thoaa of tha 
fiva ^fwanant nanbara of tha Counoil t^ioh ara non^adniniataring 
truat tarritoriea and aa nany othar naabara to ba alaetad by tha 
General Asaaably ia nai»iasary to iiwure that the total eatsberahip 
ia equally divided Nityaan thoae nenibera of the United Naticma, 
Q 
whieh adoiniater truat tarritoriea and thaee which do net* 
<V aeparate Chapter of tha Charter deala with the 
International Court of 3uatice* It ia deolared that tha court 
ahell be *'the principal J^Ktieial organ of the United Nationet" am 
t^ mt tNi Statute of the Cmirt ia to fora An integral part of tha 
Charter. '^^  
?• Art* 61« 
8. Art. as. 
9* A|*t. 86* 
10. Art* 92* And Art* 4 of the Statute* 
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TNi Secretariat of th« United Naticme eonaiets 
of the Secretary-Cefteral and *euoh staff aa the organiiation 
•ay require*"^^ The Secretary •General is appointed by the 
General Aaaewbly upon reeonMndation of the Security Couneiit 
and he i t the chief adAiniatrative officer of the oroaniaationy 
acting in that capacity at a l l neetinga of the Geiwral Aaeenbly 
ami of the Seourity Council and at the iieeting of the two 
auxiliary organst the Coononic and Social Council and the 
Trusteeship Council*'^ The Sacretary•General ia inveated by 
the Charter with a spNBcial political function to enable hi* to 
bring to the attention of the Saourity Council any tnatter which 
in hia opinion amy threaten the maintenance of world peaee and 
seourity*' 
Aa the General Aaaembly i s considered the central 
body of the whole organiaationt i t has the pmjot to discuss 
a l l (aattera which coflw within the scope of the Charter* Briefly 
apaakingp the functions of the General AaaenbJty are classified 
into throe I 
11 . A r t . 97. 
12. Art. 98. 
13. Art. 99. Last action the Secretary General hag 
tahen under thie Article was abmit the Civil War in 
the Republic of Lebanon in tlareht 1976, Sut owing t( 
the protest of the Governnent of Lebanon which 
ooneiders the o«»iflict an internal affair of the 
t^ ibanon no laeeting of the Cmjneil was taken plaoe* 
.45 
(4S) 
(1) In ternat iona l P(ilioy-«aking funotiona* 
(2) A^niniatrat i t fa and orsaniaat ional functions* 
(3) Superviaary funistiofta* 
A r t i e l a 19 of the Chartar provides the General 
AaaeiOsly u i t h the pouer to diaeusa any queationa or any nat tere 
y i t h i n the eoope of the Charter or r e l a t i n g t e the pouere and 
funetiona of any oroans of the United Nations and imke reeoRUBenda* 
t iona t o the menbera of the United Nations or t o the S«oyrity 
Couneil or to both on any etieh questicme w na t te rs * The General 
Aeeewbly aay eonaider the general pr inoiplee of oooperatitm i n thi 
aaintenanoe of in te rna t iona l peace and securi ty and aake 
reeoiwNHidationa i i i th regard to such pr inc ip les t o the nembere or 
to the Security Council or t o both* The General Aeseisbly M y a l e 
i n v i t e the a t ten t ion of the Sseuri ty Council t o s i tua t ion uhioh 
laay endanger world peace*' HoiMveri the General Aseenbly a h a l l 
not (aake any reconnendations i n respect of any dispute or 
s i t u a t i o n which i s under the consideration of the Security 
Council*^ Butt I f the Security Council because of veto f a i l e 
i n i t e priitary reeoons ib i l i ty I n Maintaining peace and eeeurity» 
then the General Aaaet»bly i s able to take up the (natter a t once 
i n an eiKergenoy specia l aeaeion ca l led on 24 hcHirs notice i f 
neeeseary and recoanende oo l leot ive eteaaures Including the uee of 
arned force* 
14» Hrt* 11* Saei Hans Kelsen, "Col lect ive Security and 
Col lect ive Self«*Oefence under the Charter of trm 
United Natione", ^werton^f tMrmA ffif ^ntrlfmitlftf l i l y^k 
Vol* 42 , 1948, p. 765-
1S* Art* 12 para 1* 
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Ufid«9 Ariiols 13 of tlw Charter, th« C«fieral 
As8«Bbly i t authori«ad to initlata studios and aaks raoowMmia'-
tions for ths purposas of promoting intarnationaX pooparation in 
the polit ical , eoonoAiet sooiaX, euiturai, adueationaX and heaXth 
fieXdSi and aaaisting in the reaXisation of humn rights and 
funda«antaX freadoaa for aXX without diatinotion to raoa, seX| 
Xangiiage or reXigion* 
It ia aignificant to atate that the CeneraX 
AssembXy can not nake any XegaXXy binding reeomMindatioiw* 
TNi vaXue of the reeoa^ndations bears very inpctttant weight 
by creating a uorXd pubXie opinicm either in favour or againat 
a partieuXar atate* The AaaenbXy has reeeived the greatest iepac 
fron tNi inoraase in the mMiter of sovereign states since the uai 
Boat of these new and eoerging Statea owed their very exiatenoe 
to the United dationa* The former Secretary CeneraX HaMMirskjoX( 
often referred to the inportant roXe of the United Nations durin 
this transitionaX staged* 
"The United Nations i s now, or uiXX lew their 
Organisation* The United (tetions can give thef a fraiw work 
for their young national Xife which gives a deeper sense and a 
16 greater weight to indepemtonee*" 
16* Preas Conference, Note to Correspondents No.2i08* (New Tork feb* i960). Seei 1?83 AnntfiX 8»¥j^ w^ Qf 
United Nationa AffaJgff (New york» New York Univ» 
PrassTTpP* 22 to 33 and 186*2Q3« 
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Th« ft«y miiib«r» on trwir partt ii><« t^* oldtt 
on««t aftpireii to uta th« United Nation* ta achiava thair 
national notivaa* Houavav* thoaa aotivaa hava imon diffarant 
fVQii» and aomatiBaa in oppoaition to tha interaata of tha g»aat 
pow8»8* Tha new atatee oonoantratad thaif attention on aeonoMie 
davaiopnantt decolonization and raaiaX equality* They began to 
play a nueh noira oenttal fole in the l i f e of the Asaasblyi aami 
of thaee atatee ae India played a very aotmd role in the affaire 
of the General Asaeiilily and the Security Council* India eontlnuee 
to play ita rola ae a defender far freadoii and a helper for every 
ney atate in the United Natl one* and ita polieiaa coowiand wide 
reepeet* for theee reaaona i t eontlnuaa to bet «nd will reiMini 
one of the More important M»bere of the General Aaaaiifoly* India* 
prepemderant poaition within the A«ian and African groupe ie the 
flioet important factor whieh aade tha new Statea aluaya aaak the 
eupport and aaaiatanoe of the Indian delegation in which Kriahna 
nenon took a leading part aMimg the Indian diplonata and 
atateenen* 
The Asaeinbly now h»B a preponderance of newly 
foreed Third World etatea* The General Asaeably becomta the 
i»intre of bloc eonfliett facing frequently two typea of quaationi 
thcMie concerning relationehipe between tha two great«power bloca 
(cold t^r ieauea) and thoae priiaarily affacting ttm relatione 
betitwen eetabliahedt econoiiically developed atatee and 
econiMBically leae developed etatea* On both aeta of iasueai the 
United Statea and tha Soviet Union have uaually found thaoeelvea 
oppoaing each otNir* 
(48) 
Within ttm frasMi wotk sot by fwquott East-Wttt 
oppotitiofit hou«v«r a good daal of ifaviation has mwttvmdi 
(tiffsrsnt issues produos diffsront voting ooalltions* Thus ths 
Unitsd Statss and i t s European a l l i es avs pro«uastern and 
relat ivsiy unsyspatlistie to African and Asian d8iMnds» yhsrsas 
th« USSR and soas Afr i (»n and Asian states stand in favour* Uthsfi 
African and Asian states though pro-uestern but remain sympathetic 
to the aspiraticms of the developing atatest i^areas •• certain 
European Statas» such as the Soandinvian cot^tries* are less 
pro*wsstem on eold war issues • they at the same t ine are less 
17 
sympathetic to African and Asian draft resolutions* 
HouBvert the bipolar aspects of the General 
Assembly pol i t ics are strengthened* The llnitsd States snd 
the Soviet Union possess sut^ great eeonomic and military 
resources that many states must carefully evaluate statemsnts 
and aetiwis of the super powers before deciding on their own 
polioies* 3ut» certain states in the Assembly are very 
susceptible to bilatmral presaure* no matter how subtle i t s a 
application may be* I t would be remarkable» for examplct i f 
Poland* nalaysia» and Israel did not defer somewhat to the 
positions of Soyist Uniwit the United Kingdom and the United 
17* See Havfa^rd H, Alker^ Jr«» and Bituoe f^ U Kussetf 
Hnlfi PMtkm in tht ffteutral Ay^gitb t^y (New Haven* 
Yale University ^east t96ST Chap* 6* See i^ oss Berkesi 
jMM§l^miQ^M ^n4k% (Oxford Stanford Un. Press 
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State* respeetivsly* But orui tsan say that biXataral oreaaura 
ia probably not as iaportant now aa i t nay hava bean In tha paatf 
tnough i t atiXl axiata to mom axtant in the Ganaral Asaaably and 
in the Security Council in nattera uhieh are euppoaed to be very 
orucial and oontroveraiaX* * Such a eiti^tion ia no doubt the 
cause of the inability of the General Aaaeably to paaa atrong 
resolutiona favoured by the great Majority* dut the condition in 
1950 was quite different where the yeatevn bloe uaa enjoying the 
aupport of the General Aaaenbly* The practical conaequenee of 
of thia hae been to leave the f^aeeably a l l the freedon i t wantc 
in iaaking reoQn«endationo withcxit looking over i t e ehoulder et 
what the Security Council nay be doing* The original Charter 
aaaignad to the Security Council "priiary reaponaibility*' for 
maintaining world peace and eeourityt even though the council ie 
able to act effectively only i f the Peraanent fSenbera are in 
19 
agreenent* Before 1950, the imual way \j»9 for one or «ore 
Member States to ask the Aaeanbly to cone icier a queetiony and 
then for the Security Council to delete the matter froa i te 
agendat ^ decieicm is taken by procedural vote* The ad(N>tian in 
16* for a diseuseion of preeeure in the General 
Asaeiiblya based on research done in l9S5t see 
R<rit>ert £* »igQ*t PftiUJBff in tht Mnlttd ^«iU'?M» 
,^ sttfriy fft MnltBd §Mt9B Anfiwnge n^ fcht^ftimigai 
f^aftiibJ4 CUrbana i University of I l l inois Prese, 
1958* Il l inoia Studies in the Social Sciences, 
Vol* 41>. 
^e«> Annual Rewieu of United Waiiona AfPairi^  (Mew York University Press, 1952>» pp.23*29. 
19. Art* 24 (l) and 27(3)* See Trygve Lie, In t^^ e^^mm el 
SmuOL (f^efiillan New York, 19S4), pp* 69-136* 
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19S0 of tha Uniting for i^aes R«aolution providad a spvoifie 
proeocair« fair transfavring raaponaibility to tha Ganaral AM«»bJly 
shouid tha Security Council find i taa l f unablo to talco action 
baeauaa of the vato* Sy thia« the Aa»«ably proved i ta ab i l i ty 
and eonpatanoe to aot in oaaaa where the Couneilf baeauaa of laok 
of imaninity of the Parfmini^t Henterat fa i l e t o exeroiae i ta 
prinary raaponaibility# and to laake appropriate reeoaaiendationa 
of oolXaotive meaaurea to raatora international pma^em and 
aecurity*^^ For thia purpose the General ^^mmmmbly i f not in 
aeaeion oan be cal led within twenty*four houra i f reqtiaatad eitha 
by a vote of any nine iwabere of the Security Council or by a 
fsajcwity of the amabera of tNi Aeaenbly* 
Thuat tha United Nationa raaorted in thia reapaot 
to take co l lec t ive aeticm to raatora psaee and security through 
the General Asaeiably* Conoretely* thia waa the plan for enablin$ 
the United Natl one to react in future eituati<cme ae i t had in 
Korea* Uhila the Uniting for ^eaoe plan could not auceeed to 
get full-fledged co l lec t ive aecurity ayatefflf notably in i ta 
fai lure to provide for obligatory partioipation by atatea in 
eanotionat i t uaa clearly put forward aa a device for 
tranafoTfting the United Nationa into an agency of univeraal 
co l l ec t ive aeourity*^^ 
20* General Asaembly Beaoluticm 377(V) November 3» 1990* 
21. Sea GAOR, Fifteenth Seaaion, 295 Plenary neetinga 
October 24, 19S0» P« 246« And 299 Plmnary Meeting, 
Movember 1» 1950» p^» 291-292* 
SeeJ ftoaa Barka, oo. c i t . . pp, 1Q5-139. 
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In adopting the Uniting for Psacs BesoXutiont 
membera of tha United Nations shouad uillingness to develop 
an intsrnatlonal tfnforcemint system appiicmltis even to 
violations of the peace in which great powers oiight be directly 
or indirectly involved* It isy of coursey an ambitious plan 
though legally it is not in tha charter* But» as it is said 
the "flood receded rather quickly and» apparently* irreversibly," 
the later stages of the Korean conflict engendered second thought 
about the desirability of repeating the expsrinsnt* The Manbars 
began to disengage themselves from active fighting in Kon i* they 
had developed a renewed appreciation for the prudence of the 
founding fathers who had decreed that the Organisation ought not 
to attenpt collective action in the face of great power 
opposition* Some states were careful not to use the United 
Nations as an instrument of one side against the other in cold 
war conflicts* 
The United States which played a good role for 
making the General Assembly to pass the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution as a device primarily for legitimising and mobilising 
support for western action to resist the Soviet expansion, 
gradually lost confidence that the General Assembly could be 
both 
counted on to put tha plan to that use, and began to doubtAhe 
wisdom and the utility of the ventures in enhancing the idea of 
collective security through the General Assembly* f^ smber states 
were hesitants to respond positively to the suggestion that had 
addressed to themselves in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, as 
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in case to aet aalde definite military units for possible us« 
in United Nations enforcement actions* This recomiaendaticm 
produced nothing except a vague affirmation that armed forces 
might under certain circumstances be supplied in effect* this 
intention for establishing a military arm of the United Nations 
uas soon ended to the dead letter office along uith Article 43f 
which it had been meant to be in its place* 
In the Hungarian and Suez crisis of 1956, the 
Uniting for Peace Plan uas invoked and uas operative to the 
point of bringing about condemnation by the General Assembly of 
the Soviet Union in the one case* and of the United Kingdom, 
France« and Israel in the other* The latter three states 
involved in attacks upon £gypt» uere induced to uithdrau and 
thus to spare the Assembly the necessity of deciding whether it 
should attempt to organise collective compulsion* The Soviet 
Union, having ruthlessly suppressed the Hungarian Revolution, 
defied the General Assembly, which showed its inability to imposi 
military sanctions* These two events revealed the decline of 
collective security since the adoption of Uniting for Pssioe 
Hesolution* 
However, one can say that in spite of limitations 
on its authority to take binding decisions, the General Assembly 
has assumed a leading position in the United Nations system and 
has interpreted broadly its powers under the Charter* In the 
Suez case it created an important precedent by authorising the 
establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force composed 
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e x c l u s i v e l y of m i l i t a r y elamenta from s t a t e s o the r than t h e 
g roa t pauers t o funct ion aa a s t a b i l i z e r of the dangerously 
22 t e n s e s i t u a t i o n in the Riddle t a s t . 
The 1950 atmosphere in the General Assembly 
which u i s in favour of the United S t a t e s and i t s uiostern 
a l l i e s , uas t o some ex t en t changed in 1960 uhen neu s o v e r a i r h 
s t a t e s became motnbeni of t he United Nations* Most of these 
S t a t e s along u i t h a number of o the r s a r e proud of t h e i r 
independence* u i t h no s t rong t i e s t o e i t h e r of t he g r e a t powers. 
These s t a t e s e x p l o i t e d t o t h e i r advantage the g r e a t pouero ' 
c o n f l i c t and succeeded in developing p o l i c i e s of Non'-alignment* 
The d o c t r i n e of Non'-alignroent has gained g r e a t p r e s t i g e in 
fiifrica and As i a . The lead ing advocates of t h i s d o c t r i n e uere 
then Pandit Oauahar la l fiahru, P res iden t Nasser , P res iden t T i t o 
and o the r s uere a l s o looked upon a s l e a d e r s of t h e neuly 
emergent s t a t e s in Asia and A f r i c a . The s t a t e d l e a d e r s 
succeeded t o t r a c e the l i n e s for t h e i r c o u n t r i e s and o the r s in 
23 Asia and Africa c -ncern ing t h e po l i cy of Non-alignment. Thus 
a number of Afr ican and Asian S t a t e s along u i t h Yogoolauia, have 
formed a "fJon-alignment" group in the United fJationc in order tc 
work t o g e t h e r u i t h i n a frame uork of common i n t e r e s t s and 
22 . Lincoln l^ i31oomfiBld, The United Nations and U.S . 
Foreign Policy (UostonJ L i t t l e , Oroun, 196 3 ; , 
pp. 44-45-67. 
2 e e : 1951 Annual Revieu. United Uat ions Af f a i r s 
UJeu York Un ive r s i t y PresG>, p j . 73-87 . See : Heport 
of In te r im Committee of G . A , for 1950. 
2 3 . Pe ter Lyon, Neutra l ism (Le ices t e r Un ive r s i t y P r e s s , 
VM6) P. 2 3 . 
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a t t i t u d e s . The Non-aligned Sta tes in the General Assembly can 
r e s i s t great pouer blandish^ints u i th the argument tha t 
acquiesoence would cause i t t o lose pres t ige and author i ty 
within i t s own region. The iJon-aligned Sta tes succeeded t o 
avoid any pressure exerted on them by the great powers a t the 
time of voting on controvers ia l matters which are not important 
t o them. In the debate in i960 on a proposal for United Nations 
cap i t a l development fund» only a few western pouers, including 
the United S t a t e s , were ac t ive ly opposed to the plan in the face 
of overwhelming majority sentiment for i t . I t i s said tha t the 
establishment of such a fund was only accepted "in pr inc ip le" 
24 
was a triumph for the United Sta tes and i t s a l l i e s . Since 
the cap i t a l development fund depended on the support of 
economically developed s t a t e s , economic power becomes an 
af fec t ive subs t i t u t e for voting s t rength in the General 
Assembly. The debate in 1962 on the proposed United Nations 
Trade, and Uevelopment, revealed the great powers' d i f ferences . 
The Joint rtfrican-^sian-Latin American r e so lu t ion , ca l l ing for a 
conference to meet by September was adopted by a vote of 73-13-2 
in the Second Committee, (Economic and Social) a f t e r the western 
mQnUmnis wayg defg^tecft^^ . 
24. General Assembly Res. 1521 (XU), 15 Dec i960. 
25. Alvin. Z. Rubinstein, 'Soviet and Hmerican Policies 
in Internaticmal economic Organisa t ions ' , Intarnation 
UrQanization.Uol.ieiUinter 1§64) i^a* 29-52. 
36* The resolut ion was subsequently adopted by the 
General Assembly, Resolution, 1785 (XU), 8 Dec. 1962. 
For committee act ion and amendments, see General 
Assembly Official Records (GiiuH)i 17th Sassion, 1962. 
Annexes, Agenda items 12, 34, 37, 39, and 84 (A/5316J 
pp. 24-28. 
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The g r e a t pouers a r e , t h e r e f o r e , impor tan t in 
t h e General Assembly, yet t h e i r i n f l uence i s not a l l de te rmin ing . 
Each auper*pouer roust uork wi th in t h e con ten t of b i p o l a r 
c o n f l i c t , which may reduce i t s i n f l u e n c e , each must a l s o use 
t a c t i c s and maneouvers wi th in the conf ines s e t fay t h e a t t i t u d e s 
of o ther s t a t e s inc lud ing those which a r e s m a l l . The s u p e r -
powers f a i l e d in most cases t o ge t t h e General Aoaerobly pass 
r e s o l u t i o n s in tended t o s e rve t h e i r i m p e r i a l i s t i c aims and 
a s p i r a t i o n s . They could not induce t h e Msserably t o adopt a 
r e s o l u t i o n favour ing co lon ia l i sm or opposing economic development 
even i f they were ever i n c l i n e d t o do so* This i s a very 
remarkable t u r n in t h e l i f e of t h e General Assembly, though 
some of the western c r i t i c s , a s I n i s Claude, Thomas Hamilton, 
Hobert Keohano and Sydney Bai ley th ink t h a t p o l i t i c a l l y t ba 
e f f e c t has been a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of the c leavage t h a t d iv ides 
t h e membership and a near r e v o l u t i o n in the s u b s t a n t i v e concerns 
t h a t pre-occupy the Assembly. They f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n of s p e e c h e s , docunen t a t i on , s u b s i d i a r y corofii t tees, 
meet ings and conferences has brought the o r g a n i s a t i o n un-> 
27 
comfortably c lo se t o an i n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r a l y s i s . I t might 
27 . In i s Claude, 3 r . , Th9 ^nanqififl Uqit^gd N^^j^Png (Mew 
York! Random House, 1967) p . 22* Thomas Hamiltdin, 
•The Changing United Na t ions i Morale Lowered by Dead 
l o c k s ; rieu York Times* Oecensber, 3 J , 196T. 
Roberts Uuen Keohance, ' H o i i t i c a l Inf luence in the 
General Assembly*, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n . No.557 
i-tatch 19G6. Sydney U. Ba i l ey , 'UiJ UotingJ Tyranny 
of the f l a j o r i t y ' , The Uorld Today. June 1966 (ttoyal 
I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , London). 
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ua l l be argued tha t because of the majori ty-rule pr inc ip le t the 
smaller and poorer s t a t e s have an incentive t o band together in 
the ' 'ni ted Nations tha t they do not have elsewhere* Indeed* the 
outstanding fact about the uay s t a t e s assoc ia te in the General 
Assembly i s t h e i r in tent ion t o cone together for f u l f i l l i n g the 
comiBon aspi ra t ion* Thus such a group or a bloc which has 
developed in the General Assembly since the majority of the 
developing countr ies sought membership in the United Nations 
a f t e r i960 is» in fact» informal and u n - o f f i c i a l , meets u i th the 
help of f a c i l i t i e s provided by the Secretary General a t the 
United nat ions .^ The exercise of the group i s recognised in 
29 
statements made on t h e i r behalf or u i th t h e i r authori ty* t-ven 
the schedule of meetings used t o be adjusted according to the 
wishes of the groups* I t i s a normal part of diplomatic 
prac t ices for s t a t e s t o consult each otf»r on issues of common 
i n t e r e s t s and the General Assembly provides easy and constant 
meetings spec ia l ly during i t s session every year* 
28. GAU{{, 18th Sessiont Annexes, Agenda i tem 60, A/5638 
(3 Dae. 1963), ^nnQx. 1* 
29* See the * Joint statement by the Latin American 
countr ies on the financing of UN£F*, GaUH, iitfi 
Sfigjaioa, 5th Committee, 547 meeting (lO December 
1956) para 1-12, the statement in 1961 concerning 
the agreement of the Uestern group t o tho d i s t r i b u -
t ion of sea ts on the £lconomic and Social Council, 
GAQH. 15th Session I9e7th Plenary meeting (l8 April 
I 96 l ) , para 69* And the statements made a t the end 
of the 18th Session of the Assembly *on behalf of the 
African group*, 'on behalf of the Arab de lega t ions ' , 
'and on behalf of a ce r t a in number of delegations of 
s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s ' , GAOR, iBth Session, 1285 
.. 1963)7 Plenary meeting (l7 Dec. 
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OaQ tiaimnarakjoldt tho farmer Secre taryGenora l 
of the United Nations unce described the United nat ions as 
an " i n s t i t u t i o n a l ayateo of co-existence** Mhlch might svoive 
towards s f@d€3rativs soc ia l system u i th i t s cx^ n P'Ublic law i f 
i t i s entrusted u i t h nou tasks uhich i t alwiQ can carry outt and 
i f neu environiaental challonQes are f^t by groying autancxay and 
delegated ;30uer» including the r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of port ions of the 
30 
char ter uhich have not yet been used* 
(Membership in the United Nations has caused 
d r a s t i c changes in the work and funetiwi of the General 
Hessoibly since the inoepticKi of the United Nations in 19A5* 
Ouring thQ period of 33 years the scope and sca l e of the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the C>eneral Msaembly in pa r t i cu l a r and o t t^ r UN 
organs in general have evolved draiDatically t o r e f l e c t the 
changing cirousistances of the ticaus and the i n t e r e s t s and a r e -
occupaticMns of the laemberehip* The evolution of the post 
war world including the in t roduc t ic^ of nuclaar uosponSf regional 
cDilitary pacts and establishments» the accelera ted pace of 
decolonization» the extra^ordinary advances of appXiod science 
and technol(Xjy» rapid increaee in population and the emergence 
of a large group of independent dovelopincj nat ions has inevitably 
created a new geooiiol i t ical s t ruoture* which cause a rad ica l 
change in the p o l i t i c a l and oconcKnic payer basis* This d r a s t i c 
change no doubt r e f l e c t s i t s e l f in the General Asoeably, wiiere 
3J, Hoe UW doc. A / » C . 109/^\J, 119 ifeb* 26, 1963), 
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d e l e g a t e s from raore than 140 ooun t r i ea meet, consu l t each 
o the r and adopt r e s o l u t i o n s dea l ing with d a i l y e v e n t s and 
a f f a i r s of t he whole y o r l d . 
DECULONiaATIUN AND HUmN RIGHTS: 
The Year 1963 marked the s t a r t of t h e coropaign 
a g a i n s t c o l o n i s a t i o n . At t h e f i f t e e n t h s e s s i o n , t he Sovie t 
Union in t roduced a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n favouring immediate 
independence for a l l dependent t e r r i t o r i e s , u i t h Premier fJikita 
31 Khruschchev himself opening t h e "Great d e b a t e . " The 
r e s o l u t i o n u l t i m a t e l y adop ted , houever , uas the one sponsored 
by fo r ty Afr ican and Asian numbers. I t i s known as the 
Dec l a r a t i on on t h e Grant ing Independence t o Co lon ia l c o u n t r i e s 
and peop le s , i t con t a in s sweeping i n t r o d u c t o r y express ion 
procla iming the "end t o c o l o n i a l i s m in a l l i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . " 
The d e c l a r a t i o n was adopted by overwhelm major i ty with none 
32 
a g a i n s t but nino members a b s t a i n e d . 
The adopt ion of the D e c l a r a t i o n by the General 
Assembly signalx&c a new phase of a n t i - o o l o n i a l a g i t a t i o n i n 
the United N a t i o n s . The inc reased number of s t a t e s which Joinec 
31* Oag Hammarskjold, *The Developing Hole of the United 
Nat ions* Annual Heview of United Nat ions A f f a i r s . 
(New York Un ive r s i t y P r e s s , 1959) , p . 10, 
32 . GAOHJ 15th S e s s i o n . 896th «ntg. 23 i i ep t . 1963, para 
183. SoeJ A.A.L. N.iRUCHf4lTiiKY, The Sov ie t Union and 
tlie United N a t i o n s . 1956-1973, CMauka P u b l i s h e r s , 
flosoou, 1975), p . 40, 
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the United Nations in 1961 pressed for the crea t ion of a new 
subsidiary body t o follou UP the implementation of the 
Declaration*^*^ The creat ion of the Committee of 24, as i t has 
come to be ca l l ed , has succeeded in pushing vigorously the Unitec 
nations* author i ty t o expand for forwarding help and ass i s tance 
morally and economically t o the peoples of the colonia l 
t e r r i t o r i e s * The ccnntnittee *8 role uas espec ia l ly c ruc ia l in 
34 
bringing the question of Rhodesia before the General Assefflbly* 
At i t s Eighteenth Session the General Assembly 
requested the Special Committee t o examine the s i t ua t i on with 
regard t o the implementation of the Declaration in each of the 
Non-Self-Governing Te r r i t o r i e s and t o undertake any spec ia l studj 
3" 
and prepare any spec ia l report; I t might consider very important*' 
33* General Assembly Hes. 1514 (XV), 14 Dec i960. Those 
abstained s t a t e s were! Aus t ra l i a , Belgium, Uaminican 
Republicf france, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,Unitei 
Kingdom, and the United Sta tes* In vieu of colonial 
power t o the claim tha t the domest ic -Jur isd ic t ion , 
reservat ion r^de the Assembly's ac t ion ultravire^f, i t 
i s curious that not one of them voted against the 
resolut ion* Their f a i l u re t o do so obviously 
strengthened the au thor i ty of the an t i*co lonia l s ta ts i 
posi t ion in subsequent controversies* 
34* The o f f i c i a l name "specia l committee on the 
S i tua t ion with regard t o the Implomentation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence t o 
Colonial Countries and Peoples," I t uas es tab l i shed , 
o r ig ina l ly with 17 members, by General Assembly 
fieaolution 1654 V'^ ^UI), 27 Nov* 1961* The membership 
/expanded was/to 24 the following year, (Official Records of 
General Aaaembiy, 1,7 Sessiof^. Annex Addendum to Agenda 
item 25 ( A / 5 2 3 8 ) . 
35, See David A . Kay,, 'The f^olitics of Decolonization* 
In ternat ional Qroanisatior^^ Vol, XXI, ^lo. 4 (Autumn 
1967), 
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a t the aama aeosiont and a t eaoh subsequent 
sessicxnt the Ueneral Asseably a f t e r conaiderlng the report 
of the Special CcMmaittGet adopted a resolu t ion reneuing the 
oorsmittee's mandate* 
37 
At i t s Tuenty seventh aesaiont the General 
Aosoiably foliouinij i t s considerat ion of ttm repor t of the 
Special oororoittee (i/8723 and Add. 1-7), apjrowod tha t report 
and appealed t o the cOfiinltteQ to continue t o s t r i v e for the 
itarr.Qdiato and fu l l Iraplementatian of General Asserably rosolutionfl 
1514 (XV) Jind 2621 (XXU) in a l l T e r r i t o r i e s , uhioh have not yet 
Qttainad independence and, in p a r t i c u l a r , t o formulate spec i f i c 
propcMsals for the el imination of the remaining c^ni fes ta t ions of 
colonialisBi, and report thereon t o the General Assembly a t i t s 
Tuen ty^ igh t Session (Hes. 23)8 (XXUHI). At the same 8oo»ion,tli 
General Asoerobly adopted a nuabor of other r&solutions r e l a t i ng 
36» Gonoral Aasembiy Kes» 1970 (XViil) , 
3?« For the repor ts of the Special Cofnr.ittao submitted 
t o the General Assembly a t i t s ^.ighteenth t o Twenty 
s ix th Session, see Official Hacorcio of the Germral 
Assombiy, 6;iol| |a.entlLi.palga, /^nnexes, addendum t o 
agenda itefn 23 C'^>^446/RQV* 1 ) .|Aipjg.f riinfltaanth 
Sesaion^ Annex Uo, 8 (%rt I) T v 5 8 3J/ (iev, 1^, 
itl) .^BggJffQt Annexeo, addendum to 
23 (Part I t b l T l ) CA/eTWRevT I ) . 
IMsk t IjiiBIlfe4atl} ^gg^^ c
agenda i t on 23 
SpaaioQ l.A/63 3 , 
Saosion. Item t 
lalg,* ljMeil,t.y II>A;Cri ,^e^§,^qnf addendum item 23 
no. 23 C*/7C23/R0v. I ) , .i&iik.> JUi^ty*f4ftn^Bgft49nt 
;*upp. rJo* 23 (A/8a23/«ev7j|7rjy2Ail^ Tuentv Sixth 
Sgaslgn,' ^^up:at rio. 23 ('V8423/Heu, 1i# 
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3B t o decolonisat ion* The General Asaembiy decided t o postpone 
considerat ion of the question of Ori t i sh Honduras, the Falkland 
39 I s lands , French Somaliland and Gibraltar t o i t s Twenty 
£iighth Sesaion* 
During the Twenty £ ight and Twenty Ninth 
Sess iana , the Spec ia l Cmaniittee continued t o discharge 
the mandate entrusted t o i t by the General Assembly in 
re so lu t ion 3163 (XXUIII) of 14 December 1973. A f u l l account 
of the Special Committee*8 a c t i v i t i e s during 1974 i s found in 
i t s report t o the General Assembly* 
38* Agenda item (22) : 
(a) Report of the Spec ia l Committee: A/8723 and 
Add* 1-7. 
(b) Reports of the Fourth Committee* A/8954, A/8955, 
see Also A/e8e9* 
(c) Report of the Fi f th Committee J A / 8 8 6 7 . 
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40. The new designation of the Territory i s French 
Territory of the "A fars and the lasas** (see 
Terminology Bul le t in Mo. 240 (ST/CS/S£R. f . / 2 4 0 ) 
i ssued by the Secre tar ia t on 15 April 1968. 
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In organising i t s work for 1975| the Spec ia l 
Committee decided t o re ta in i t s subsidiary bodies and referred 
t o them a p e c i f i o items for considerat ion and report* Deta i l s 
on the Special Committee's a c t i v i t i e s during 1975 appeared in 
the co{Qmittee*8 report t o the General Assembly a t i t s Th ir t i e th 
se s s ion* 
The Committee adopted f i v e reso lu t ions r e l a t i n g 
t o v i s i t i n g miss ions ; f*lontserrat» Seychel les* Comoro and 
Popua Neu Guinea, Brunei* TokelaUf Cocos (Keeling) i s l a n d s , 
New Hebrides, Bermuda, Gibbert and E^llice i s l a n d s , p i t ca inn , 
Solomon Is lands , St* Helena, Br i t i sh Uirgin I s lands , Cayman 
I s lands , Turks and Caici^s I s lands , United S ta te s v irg in i s l a n d s , 
American Sanoa, Guem, and the Trust Territory of the Pac i f i c 
42 I s lands , administered by the United States* 
HUmN RIGHTSS 
The question of Human Hights , o speo ia l l y r a c i a l 
d iscr iminat ion in South Afr i ca , have come t o dominate the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the General Assembly* In the beginning, the 
question of human r ights uas treated primarily as a l ega l 
41* Of f i c ia l Records of the General Assembly, Tuentv-
ninth SBsaion. Sup p. fio, 23 (A/9623/Hev. iTT For 
other relevant documents see Ibid*. TLfsntv Ninth 
Ses s ion , annexes, Agenda item 23. 
42. IfeAtii.f T h i r t i e t h Sess ion . Supp* Ua. 23 (H/l3023/f<ev.1 
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ques t ion t aa i s r e f l e c t e d in the Univeraa l D e c l a r a t i o n of 
Human Righta which the General Msaembly adopted on 13 Oecsmbar 
1948* E f fo r t s i n the General Hosembly uere e x e r t e d t o develop 
t h e Dec la ra t i on by supplementary covenants t h a t uould spec i fy 
t h e r i g h t s in d e t a i l and make them b i n d i n g . Houever, in 1966 
t h e f^ssembly s u c c e s s f u l l y adopted t u o d r a f t covenants on c i v i l 
and p o l i t i c a l Rights and on tconoinlcf S o c i a l and C u l t u r a l Rights 
but t h e process of r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e s e covenants uas very 
slow* 
The p o l i t i c a l approach t o the ques t ion of human 
r iQii ts a t t r a c t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of the General Aeaeinbly uhen 
in 1946 India complained a g a i n s t t he d i s c r i m i n a t i n g t r ea tmen t 
of Indian c i t i z e n s in South 'Africa. Thus, in 1952, the g e n e r a l 
problem of a p a r t h e i d was added t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , with the 
charge t h a t r a c i a l c o n f l i c t a l s o t h r e a t e n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace 
44 
and s e c u r i t y * 
In i960 uhen the Dec l a r a t i on on Deco lon i sa t ion 
d e c l a r e d c o l o n i a l i s m ••a d e n i a l of fundamental human r i g h t s " 
and reaff i rmed t h a t " a l l people have the r i g h t t o s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n " , t h e i s s u e s of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n (group e q u a l i t y 
43* For d e t a i l s , see UN Chron ic l e , '^ug« S e p t . 1975, 
Vol, XII (United Nat ions Office of Publ ic Information 
pp. 22 , 2 3 , 24, 2 5 , 26 , 27 , 2 8 . 
44 . 5ee Report of the ^.figyetaPY i^^ngyaj. OQ thP ^osH§ 9f. 
t he Organisa t ion 16 June I9744i June 1975. General 
Assembly O f f i c i a l Records . T h i r t i e t h Sess ion Supp. 
No. I ( A / i 0 3 a i ; , 
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and i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s ( r a c i a l e q u a l i t y ) uere brought t o g e t h e r . 
The connect ion of huaan r i g h t s u i t h the c o l o n i a l i s s u e rece ived 
f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n due t o a n t i - c o l o n i a l s t a t e s ' success in 
r e l a t i n g I t t o p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y concerns of t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
The United Matlona made a very remarkable development by using 
enforoenient a c t i o n t o meet " t h r e a t s t o t h e peace" t o bo 
cons idered e x c l u s i v e l y in the con tex t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n in 
Southern A f r i c a . The General Assembly d e c l a r e d t h e t e r ra ina t ion 
of ijouth A f r i c a ' s mandate for iJouth West Afr ica (Namibia) in 
1966 fo l loued by e s t a b l i s h i n g the Council for iiouth Uest Afr ica 
45 t c 'Administer t h e t e r r i t o r y " u n t i l independence ." The 
Assembly con t inues i t s e f f o r t s by making p r e s s u r e s t o get t h e 
S e c u r i t y Council t o under take enforcement a c t i o n a g a i n s t Portuga, 
and South A f r i c a , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e Portuguese co lon ie s a re now 
no more a problem t o the United Nations a f t e r t h e former 
r e a c t i o n a r y regime in Por tuga l had tu rned out by t h e r e v o l u t i o n 
in 1974, but t he South Africa r a c i a l po l i cy i s s t i l l a world 
i s s u e in the General Assembly and t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l . South 
Afr ica uas suspended from a t t e n d i n g the Tuenty-n ine s e s s i o n of 
t h e Genet-al Assembly because of i t s cont inuous def iance of the 
United Nations Char te r and United Nations General assembly and 
S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n s . 
4 5 . T u e n t v C i o h t Sess ion of General Assembly (A/9393) 
15 June 1973, p . 6 3 . 
46 . General Aasembly i^es. 2145 (XXI), 27 Oct. 1966; 
and Res . 2248 ( s -V) , 19 Tiay, 1967. See a l s o Report 
of t he S e c u r i t y Council 16 June 1974-15 June 1975, 
o f f i c i a l Records : T h i r t i e t h Sesaior i . Supp. No. 2 
(A/13332) United N a t i o n s , Chapter 4 , QP* 43-44. 
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ST«£NGTH£NING OF lNT£ftN.a lUNAL SECURITY t 
The question of ths strengthening of in ternat iona l 
s ecur i ty was f i r s t included in the agenda of ths General Asaanbly 
at i t s Twenty Fourth Sesaion at the request of the Soviet Union* 
At that sess ion* the General Asaembly inv i t ed nemtser States t o 
inforia the Secretary General of t h e i r views and suggest ions as 
wel l a s of any foeasurea they took for the purpose of strengthenir 
in ternat iona l s e c u r i t y - Ht the Twenty Fif th Session* the item 
was considered on the basis of a report of the Secretary-
t 
49 
AQ 
General* fol lowing which the General Aaaerobly adopted the 
Declaration on the Strengthening of International Sacurity* 
At the twenty s i x t h ses s ion* ths Secretary«Caneral 
presented t o the Assembly a report on s t eps taken by flember 
S3 
s t a t e s in perauance of ths Declaration* At that sess ion* the 
General Assembly* while solemnly reaffirming a l l the pr inc ip l e s 
and provisions continued in the Declaration* i n t e r a l i a * 
47» Of f i c ia l Records of the General Assembly* Twenty 
Ninth ,!^ esai-On,» Annexes* Aganda item 3» document 
A/9847* See a l s o Resolution 3206 (XXIX) and 3207 
(XXIX), 
48. Hes. 2636 (XXIU) See i.ntieynat4qnaLJlt£aAjEg. Issue 
6 Of June 1976, floscou* pp. 126-27. 
49. Document ( A / 7 9 2 2 and Add. 1 -6) . 
Sa, Res. 2734 (XXU), 3©e a l s o A.rt.L. TJAKOCHNITSKY, 
Xhe^^oyjlgt "nion ^nri the ^nUerf t^aUans. X9§§'19 
CNauka Publisher. f^ Joscow 1975-1, p. 39 . 
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requested the Secretary General t o submit t o the General 
Assembly a t I t s Tuenty-<>oventh sess lont a report on measures 
51 
adopted in persuance of tha t Declaration* 
In pursuance of paragraph 8 of the General 
Assembly resolut ion 3185 (XXUIII) of 18 December 1973, the 
Secretary-General submitted t o the Assembly a report on the 
implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of 
CO 
In ternat ional Security* The substant ive par ts of r ep l i e s 
received from 17 riembsr S t a t e s , giving t h e i r views on the 
subject uere reproduced in the r epo r t , t o uhich was annexed a 
l i s t of addi t iona l documents. 
On I7th December, 1974, t t e General Assembly 
adopted resolut ion 3332 (XXIX), in which i t reaffirmed the 
pr inc ip les and provisions contained in the Declaration on 
friendly r e l a t ions among s t a t e s as the basis of r e l a t ions among 
a l l S t a t e s , reaffirmed tha t a l l s t a t e s have the r igh t t o 
pa r t i c ipa t e on a bas is of equal i ty in the set t lement of major 
in t e rna t iona l problems, reaffirmed tha t any measures or pressure 
d i rec ted against any s t a t e while exercis ing i t s sovereign r igh t 
freely t o dispose of i t s na tura l resources const i tu ted a 
f lagrant v io la t ion of the r igh t of se l f -determinat ion and the 
pr inc ip le of non-intervent ion, as se t forth in the Charter of 
the United Nations; reaffirmed the legitimacy of the s t ruggle of 
Peoples under a l i en domination t o achieve se l f -de terminat ion , 
5 1 . Document (A/8431 and Add. 1-5). 
52. Hea. 2880 (XXUI). 
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appealed t o a l l S t a t e s t o iropleroent the United Nat ions 
r e s o l u t i o n s on t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of c o l a n i a l i s m , racism and 
a p a r t h e i d , and r e q u i r e d the S e c r e t a r y General t o submit t o the 
Assembly a t i t s t h i r t i e t h s e s s i o n a r e p o r t on the implementat ion 
of t h e Dec la ra t i on on t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Securi ty 
DE:FINITIUN UF AGGR£3SlUNt 
On 1A December 1974* the General Aasembly 
adopted without a vote a d e f i n i t i o n of a g g r e s s i o n t the 
r e s u l t of e f f o r t s which s t a r t e d over f i f t y yea r s ago in t h e 
League of Nat ions and twenty f ive years ago in the United 
S3 Nations* 
The 'Assembly c a l l e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of the 
S e c u r i t y Council t o the D e f i n i t i o n and recommended t h a t 
i t should a s a p p r o p r i a t e * t ake i t i n t o account* The preamble 
t o the D e f i n i t i o n r e i t e r a t e s t h a t t h e Counc i l , under A r t i c l e 39 
of the C h a r t e r , s h a l l determine t h e e x i s t e n c e of any t h r e a t t o 
t h e peace , breach of t h e peace , or a c t of a g g r e s s i o n and s h a l l 
dec ide what measures should be t a k e n , whether of a m i l i t a r y or 
n o n - m i l i t a r y na tu re* Since agg re s s ion i s t h e most s e r i o u s and 
dangerous form of t h e i l l e g a l use of force pos s ib ly leading t o a 
world c o n f l i c t , t h e Assembly decided a g g r e s s i o n should be de f ine 
5 3 . Docunent ( H / 9 6 9 5 ) . 
For o ther r e lovan t documents, see O f f i c i a l Hecords 
of the General Assembly, Twenty Ninth Sess ion . 
Annexes, Agenda i tem 36* 
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at the present stage* In doing so, it was convinced that the 
adoption of a definition ought to have the effect of deterring 
a potential aggressor, uould simplify the determination of acts 
of aggression and would also protect the rights and interests of 
the victim* 
Hecalling the duty of States to settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means, the preamble states 
that nothing in the definition shall be interpreted as in any 
way affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with 
respect to the functions and powers of the organs of the United 
Nations. 
On issues of peace and security in which both 
super powers may have strong direct interests, the current 
trend, with exceptions, for both to turn to the Security Council 
rather than the General Assembly* The development of the General 
Assembly has been '*a continuous struggle between the advocates 
of conflicting purposes or between those whose conceptions of th 
proper order of priorities are different, a struggle to 
determine which purposes and whose purposes the United Nations 
will serve*" 
The great task confronting the General Assembly 
in the meantime is to better equip itself to be, in the words 
of the Charter, "a centre for harmonizing the actions of 
nations." Uhile the complexity of this task has increased 
54. for the Text of the Definition, see Appendix 0, 
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through the l i f a of the Assenbly, I t i s a l so possible t o say 
tha t the very cownDlexlty of th© oonteinporary world creates new 
opportuni t ies for conc i l ia t ion and ocwiproiniae of differences 
among s t a tes* 
P o l i t i c a l issues concerning uorld peace and 
secur i ty as (Middle East* Cyprus, peace keeping operations» 
disarmament and re la ted mat ters , decolonisat ion, human r i g h t s , 
apar the id , Korea, u i th other economic and soc i a l mat ters , are 
every year placed in the agenda of each session of the General 
Assembly in uhich delegates of Member s t a t e s come t o the United 
Nations headquarters t o debate, adopt reso lu t ions or recommenda-
t ions t o the Security Council or t h e i r countr ies for iroplementa 
t ion* Out t h i s i s of course not enough because not every 
resolut ion passed by the General Assenbly ought t o be implementei 
by a l l the riembsr States* The United Nations in f ac t , i s not a 
uorld government pc^sessing a pouer t o enforce i t s resolut ions 
and orders and the General Assembly resolut ions have no binding 
lega l force on the <1ember States* I t s r e so lu t i ons , are only 
moral recommendations* 
I t i s c lear tha t the r e v i t a l i s a t i o n of the 
General Assembly i s e s a s n t i a l , i t depends on the a t t i t u d e s and 
po l ic ies of i t s members* But one cannot deny tha t "the General 
Assembly occupies a key posi t ion in the netuork of organs of the 
United riations* Some of i t s main procedural problems have 
a r i s en from the fact tha t i t has had t o do th ings for uhich i t 
. . 7 J 
(7Di 
en 
i s not f u l l y equippedf l e g a l l y or p o l i t i c a l l y . " In r ecen t 
years* the United Nations Organisa t ion i a equipoed t o dea l with 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l orobleras t h a t coroe before i t , t h e General Aaaerobly 
i n i t a t u rn can pos s ib ly cone t o a c q u i r e t h e l eg i t imacy and 
va lue which a r e very e s s e n t i a l for i t s a f f e c t i v e n o s s . Houever, 
t h i s mat te r of " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n " i s v e r y i « p o r t a n t for 
56 
reform process* 
Ao t h e United Nations grous o lder and i s 
expanding, i t r e q u i r e s »ore e f f o r t s t o be e x e r t e d for 
naking i t s c a p a b i l i t y in s o l v i n g uor ld issuGS, o therwise 
t h e consequence w i l l be more f r u s t r a t i o n and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t 
which may produce "a dangerous tendency i n c r e a s i n g l y t o t ake 
d r a s t i c s h o r t - t e r m measures r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r long term 
-57 consequences*" 
TuurtRus E:rf£CTm£rj£Sia f\m EFFICIENCY: 
Thi r ty yea r s ago , when t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
of 50 c o u n t r i e s met i n San F ranc i sco t o c r e a t e t h e United 
Fixations, t h e i r i n t e n t i o n was t o adopt a new r u l e of I n t e r n a t i o n a 
55. In i s L. Claude, J r . , Lbg^imiQlng UnUsti ^^ t^Png ' (New Yorki Random House, 1967), p . x v i i . 
See* Leland lu Goodrich, "Expanding Hole of the 
General Assembly", IntBirn^t lonal '^onc4U^t4on» (l^^Sl), 
??• 236-47. 
56. Sydney o . a a i i e y , Ths t»gnag§l AggBffit?i,y gf thfl ^nHfid 
t j a t i ons . Ciuiby Eas t e rn Heprint 1967), p . 239. 
57. Herbert 3 . S p i r o , W2£ijl3lUUfifiL» The Global Svstam. 
(Home Uood l i i J Oorsey P r e s s , 1966J, p . 129. 
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decislon-roaking, the ru le of the majority, a neu ru le of 
consolidating peace and secur i ty by oiaking the Security Council 
strong enough t o stop aggression anywhere in the world, a new 
Qconofljic and soc ia l aystatn in order t o enb;:ince the standard of 
a l l the people of the world, a new ru le of law and Jus t i ce in 
order t o preserve human r igh t s of inankind* The United Nations 
t r u l y speaking achieved much and served so tauch hut s t i l l requiri 
reforms in order t o do i t s r e spons ib i l i t y e f fec t ive ly and 
e f f ic ien t ly* The General Assembly, in t h i s respect considers 
the p r io r i t y t o be refortaed* The twenty-fourth Assanbly Session 
adopting the repor t of i t s preparatory Corotnittee on the 
celebrat ion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary, declared tha t the 
commemoration should be "an occasion t o strengthen the United 
Nations and make i t more ef fec t ive by reaffirming the fa i th of 
Governments and peoples in the purposes and pr inc ip les of the 
Charter ••• and renewing t h e i r endeavours t o give them fu l l 
eg 
effect»-^° In renewing the committee's mandate, the Aaaembly 
58* Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary General, 'Time to Move 
from Principles t o R e a l i t y . ' UN Chroniele. Auoust"September 
1975. Uol. XII (United Nations Uffice of Public Informations), 
pp. 59-71. See a l s o , Leon Gordenker, 'Policy Raking and 
Sec re t a r i a t Influence in the UN General Assembly. The Case of 
Public Information^ Jt)Q AfngfAcan P^l^tJQ^l HlQHQQ ^BViStft Vol* 
LIU, No. 2, (1971), 99> 359-373. 
See a l so Thomas 3 . Hamilton, 'The Changing United Nations* 
Morale Lowered by Deadlocks' , New York Times. December 33,1963. 
See a l s o , Roberts Ogen KeohancsT ' P o l i t i c a l influence in the 
General Assembly', Intayf^liJlOTOl ConcJrU^tJ^qny '^o.557, March 
1966. See a l s o , Sydney, 0. Bailey, 'UN Voting * Tyranny of the 
Major i ty ' , The World Today- June 1966 (Plonthly Journal Published 
by the Royal I n s t i t u t e of In ternat ional Af fa i r s , London). 
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requested i t t o coordinate plans for the obsGrvance»includinQ 
the consideration of proposals and suggestions • • . . for 
59 increasing the effect iveness of the United fiations." 
In response t o the appeal of the General 
Assembly, suggestions for improving the Organisation 
have been tnade by governments, scholars and pr ivate organisa-
t ions* The evolution of any of these suggestions or proposals 
wi l l determine hou far procedural changes are l i ke ly t o r e su l t 
63 in a more effect ive United Nations* 
TH6 CHARACTER OF UH J 
The f i r s t requirement for e f fec t ive reform of 
the General Assembly i s a recognit ion of Jus t uhat type of 
i n s t i t u t i o n i t i s* I t s l imi ta t ions and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s are 
shaped and i l l u s t r a t e d by factors tha t must be understood i f 
proposals for reform are not t o be uide of the mark* Some 
recommendations for "strengthening" the United TJations betray 
some fundamental misconceptions about i t s nature* Hecommendationi 
bear in nind tha t the Organisation i s an embroynic world govern-
ment are u n r e a l i s t i c i f not superfluous and may harm the United 
Nations than t o improve i t * 
In fac t , the United Nations i s not a world 
government, nor the General Assembly a world Parliament* I t 
59* General Assembly Has* 2499A (XXIU) 17 Dec* 1969. 
63. ifej^. 
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ia an in to rna t lona l soc ie ty , uhoss primary fac tors ara s t i l l 
sovereign nation s t a t e s . The r e a l power in t h i s respect l i e s 
with th« hands of the fJember S t a t e s . Tharefora, i t i s vary 
e s s e n t i a l t o dispose a t the outset t o think about the United 
61 Nations u i th soroe sor t of uorld federa t ion . I t ia therefore 
unnecessary t o consider furthar r ad ica l type of proposal for 
changing the e n t i r e ayatetn of the Uorld Organisation. I t i s 
proved a fa i lu re u i t h no general impetus even t o convene, under 
A r t i c l e 109 "a General Conference of the r->embers of the United 
C o 
Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter." 
The 48 member comeiittee set up by the Assembly to discuss 
observations received from Gouarnments might wish to make for 
enhancing United Nations effectiveness, failed to make any 
61. General Assembly Bsa. 3073 (XXV/IXI) of 33 November 
1973. See also Report of the Secretary General, 
"Strengthening the role of the United Nations with 
regard to the maintenance and consolidation of 
International peace and security, the development of 
cooperation among all nations and the prcmotion of 
the rules of international law in relation between 
states" (H/9695). 
See also. General Assembly Res. 32B2 (XXIX) and 
3283 (XXIX) of 12 Dec. 1974. For other relevant 
documents, see Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Twenty ninth Session. Annexes, Agenda 
item 20. 
62. See, for example, many of the recommendations in 
the twentieth report of the commission to study the 
Organisation of Peace. The United Nationss The Next 
T.MBntyfiyg ya^ya (^ e^u York, i s s o ) . 
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reeommendations for action* 
nEinQERSHlPi 
The goal of un iversa l i ty of the memberahip in 
the United Nations has aluays been accepted in pr inc ip le by 
most Member S ta tes but t h i s i s of course not su f f i c ien t uh i le 
the question of ffleisbership in the United Nations reiKiins 
disputable betueen the two super poucra uhich in i t s turn marks 
some of the most dangerous conf l ic t in the Socurity Council and 
the General Assembly betueen £^ast and West* Issues concerning 
China9 Geriaany yhich were matters of conf l i c t s among Big Powers 
s ince 1949 in the United Nations are nou solved uhen in 1971 the 
General Assembly voted with more than tuo - th i rds of i t s i*iembsr 
Sta tes in favour of People's Republic of China t o resume i t s 
legi t imate r igh t s of membership in the General Assembly and the 
Securi ty Council in place of Tiuan which had expelled from the 
United Nations* The tuo Cermanys nou accepted for membership 
a f t e r they agreed t o ease the i so l a t i on of Uest Berlin owing t o 
detent policy which was adopted by the former Uest Germany's 
63* The twenty ••fourth Assembly agenda included an 
item "Nead t o consider suggestions regarding the 
review of the Charter of the United Nations** 
Not having had time t o examine the questiun 
adequatelyt i t deferred the item t i l l twenty f i f t h 
session* General Assembly Res* 2552 (XXIV) 12 Oec* 
1969. 
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Chancellor U l l i y Brandt. But, the issues ooncerning 
laeabarship of Korea and Vietnam remain a disputed matter between 
the two super powers, i n uhich the v/eto^^usually used e i ther by 
the United States or by the Soviet Unian,as i t haposned las t 
t ime i n August 1975 uhen the United States of Anerica voted 
against the admission of South Vietnam and the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam* The vote on each d ra f t reso lu t ion uas 13 
i n favour t o 1 against (United S ta tes ) , w i th 1 abstent ion (costa 
H ica) . The United States used the veto power on a procedural 
decis ion uhich the counci l took on 6 August not t o include i n 
i t s agenda an app l i ca t ion for United Nations membership from the 
BapuJalic of South Korea* The docision was taken by a vote of 7 
i n favour t o 6 aga ins t j u i t h 2 abstent ions* The then Permanent 
fiepresentative of the United States t o the United Nations 
ambassador Daniel Roynihan said i n the Securi ty Council that 
there are three app l ica t ions of three nations wish t o be members 
of the United f ia t ions, "The United States had bean prepared t o 
vote fo r the considerat ion of each of them* The essent ia l trust 
of the Charter towards un i ve rsa l i t y required nothing leso.** 
64* See UN Chronicle (tiugust-September 1975) 
Vol* X I I , rJurober 8 (United Nations Off ice of 
Public In format ion) , p* 3* 
65. See The New York Tiro£?s of 8 Sspteraber 1973. 
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The case of the divided halves of Korea and 
Vietnaqj i s coaplax, although the question of their representa-
tion in the United Nations has not beon detaated as extensively 
as that of China* The Communist countries have annually raised 
the issue of North Korea participation in the First Coinmitte«'s 
discussion of the report of the United Nations Commission for the 
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea* Houeverp the United 
States has so far been able to muster enough votes not to l e t 
these tuo states to take part in the Committee* On their part» 
both North Korea and North Vietnam have persistently denied that 
the United Nations has competence on questions concerning re -
unification of Korea and Vietnam respectively* Houever* owing t( 
the victory of the cc^munists in South Vietnam^ and announcement 
of reunification of both North and South Vietnam* the question 
of their representation in the United Nations might be easi ly 
resolved in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly 
after the United States declared that i t would cease to oppose 
the membership of the Republic of Vietnam in the United Nations* 
Another issue which brought a radical change 
in the membership of the United Nations i s the increase in 
the number of small s tates in the General Assembly that widened 
the gap between real power and voting power and has thereby 
undoubtedly contributed to the decline of support for the 
Organisation on the part of large powers* The one-statSf one 
vote systemt becomes always a controversial aspect of General 
i^aaBmbly procedure has increasingly been cal led into questions 
by some of the larger states (though not by the communist 
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powers)t which uarn tha t v i a b i l i t y of the Organisation i s 
threatened by an influx of s t a t e s unable t o assutne affect ively 
66 the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and obl igat ions of membership. 
The siaall s t a t e s do not consider thetnselves any 
less important than the great pouera* They consider t h e i r 
weakness caused by the imperial domination of t h e i r lands* Having 
f u l f i l l e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l independencet they fee l e n t i t l e d t o the 
f u l l exercise of tha t "sovereign equal i ty" guaranteed in the 
Charter of a l l members* Nothing in t h e i r opinion dangerous t o 
th© United Nations by t h e i r Joining i t s membership* 
66* Seo UN Chronicle Oo* c i t * . p* 5* 
67* In hie concluding remarks t o the Twenty Third 
'Assembly* the Late Assembly President Emilio Arenales 
Catalan of Guatemala c r i t i c i s e d the " u n r e a l i s t i c and 
emotional approach of a majority of delegates*" "The 
delegates'*! he declaredt^'had concentrated on passing 
reso lu t ions tha t f a i l ed t o cure " the e v i l s of t h i s 
uorld"« ra ther than on developing good fa i th and 
greater p o l i t i c a l u i l l to solve problemsy and had 
often placed emotion before reasont regardless of the 
consequences for the iJrganization or for the World* 
m Dec* A/PV. 17S2, 21 Dec* 1968, pp. 213-216. 
The follouing year, the president of the Twenty 
Fourth Assembly, f'lrs* Angle Brooks of Liber ia , 
cautioning her fellow delegates agains t "complacency" 
pointed out "the gradual decline of the United 
Nations in the eyes of public opinion". UN Qec. 
M/PU 1753. 16 Sept. 1969, pp* 28-33. For further 
discussion see , pp* 42-57. 
I^ -^^ '^S^^ 
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The big poucrs are ayare of the General 
Aaaembly domination In recent years by the developing 
countr ies that thay are obliged t o c a l l for a reappra isa l 
of the '*opan door** policy on membership uhich has been 
prevalent since the l a t e l95Cls« The French and the United 
S ta tes delegates openly ra ised t h i s issue in the Security 
Council, uhere ac t ions cwi membership normally commence* They 
questioned uhether "some agreed standards - soae louer l imi t s ' 
(should not) be applied in the case of future appl icants for 
United Nations memberahlp*" Nothing* houaver» resul ted by 
such a move and in the period since 1965 eleven nau countries 
a l l but tuo u i th population under one mil l ion have become 
menibers of the United Nations* Neither the United S t a t e s , 
France nor any other big pouer of the Security Council vetoed 
the admission of any applicant* 
Again in August 1969, the United Sta tes did 
e f fo r t s t o r a i s e the issue when i t suggested tha t the Security 
Council may e s t ab l i sh a committee t o study a t grea ter length 
68* The former Secretary General the l a t e 
Oag Hammarskjold once s t a t ed " I cannot ••• 
share the view of those uho regard the possible 
influence of smaller powers as a danger •••'* 
Press Conference, Note t o corresaondence i'Jo* 1983 (30 April 1959). 
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69 
t he quas t ion of o r e a t i n g a category of assoc ia te mambars* 
Tha Counc i l sa t up a Cocmnlttee of Experts c o n s i s t i n g of a l l 
Counc i l insfflbars* The committee he ld a se r i es of meetings betuaan 
12 ^eptaraber 1969 and 10 3ufw 197Q« In an I n t e r i m r e p o r t 
subiRl t ted on 15 Junei the cotmnittea f a i l e d t o coma up u l t h 
any cono lus ionst I n f a o t t ''a nuffiber of mambars" had not even 
made any statement on the substance of t he mat te r * Houaver* the 
m a j o r i t y of the develop ing c o u n t r i e s have been aga ins t tha 
es tab l i shment of standards f o r admission of new a p p l i c a n t s as 
thay are Intended t o c reate a category of second-c lass membershl( 
u l t h l n t\rm o r g a n i s a t i o n * They c l e a r l y see the es tab l ishment of 
c r i t e r i a (whether of t e r r i t o r y » s ize» popu la t iony f i n a n c i a l 
capac i t y * or a lmost any o the r ) f o r new members as but a pre lude 
t o the ex tens ion of such c r i t e r i a t o sma l l s t a t e s a l raady member 
of the O r g a n i s a t i o n * ^ The B r i t i s h de legate t h i n k s t h a t the 
69* See Un i ted Nations S e c u r i t y Counc i l O f f i c i a l 
Recordss 1243rd* f^tg* 20 September 1965 para 
93, members of the C o u n c i l i houever» China 
d i d not t h i n k smal lnasa lessened tha u i l l of 
tha people t o independence! tha Sov ie t Union 
dec la red t h a t the 1963 Dec la ra t i on on de» 
c o l o n i s a t i o n a p p l i e d t o a l l c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s 
of any s i z e or geograph ica l l o c a t i o n } and the 
i v o r y C ^ s t ; f e l t t h a t the s t a t e s , " t h e mora thay 
need t h e Un i ted Nations**• i i j i i dx * Pai^a 52 , 62 , 42* 
70* Submission of i t em f o r Counc i l agenda* UN Uoc* 
S/9397, 18 August , 1969, 
7 1 . UN Ooc. S/9836, 15 June, 1973. 
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category of asaocia ta meroberships might be accoptabla if the 
sBiaH s t a t e s voluntar i ly renounce ce r ta in r igh t s while other 
u i se enjoying the pr iv i leges of merabership* This could be dona 
without amending the Charter by having the new s t a t e f i l e a 
dec lara t ion in i t s appl ica t ion for memberahip s t a t i n g tha t i t 
does not wish t o pa r t i c ipa t e in voting in any organ of the 
United Nations, nor t o be a candidate for e lec t ion t o any of 
the three ccKincils es tabl ished by the Charter* on the basis 
t ha t the assessment of i t s f inancia l contr ibut ion would tw a t a 
72 
nominal level* 
Howeverf the fact i s no so lu t ion can be reached 
and even the acceptance of a s soc ia te membership by a l l future 
new s t a t e s wi l l not solve the ex is t ing problem tha t the larger 
s t a t e s complain about* The new Member s t a t e s have learned how 
to manipulate, with Soviet support , Assembly procedures t o thaii 
advantage, in a manner reminiscent of the t a c t i c s used by the 
United Sta tes in the aar ly years of the Organisation* Thus, 
even with two types of memberahip, a change in the voting sys te 
s t i l l be needed t o meet the basic p o l i t i c a l problem t o the 
73 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the larger s t a t e s in the General Assembly* 
72. Sydney 0* Bailey. The General Aasemblv of the 
United Nation^, (uilay Eastern Reprint , 1967) 
p . 8* 
73. MiisLu* Annex. I I , p . 1. 
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RESOLUTIONS J 
Tha ganaral debatoa aparty Assembly discussions 
and oonsuitatlona among delegatsa normally have as t h e i r goal 
the adoption of a resolution* Thus* the r e s u l t of each Assembly 
sess ion i s the array of resol«it,ion3 passed. The great number of 
reso lu t ions uhioh the Genatal Aasembly adopted since 196G caused 
what i t i s cal led in the United Nations " c r i s i s of confidence" 
which undoubtedly provided incent ive t o re-cvQluate t h i s aspect 
of the a c t i v i t i e s of the General Assembly. The study based on 
363 resolu t ions uhich the General Assembly adopted in i t a Ninth, 
Fourteenth and Seventeenth regular sess ions (1954, 1959 and 
1962) shoued the follouinq facts? 
1. Since the: increase of merabership in 1954 
there has been an increasing trend tcHjards 
overwhelming majority decisions or unanimity 
in the General Assembly. 
2 . For those decisions uhich are contes ted, 
there i s an imbailance in decision pouer in 
the General Assembly even a f t e r allouance for 
informal sources of inf luence, i t favours the 
emerging countries as against the older , 
developed countries of both East and West. 
3 . Over half of a l l General Assembly reso lu t ions 
uhioh require implementation are i n t e r n a l 
dec i s ions , carr ied out by UN Organs and not 
d i rec t ly dependent on individual s t a t e s for 
compliance. 
(82) 
4* Uhils there are conspicuous exceptionst 
the Assembly's recofflmendatory decis ions 
achieve a greater measure of compliance 
than i s generally recognised* 
S* Out voted minority members have responded 
with a var ie ty of equilibrium-seeking ac t ions 
depending on the content of resolut ions* The 
most danaging t o the author i ty and resources 
of the Organisation are the responses evoked 
by inter : )al decisions and assessment decisions* 
Inbalance in decision pcH.)sr i s therefore most 
ser ious u i t h respect t o decisions in these 
74 categories* 
Resolutions can more f r u i t f u l l y be conceived 
of as a method of defining a community i n t e r e s t* Their 
moral and p rac t i ca l impact depends on hou successfully they 
f u l f i l t h i s leg i t imis ing functions* This se l f legi t imis ing 
74. GrtOH, i8th Sessionf Annexes, Agenda item 25, 
A / 5 4 2 3 (28 May 1963). See a l s o : Sydney 0* Bailey, 
Qo, ei^*t Appendix 10, Extracts from the Report of 
the Ad. HOG* Committee on the Improvement of the 
(Hethods of uork of the General Assembly, p* 331* 
See a l s o Appendices, 7, 8, 9, pp. SOS-SSO. 
75* See Robert W. Gregg and flichasl Burkun, The United 
Nations System and i t s functions* Solaeted readinoa. 
(Aff i l ia ted East-Uest Press Pvt* Ltd. 1970, Bombay 1, 
India) (Reprinted In India u i t h spec ia l permission of 
the o r ig ina l pub l i she rs . Van Nastrand Reinhold 
Company, New York, USA,) pp. 2^3-253. 
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function of voting suggests t h a t a t t anp te t o s trengthen 
"tnajoritorinisBi" in the General Aasorobly may be misconceived* 
Procedures enhancing the conci l ia tory and consensus building 
aspects of reso lu t ions t o keep u i t h the Charter conception of 
the United Nations as a '^centre for harmonising the ac t ions of 
nations*" Would be more construct ive than procedures enhancing 
the a b i l i t y of a majority to prevai l over a minority* 
** corol lary t o the argument favouring resolu t ions 
t o express cooimunity of i n t e r e s t i s tha t in niany instances 
reso lu t ions are simply not ca l led for* I t has become ra ther 
indiscr iminate Assembly habit t o pass a reso lu t ion a t the end 
of most substant ive debate* But uhere there i s an absent 
consensuSf or where consensus extends only t o the pr inc ip le 
involved (e*g* on apar theid) and not in ac t ion t o implement i t t 
pressing a d iv i s ive resolut ion t o a vote may only intensify the 
atmosphere of dissension* It seops a t t h i s stage« tliat 
consul ta t ion i s useful i f the members shou Qood s p i r i t t o reach 
a consensus* When i t i s simply not possible t o co l l ec t a 
majority for a reso lu t ion t a statement of consensus made by the 
presiding officer may be acceptable t o a l l members because each 
one of them can s t i l l say tha t he did not ac tua l ly commit hinseJ 
7fi t o every uord of i t by existing a formal vote* I t may be noti 
76* See Benjamin M* Cohen» 'The United 'Nations in i t s 
Tuentieth t e a r ' , I n t a rna t iona l OrQanisationy Vol. 
XX, No. 2 (Spring 1966), P» 235. 
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t ha t t h i s same process increasingly a t taches t o reso lu t ions 
theroselvea through extended use of "explanations of vote" by 
members* The consequence i s t o ueaken the reso lu t ion in question 
and minimises the c r e d i b i l i t y of the resolu t ion process in 
general* The developing countries r e s i s t t h i s l ine of reasoning* 
The question of voting remains as i t i s and pe r s i s t en t use of 
confrontation t a c t i c s may a l i ena t e great ly the very powers yhoae 
cooperation they need t o achieve t h e i r aims, u i t h a r e su l t an t 
tendency for those e s sen t i a l poyers t o by pass the Organisation* 
Uestern disenchantment u i th sometimes s t r i d e n t and inf lex ib le 
anticQloni«lism of the cCHsmittee of 24 i s a case in point* 
Aust ra l ia has withdrawn from the oommitteet and the United 
Sta tes delegate was moved t o ask "whether a committee of t h i s 
type has a ro l e t o play in the United Nations frame work which 
77 
is dedicated to the peaceful settlement to disputes* 
Final ly , while the question of "on© Wi^ rRbert onf 
vote" caused a problem of majority and minority, i t i s des i rable 
t o s t a t e that the larger coun t r i es , now in the minority, must fc 
t h e i r pa r t , recognize that subs t an t i a l concessions on questions 
of concern t o the smaller s t a t e s w i l l be required i f the l a t e r 
are to be persuaded t o forgo some of the advantages of 
roajoritarionism. The price of mors "responsible" behaviour on 
the par t of th« majority wi l l undoubtedly have to be more 
77* Andrew Boyd, 'A Repairman Looksat the Un*, Viata. 
yol* 5 No. 6 (Jnay-3une 1970), pp. 2J3-234. 
• • • 85 
(85) 
responsive behaviour on the par t of the minority* There i s 
probably l i t t l e t o be gained by put t ing i n i t i a l r espons ib i l i ty 
for changed a t t i t u d e s on the majority of smaller powers, since 
p o l i t i c a l pressure i s almost t h e i r only ueapon against the great 
pouers and the General Aasambly i s p rac t i ca l ly the only place 
where they can exert i t co l lec t ive ly* ^ut i t i s equally 
imperative tha t construct ive i n i t i a t i v e s by the leading powers 
be supported and reinforced by the tnajority, which much l ikewise , 
in the words of the Secretary General **8ubordinate t h e i r ancient 
quarrels'* (and t h e i r modern ones) in the i n t e r e s t of creat ing 
tha t "global partnership* so e s s e n t i a l t o the future of tho worlo 
78 
as well as of the world Organisation* 
The United Nations i s e s s en t i a l l y an i n t o r -
governoiental organisat ion based on the concept of the sovereign 
equal i ty of ra t ions* Aa such, the r e a l i t y of world p o l i t i c s i s 
bound t o be mirrored in tho work of the Opganisation* ^hen the 
Uorld i s divided, such a d iv is ion i s sharply re f lac ted in the 
United Nations* I t i s in fact easy t o deplore the weaknesses ani 
l imi ta t ions of the United Nations of today, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
a t the sane time t o bring an a l t e r n a t i v e to i t * The best i s t o 
keep the United Nations working and evoluting i t s e l f t o the 
78. m Ooc. H/ic,/l39/PU 735 ,Apr . 1970, pp» 24-25. 
See a l s o Secretary General U. Thant, Urj Press 
RaiaasjL ac/sm/nag, 9 May, i969, p. 2. 
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constantly changing requiroments of In te rna t iona l 
society* As the President of the Twenty-fUnth General 
Assembly Session <^)r Abdul Aziz Souteflika expressed i t 
uhen he addressed the General Assembly on 17 September 
1974» "The United Nations could a t i l l be improved. I t 
79 
uas progressively reforming i t se l f*" 
79» See UN Viq^%nii gnffPn^cAs; Vol- XI 
iiufflber 9, October 1974 TUnited iJations 
Office of fHjblio Information), 9^i» 4 -5 . 
ROU OF UNO FQR P£AC£ AMD SECURITy 
THE SECUfllTY CQUWCII. 
Tha role of th« UnUed Nations i n bui lding 
in tornat iona l peac* and aacuri ty ia ih« basic object to 
save mankind fvma the socurge of %»tf and ttw Charter contains 
elaborate provisions for siaintenanoe of world peace and order* 
Upon the Security Council f a l l s the prinary respons ib i l i ty for 
peace "keeping and peaoe<*inaking and the M»»bera of the United 
Nations which are not meebers of the Security Council agree that 
the Security Council acts on t h e i r beha l f * ' The Cr^rter oests 
the problene of peace and seourityy f i r s t by de ta i l ed provisions 
for the pac i f ic settlement of disputesi and seoondlyt by equally 
deta i led provisions for act ion by the Security Council i n the even 
of threat to or breaches of the peace* The par t ies to any dispute 
the continuance of which is l i k e l y t o endanger peace» agree f i r s t 
of a l l to seek a solut ion by one or other of the various procedure 
ava i lab le * On i t s p a r t ; the Security Council has the r igh t t o 
invest igate any dispute in order to determine whether i t s 
fifflnfeinmimci la U H S I Y tff„entl^nfigg PB^oflt'^ and At h^> ftAa^ fcht 
1* As s p e c i f i c a l l y stated i n Ax>t« 24* 
See U o Pasvolsky, I . ^ Mnj t ld ><itA9ng i n ^Q%k<m (U»b«na, 
Universi ty of I l l i n o i s nress* l 95 i ;« ftP» 8D-81* 
2* Art * 33* This a r t i c l e supplements the pr inc ip les of 
A r t i c l e 2» pledging the nenbers of the United Nations 
to r e f r a i n from the use of force and to resort to 
peaceful methods of sett lemsnt* 
3* Ar t * 34* 
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right at any ataga of a diaputay to reooomend approprlata 
proeeduroa or nethoda of aattienent* In eaaa attanpta of the 
partiaa to a dlaputa fai led to aatt ia i t by any of the varioua 
peaoeful prooadureot thay agree to refer i t to t ^ Security CounoiX 
uhieh in i ta turn takea aotiona to ae t t i e tNa diapute Oy 
reocNBfflending appropriate procedurea of aett leaent aa i t may 
5 
oonaidar adequate under tha eireuinatanoea* 
Failing a settlement of diaputaa betuean the 
concerned partiaa^ i t remains for the Sacurity Council to 
deteroine whether the eituatiem conatitutes a threat to peace« 
and i f ao uhat meaaurea muat be adopted for peace maintenance* 
^roviaional taeaaurea may be agreed upon and the Security Council 
may ca l l upon the partiaa to eonply with then* In oaae of 
fai l ing^ the Security CcKincil nay decide upon meaaurea not involving 
the uee of arned forooy but i f thsae ahould prove not adequate; 
9 the Security Coimcil emy then "taka wore action by airt aea or 
4* '^rt* 36* 
S* Art* 37* 
SeOf Coodriohi Ufl* and Hanbro« £*y loe Git*. 
ppm t40*1S4* See alaO) C* Caglet on *Tht>Juria diet ion 
of the Stcurlty Council over dioputes*, ftjtliBin ^^Oygnul* 
Vol* 43 (1946), p« S13. 
6* Art* 39* 
?. Art* 40* 
^•o* ^nmmi ftttyjtw fff MnltBj NUffm ^ffairi (»ow vorki 
New York Univ* Preaa 19S3)» ^p» 75*e8« 
8* Hrt* 41* 
9* '^ r^t* 42* 
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XarHt foreea as auiy b« naeasoary to araintaln at t o t99tavm 
international {teaea and ••outity*" In thia iatt«v caaa, the 
flenber States abicie theaaelvea to make available to the Security 
Council* on i t e ea l l and in aceordanete with special aQreenent or 
agreenente> the ariB fore»ef aasiatanee and f a c i l i t i e s necessary to 
maintain peace*^^ The unaninity of the Remanent fleiibeve at th is 
stage of Security Council action under Chapter UIX isttherefore! 
essent ia l and i t i s unlikely that any enforoemint action can be 
taken against any of the Perimnent nembers or any other state 
ssouring t^»ir supportf the veto power ensures that result* U i s 
for t h i s reasony above a l l others * ttmt the oeasuras envisagsd in 
Chapter UIl are virtual ly useless in an age in uhioh the threats 
to peace* breaches of peac« or acta of aggression occur in s i t u a -
tions in which there i s a confl ict of interests between the U*S*A« 
and the y*S«S«H, and oonsequentlyt no unaninity amonget the 
hiroanent fiecBbers* Hence* after the Indonesian affairs in 
1947* and unti l the Congo c r i s i s of Duly 1960, there had been no 
occasion (xy which the Security Council e f fect ive ly used i t s power 
under Chapter VXI* except that of Korea in 1953* ^nd th is had 
13 
happened due to t t e fortuitous absence of the Soviet Union*' The 
13« Ibid*. 
11. Hrt** 43, 45. 
12. H.3. Plorgenthau, fffllitl.ffig, ^Wmg l^ ftl4,ffnB> (Indian 
Edition* Sc ient i f i c Book Agency* Calcutta* 1966)* 
P« 480. 
Ouight E» tee* "The Genesis of the Veto" in 
.lnt§ynfftJlon§l OgB';«n4g^ ti4ftn» February* 1947* Vol, 1, 
No. 1* pp, 33*^2« 
13« iilidxr P» 481. 
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succasAive disputes of Serl in^ ^ i e s t i n o t Z(Kio*Chinaf Hungary 
and Suazt ^vm a l l involved the £ast«Ueat c o n f i i e t of in te res t 
and»thereforet the Counoil has ref ra ined i t s e l f f ron using i t a 
enforoenent powers* The ^aat^Ueet c o n f l i c t destroyed the 
pr inc ip le of unanimity upon whieh the uhole s t ructure of Chapter 
VIX depends for i t s a b i l i t y t o uork as intended under the Chapterl 
The Congo c r i s i s of 196Q appeared» a t the outsett t o be a unique 
example of a s i t u a t i o n which ca l led for UN act ion but did not 
involve the East-bfest c o n f l i c t * Hence> the major resolutions of 
3uly 14f 22 and August 9 oa«e frott the Security Counoilf asking 
the Secretary General t o provide m i l i t a r y assistance to the 
IS governaent of Congo* *^ The resolut ion ca l led on Salgiufli t o 
withdraw i t s troops f ron Congo and requested the Sacretary General, 
i n consultat ion with the governsont of CongO| t o provide such 
m i l i t a r y assistance as was necessary u n t i l the secur i ty forces 
were able to parforn t h e i r nornal dut ies* The resolut ion wss 
passed by • votes t o Q$ 8 r i ta in« China^ and Trance abs ta i r»d* ' 
14* ^99i P l i t f i n qtjKl ttW "nUlr i , ^ti^PnS (Uondon, 
Her Majesty's Stationery Of f ice , 1970) , p. 11* 
"The Soviet Union has used the power of *Ueto* IQS 
t i n e s , francs four t i n e s , B r i t a i n three t l ^ s , China 
onc», and the United States not a t a l l * * Th9 fact 
since the issue of the id les t in ians in 1974 the United 
States for supporting Israel^ used the veto powers nore 
than four t ines* 
15. Burns and N* Heathcote, Pflggg Kjapj^ng fay Ur^  f<^yBii, 
(Princeton, 1963) , p. 24* 
16. S/4387* Thffi tex t of the resolut ion i s included i n 
Burns and Heathcote, I b i d . . p* 249* 
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Th8 Unit«cl States and th« Soviat Union votad 
together to set up the United Nations opevatior«Ei in the 
Congo (ONUC) although neittwir was absolutely sa t i s f i ed with 
the re8olution» neverthelese« at the outsetf the tyo powers 
whatever their ultioiate intereatSf were generally will ing to 
allow the United Nations to aaaune reaponaibility and save thee 
frc»B involvement in what night turn out to ise a s i tuation 
endangering world peace* Thusf the action taken was not 
"enforcement action" under Articles 41 or 42 but rather the 
"provisional measures" envisaged in Article 40« but i t nevertheless 
marked an unprecedented and i n i t i a l l y successful uee by t in 
17 
Security Council of i t s powers under Chapter VIX* 
The deternination of a "threat to the peace 
breach of the peace or act of aggression" under Article 39 
oust precede the use of the Council's powiers under Articles 41 
and 42t uhet^ Mlr the Article spec i f i ca l ly invoJed or not» the 
practice of ttva Council hae been to avoid spec i f i c reference to 
that Articlet even in deternining that the araed attack upon 
17« The Internatiofial Cmjrt of Justice in i t s advisory 
opinion of July 20i I962t on certain expenses of the 
UNy tO(M< the view that ^UC was not "enforoenent 
action" against any s tates and that the Security Counci 
could "police a situation"» p* (167^ uithmit agree»ent 
exist ing under Article 43 and without characterising iti 
actions as "enforoeoMint action*" 
18* S«e Hapertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*» 
Vol, 11, p* 334 et seq* 
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the ftspublio of Korsa oonatitutad a '*b?oach of th« peace"» no 
epeoif lo taferenee to ArtieXe 39 was mads by the Council in i t s 
raaolutltm of June 25, 1950.^' The uord "Peace* in the Charter 
oeana "international peaoe"| the Council in th i s reepeot should not 
take any action i f a c i v i l war e x i s t s in any s tate unless the 
s i tuation shows that world peace really in danger* Both in the 
Korean question and in the earl ier Indonesian quaation the argunent 
was advanced that action by tt« Council uaa barred on ttm ground 
that i t intervened in the purely donestic jurisdiot ion of the State 
concerned* Qut such arguaient in both the referred oases implicit ly 
rejected* In CongOf although the Security Council acted under 
Art ic le 43t at the t ine there was a specif ic requeot fron the 
Governnent i t s e l f for United stations intsrventiont i t nay be a l so 
recalled that the principle of non*intervention guidad the 
Secretary-General in instructing the UN Force not to intervene in 
the internal struggle for po l i t i ca l power but to confine i t s 
a c t i v i t i e s to the aaintenance of law and order, the protection of 
huisan l i f e and the el inination of the foreign elements which tended 
19. S/iSOl, similarly in the resolution or June 27, 1950 
( V l 5 t l ) i t fsay be noted that neither resolution, the 
lat ter of which recommended Ambers to furnish 
assistancs to the Republic of Korea cited Article 41 or 
42* Cine construction of these rssolutiona ia that they 
were in exeroiae of the power of recommendation under 
MiS^i^i*.^/®:„ ^2«J! ^^ General Aeaembiy, f i f th ^Mai^fflf UN DOC A/f48 Of November, 1950. 
See* Annual Heview United Nations Affa irs . New York 
University fress , 19S1, P9* 3-31* 
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to evsata a thr«at to intatnational poae«* Tho abasnoe of th« 
definition of asgvaaaion to guido tho Sseurity Council was an 
obataole for prop«» guidanoo to daterMino firm noaauraa to atop 
aggrsaaion at onoa* Ihm praotioa ahovta that tha raquiraimnt for 
aoourata facti^X knoMladgs of airanta» ratftar than ona of iagal 
definit ion ia uaaful and vary praetieat>la« the Countsil roXiad 
heavily m the report of the United Naticna CoKniaaion on Koraa, 
(UNCOK) the aane ralianoa aXao in United ttationa Qbaarver Group 
in Lebanon (UNC3GIL.) when the o i v i l yar atarted there* The 
preaenoe of aueh graupa "on the apot" in a great advantage which 
the Cc^noiX poaeeaeea the power under Art ic le 34 to aend a 
oonKRittee or group whore none aXready exiata* Houever* after the 
deoXaration of the Oef in i t iw of Aggreaaion by the CsneraX 
'isaeBbXy on 14 Deeeaber I974p^^ by which the GeneraX AsaeabXy 
oaXXed upon aXX the Statea to refrain froa aXX acta of aggreaaior 
and other uaee of foroe contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nationa* and aXao eaXXed the attention of the Security CounciX t 
uae the Oafiniticm of Aggreaaion aa guidance in determining» in 
aeooc-dance with the Charter^ the exiatence of an act of aggreaai 
after the adoption of aueh a def in i t ion , the perfornance of the 
Security Caunoii» certainly ehaXX be iRC^ e eaeiar to deternine an 
20* Secretary GeneraX State«ent to the Security CaunciX 
<UN Ooc. S/P. y,/B87)» 
21, GeneraX AsaesbXy Bea* 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. 
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22 
act of agQr«88ion in the future* 
The usual Nabit of the Security Council 
I l lustrated that the power under Article 43 to c a l l 
upon the parties to conply with "provisional neasure" did 
not depend upon a prior detarnination under Article 39* In 
the Palestine question Article 43 was spec i f i ca l ly inv(^ced» in 
ordering a ceasefire and cal l ing for a withdrawal behind 
provisional truce lins« similar measures were ordered by the 
Council in Kashmir* In Congo» while there yas suff ic ient 
evidencw in the terms of the request for assistance by the 
gmiernment of Congo and in the statements by the representatives 
in the Security Council that a "threat to international psaos" 
existadt no spec i f i c determination under Article 39 was made* It 
1^8 however, clear that the three resolutions of 3uly 14» 22 and 
August 9 were considered as mendat<»ryt for the Secretary General* 
23 
conclusion that Article 2S and 49 applied was confirmed by the 
Security Council in the resolution of Augyat 9. 
The d i f f icu l ty whic^ the Security Council 
confronted from the start was the ereatlcwi of the armed 
forces which was considered very necessary to enforce i t s 
22. General Afisembly Iwaty Paamti ffiffffjrPflf Supp. 
No. t6A CA/67t6/Add*)| p* 9. Also Official Records 
of the General Aesambly, Twentv^inth Saaaioi^. 
supplement No* 19 (A/96i9 and corr* 1)* 
23* Statement to the Security Council on August 8; (Ooc* S/P*V. 004), pp. 9-13. 
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decisions against reoaloitrant s tates uhicH raquirsd an 
agreaiMint bstiwan tha FHiabsr States and tr» Council foe which 
provisions ysrs nads in Artiols 43* No suoh agreenant or 
agraenonta Hava aver been rsachad that stakes the Bil i tary Staff 
CcMRiQittaa for yhieh provision i s made in Articles 46 and 47| 
though i t was established sinoa 1946« and no real function 
happened since i t s purposes ware to makm plans for the applies* 
t ion of armid f oroa placed at i t s disposal* 
The Soviet Union has always ins is ted that bocauae 
Article 43 has never bean inplenentadt therefore* Articles 41 
and 42 which give the Counoil binding authority to take 
co l lec t ive enforcesiant naasurasi are inoperative* But those 
who supported the action the United Nations took in Korea have 
considered i t s val idi ty under Chapter VXX and have jus t i f i ed i t 
by refarsncMi to Article 39« Howavar» tiw fact i s that the 
Article only empowara the Security Council to naka 
*raeoimBandationa*; i t does net authorise i t t o oblige nembers 
to partieipata in co l lect ive action* The Security Council in 
1966 whan the atrong feeling grew so strongly in the United 
National was able to take for the f irat tina exp l i c i t anforcemer 
action under Chapter VXX in relat ion to Southern AhcMjesia* Xn 
April the United Kingdosi secured authority ' to prevent by the 
use of force i f necessary* the arrival of o i l tankers at Seira 
bringing muppllQB to Southern Rhodesla* on the ground that the 
continuance of Rhodeaia's i l l e g a l independence was a 'threat to 
peace*' Uhen Snith's regine despite a l l pressures continued in 
i t s defianceI the Security Council in Oaoenbar 1966 for tha 
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f i r s t tiJNi in the hiatory of the United Nations inposad 
•oanonic sanetions.^^ Finding that th« s i tuation in Southsrn 
Bhodeaia constitutea a throat to peaoo and soourityt i t 
exp l i c i t l y involMd Articles 39 and 41 and cal led on a l l Pieaber 
States (and ncm-nembers) t o ban the inport of a wide range of 
Southern Rhodcsian products and the export to ^^r of o i l , 
airorafta, arnsy or equipment and a l so to deny her any financial 
or other eoonoaio aid* 
In nay 1968 the Baourity CcHincil unaninously 
made the sanctions both oonprehensivs and nandatoryt an 
action of authority that want toyond anything previously 
atteapted by either the League of Natitms or the United Nations* 
Sut the aanctions proved ineffect ive due to the to ta l ncm* 
conpliance of South Africa and Portugal and the inabi l i ty of 
dependent and adjacent African States to cut off a l l trade* 
Thu8» Smith's regime uae able to strengthen i t s internal 
poaition, proclaimed a republic and took drastic measures on 
i t s black majority* The Security Council in Harch 1970 adi^ted 
a resolution which ca l l s upon s tates to severe a l l relations» 
diplomatic and economicf with the regime of Southern«^hodesiay 
and a l so interrupt a l l transport links* H<^ever» the Securit 
24* Security Council Has* (232) of 16 December 1966* 
25* Security Council Res. (253) of 29 P5ay, 1968. 
26. Security Council Res.(277) of 18 Barch 1970, Sea 
a l so Security Council Res*(286) of 17 Nov. 1973 a lso 
Heport of the Committee (3/9644) and Add. 1»2»3. 
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Council oontimiea i t s 0fforts t o nako th« sanotiona matm 
8ucco88ful and on 6th (^ aroh« 1976» adoptsd a resolution 
unaninoualy uhioh in i t attengthoning i t s seoncHnic sanctions 
against tho racist regiiae of Southern Rhc^esia and appeals to 
a l l tho intsrnational firAs and eonpanys not to snter with tho 
South Rhodesian regino in matters concerning trade and coomsres* 
The neu resolutioni brought in i t s provisions new slonents in 
order to o^nsolidate the efforts of the Seoutity Couneil to bring 
doun the racist regime or to force i t t o snter into paaceful 
negotiations with the leaders of the African naticNrial Koveiients 
in Rhodesia* Even th i s resolution i s not suff ic lont to solve the 
issue and shall remain unsolved t i l l po l i t i ca l s i tuations bring 
a change either in Southern Hhodeeia i t s e l f whore nou the 
national movement beccMies more stror^er or uhen the Security 
Council unanimously agrees to take a strong action in order to 
enforce i t s ser ies of rosolutionSf though such an action i s 
s t i l l far impossible tocause both ttw United Kingdcmi and the 
United States of America arc not wil l ing to do so* 
27* Security Council Resolutions on Southern ^hod9Bl& 
are as fol lous) 
(216) of 12 November 196S 
(217) of 23 November 1965 
(221) of 9 April il»66 
(232) of 16 UeceiBbar 1966 
(253) of «9 nay 1968 
<277) of 18 fiarch 1970 
(288) of 17 November 197Q, 
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The Charter, though i t cor>ferr«d on the 
Security Council exclualvfi eoapetenoo in the onforoaoent 
f le ldt nevar regarded thle aa the only task appropriate to 
i t s nature* The Security Counoil in i t s dealing with world 
po l i t i ca l problawa which are threatening international peaoo 
adopted always methods of recommendationa, inveatlgatlona, 
interpoaitions and concHiaticne in accordance to Chapter VI of 
the Charter, which deals with the "f^cifio Settleisent of Oieputee. 
The Security Counoil for instance in Kaehoir 
iesue uaed the ooncil iation inatrusent by forjsing a conmittee 
of Good Office oonaiete of three (sembera as a negotiator or a 
conciliator.^® The Co»araittee «» the CoBwaisaion was, however, 
unable to reach agreeraent with the parties (IMDIA AND PAKISTAN) 
on the terflia of defflilitariaatiun of the s tate before a plebisc i te 
eould be held* Despite mediation by variaua United Nations 
representatives, differ^>nces between the two countries remained 
and the problem o f f i c ia l ly called the India-Pakistan questicm 
came before the Security Council tim and again* It renained a 
po l i t i ca l case which the Security Council fa l leJ to solve* 
In the ^uez Canal dispute in 1956 the Sacurity 
Council used the reeoofflendation vethod when i t forBulated 
certain principles or courses of action for se t t l e sent such as 
freedon for users froa a l l discrinination, respect for the 
28* Sir Dixon/Craham Conmission* 
for detailed record, see g^f4o ,fffil? ^bwt t{TB MnJLtiri 
Hatioitf (United Nations, »eu VorM, l97o; , p* 18. 
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sovereignty of Egypt> and the allocation of a fair proportion 
of the cHms to developnent* Howeveri attaapto of the Security 
Council uere a l l fai led in solving the dispute* 
The Security Council emnetiaee because of i t s 
fai lure in other iRethode to solve a po l i t i ca l issue may 
einply addfese a direct appeal to the disputant to refrain 
frcMB iaproper behaviour* The appeal have been as diverse as 
the aituations giving rise to them* As fair ly typical exanple 
29 to quote the Security Council resolution of 4 ^ulyi 1969 on 
the Israeli attempt to change the status of the captured city of 
Jerusalem* In t h i s the Councils 
(l> "Censured in the strongest terms'* a l l measures 
taken to change the status of the c i ty of Jeruealem 
and deplored the fai lure of Israel to show any 
regard for previous resolutions on th i s subjectt 
(2) Confirned that a l l l eg i s la t ive and administrative 
measures and actions by Israel which purport to 
a l ter the status of Jerusalem are invalid and 
cannot change that s ta tus ; 
29* See Secm^ity Council Record (Official) of July-August on 
Jerusalem question* See a l so General Assembly resolution 
2,254,C^a-^) relating to Jeruealem* Sea a l s o , Annuftl l^ aPWt 
jtfW 1gg7*t5,4Mr!gJiaia Of f ic ia l fieeords Twenty Third Session, 
Supp. No. 1 A/72Ql,pp* 16-23. 
Sees Qfficial Records of the Security Council Twenty Second 
Year, 1341 s t to 1361 s t , 136Sth» 1366th,1369th to 137lst , 
1373rd,1375th,1379th,to I3a2nd,14aist to 1407th,1409th to 
1412th,1416th to 1426th and 1429th, footings. See a lso 
Official Records of the General Assembly.Fifth ^meroencv 
g p g g ^ l Sgffffj^pnt^nnoxes Agenda item 5; and jjjiilt., Twenty 
Second Session Annexes, agenda item 94. 
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(3) vvquestsd U r a a l t o inforai tho Couficii of 
i t s intent ions with regard t o inplenenting 
ttw resolut ion and warned that " i n the event 
of a negative response or no response" i t 
would reconvene withmit delay " t o consider 
what fur ther act ion should tm taken*" 
Such an appeal of the Securi ty Cixtncil i s 
v i r t u a l l y u n u n i t e d excKtPt which i s inpased hy the good 
sense of i t s aeiirbers* But the appeals of t h i s kind tear only 
exhortations^ inplorat iona and i n r e a l sense hae no pot^ir to 
be enforced* Thm neareet the Cminoil has ooiBe t o t r y t o enforce 
such a reconoendation was i t s resolut ion of 15 3uly 1948 
provided by the truce v io la t ions i n Palestine* This rsads* 
(The Securi ty Council) Oetermines that the 
s i tua t ion i n ^ l e s t i n e consti tutes a threat 
t o the peace wi th in the mianing (^ A r t i c l e 39 
of the Ctwrtor; Orders the QoverntRents and 
author i t i es oonoernedt (Hirsuant to A r t i c l e 43 
of the Charter of the U*li)*, t o desist frosi 
fur ther m i l i t a r y act ion • • • no l a t e r than 
three days fron ( th is date and) Declares that 
f a i l u r e by any of the C^ievernnents or au thor i t i es 
eonoerned t o ecMply • • • would dsMonstrate the 
existence of a breach of the peace wi th in the 
eeaning of a r t i c l e 39 of the Charter, requir ing 
inetediate consideratitm by the Security CcNjnoil 
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with a viffw to •uoH further aotiovi uncfar 
Chapter VXI of tha Charter as laay be decided 
upcwi by tha CmjnGil)« 
In factf thia i e the only oeeaaion on which 
the Security Council found to atand very aerioualy uhen 
i t s reooiBRtendation under Chapter tfX waa ignored* The Security 
Council aluaya refuaea to try to enforce a p o l i t i c a l deciaion* 
Thia ia very clearly ahown in acne v i ta l international iaauea aa 
Southern Hhodeaia^ Middle E a^att Naisibia, Cyprua and Kaahnir* In 
moat of the world iaauea which threaten world peace and aeourityi 
i t ia f%ind the Security Council unable to do anything* for onm 
reaaon that the great powers have been involved direct ly or 
indirectly* StamB of theae iaauea where nore than two great 
powers are taking part* t l^ whole iaeue might be kept even out 
of tha Security Council work* This clearly ia aeen in the 
Vietnam war where no State tr iea to bring the attention of the 
Security Council to the dieaatrt^ia t,^r in South Cast Aaia which 
threatena peace and aecurlty of the worid and sKinkind* Such a 
behaviour of the Security Council with v i ta l world iasuoa 
i l lustrataa that i f a great power becoeas an aggressor, the 
United Nations Organisation wi l l not be able to ac t , and the 
31 
eituation will have to be handled outside the organisation* ' 
30. See H*C* Nicholas, loc Cit.» p. 90. 
31. In 1956 two Great Powers, aritain and France with 
the help of Israel invaded E^ gypt* The Security 
Council kept itself inoperative* The Hungarian issue 
alao dealt ttw aame when the Soviet Union invaded 
Bodapest* 
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This iXluatratas that the yorld ooXleetlve svcurity rsnains 
umskk due to the abttencse of euff ieient world authority to ooerce 
32 
a great power* 
The veto power which enables any of the five 
Pernanent f^nhera of the Security Council to block decisions 
on substantive matters in that organt including the deter»ination 
that aggression has taken placet the designation of the a^eesort 
and the decision to resort to sanctions military or otherwise 
against the invador^ i t i s the nain cause which kept the Security 
CcHincil in a world c r i s i s inoperative* It clearly gives each of 
the great Powers the capacity to prel^ent the operation of the 
United Nations enforcwment system against i t s e l f 9 against any 
state which i t chomes to support and protect* or in any other 
case in which i t prefers not to participate or to have others 
participate in an enforcement ventures under United Nations 
auspices* It i s in ahort» renders co l lect ive security impossible 
in a l l instances most v i ta l to the preservation of world peace 
33 
and order* The veto in the opinion of florgenthau has three 
consequencess 
32* ^se {Report of the Sonate Committee on foreign 
Relations on the United Nations Charter» duly 16» 
194St reproduced in Review of the United Nations 
Charter' ^ col lect ion of Ooounentsy Senate Document 
No* e7t 63 Congressf 2nd Session (Washington 1954)* 
P* 68* 
See UN informatitm organisations and US Library of 
connressp PftfflMwin|t» qf %fm MnUfld r^ttifffKi gmifwMaa 
an Ifltftfliliffllii ,0lOTnii8BtJlfln i^ *aw York, 194SJ, XI, 
P* 514* 
33* See yellinQtonKqo, J r . , ^fjUm PfftBgdyrgg 4n 
(New Ti MggfWUonfli fgl.Uit»4. QgQfnlflaUgDft (W  York, Columbia, 194?;* pp, I i 7 , 124, 134* 
See* Dwlght £. Ue» loc Cjt.f p,36* 
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f i r s t t i t reintroduoat into the ayatem of law 
enforoaiwnt of the U»N« the principle of deoentraiiaation 
by nakins the operation of the ayaten dependant upon the wi l l 
of each of the Permanent (^enbera* A Pernanent l*lember| aa the 
proapeetive v ict in of any enforcement neaaure propoaed to be takei 
by the U«N«^  would aimply veto the meaaure and expoaea the 
iffipotenoe of the Uorld QrQanlaatlon in the face of threat to the 
peace* breach of the peace or act of aggreasion* 
Secondly« the Security Council nay take enforoement 
neaaurea against ainall and nediun Powers« that ia^ thoae which 
are not the Permanent Plembera of the Secyrity Council and hence 
cannot veto the enf oroeiRent neaaurea* &utt in the view of the 
veto of the great powerot even th i s wi l l be possible cmly under 
extra-ordinary circumstancos* 
Horgenthau notesi "As international p o l i t i c s 
i s constituted today* nany of the small and mediun powora are 
int inately aligned with one or the other of the great powers that 
doninate the international scene* They are unlikely to conmit a 
breach of international law cal l ing for enforcement neasures 
under Chapter VII of tNi Charter without the enccHirageflient or» 
at leastf the approval of the great power with which they are 
aligned ••••" 
34* H«3. norgenthau» loe C i t . . pp. 308 and 309. 
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Tim Security Council was b u i l t upon th« 
hopeful assuapticm that tha great powers would agree 
and the veto would force them t o oonproaiieet but i n practice 
i t beconea d i f f i c u l t especia l ly when the great powers think only 
abcHjt t h e i r in te res t of influence i n the world* U seeiss the 
weakness of the Sscurity Council w i l l renain while the veto 
a r t i c l e i s there i n the Charter and d e f i n i t e l y i t s abo l i t ion i s 
VBty s ign i f icant t o the pr inc ip le of sovereign equal i ty of a l l 
the fflenbers of the United Nations*"^ The veto coniBits Permanent 
^e^bers of the Security Council t o act d i f f e r e n t l y without 
considering the reactione of the isajority members of the 
Organization* The veto, therefore* i s an an t i thes is of the 
equal i ty pr inc ip le and the danocratisat ion of the United Nations 
syston as re f lec ted i n the General Assenibly* The great powers 
s p l i t 9 together wi th the adniasion of large numbers of Afr ican 
and Eluropaan n a t i o n a l i s t Statea has alsost destroyed the oolleetlv 
secur i ty functions t ^ t were t o be the organisat ion's p r i n c i p a l 
35. See A.F.K. Organski, MfffJtd ^^kUoUt ( Indian ^ 
£ d i t i o n , 1964 S c i e n t i f i c Sook Agency, Ca lcu t ta ) , 
pp, 419~2Q* SseS Laland n* Goodrich, "The naintenanoe 
of In ternat iona l Peace and Secur i ty" , In tarnat iona l 
Qffl^nAaatlfflt '^ol- l ^ , MO* 3 (Sucimer 1965; ,p . 429. 
36 . A r t . 2 , para 1 . See a lso the c r i t i c i a n of the 
veto power as i l l u s t r a t e d by H.C. Nicholas, loe. C i t . . 
pp. 91-97. See a lso Aeport of the Ad hoc Committee 
on the Charter, (General Assembly O f f i c i a l Records, 
triAffttefeh ftagglffnt ^UPP. NO. 33 "A/iao33"), P. 67. 
f^igeria suggests to abol ish i t or extends i t to the 
regional groups of Af r ica and Lat in Anerica. 
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37 
roason for axlatsnce* Cast-Ueat rivalry i s s t i l l a 
preminent feature of United Nations affairs apeoially in the 
Security Council where the two supper powers» the United States 
and the Soviet Union acted rigidly agaif^Bt each other at the 
sKpenee of world poace and seourity* The veto power was used 
frequently by both the two super powers that made the Security 
Council inoperative even when there i s a serious declared war 
ex i s t s in the world* This clearly appeared during the Indo-
%kistan war in Oeeember 1971* The Security Cc^jncil because of 
the veto caoted partly by Conmunist China and partly by the 
Soviet Union* wtas unable to do anything to stop tha war in the 
Indian Sub•Continent* The frequent use of the veto power by the 
U»S«iU in the recent years supporting Israel 's continuous 
aggressionf nade the Security Council unable to force Israel to 
iffiplenent i t s resolutions for establishing peace in West Aeia* 
The Security Council fai led to reconcile i t s e l f with the General 
Aasembly which reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of 
Palestine* In Oune 1967 the Security Council was torn by 
37* Thoflias 3* Hanilton. *The Changing United Nations* 
fiorale Lowered fay Deadlocks*, Nau Vork Tiaea^ 
December 30, i960. 
See a l so) f^ uhaned ^affrulla Khan, '*The General 
Assembly in United Nations and yorld Affairs", in 
A«u, Cordior and U* foots , e d s . , Thfl Qytti.fffg ^ftfit 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 19657,pp*167-82 
38* General Aasembly Res* 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 
22 November 1974* See a l so o f f i c ia l Hecords of the 
General A»»e«bly, Twenty ninth Session. Plenary 
meetings, 22B2nd laeeting, para, 3'-83* 
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disagrsenenta among i ta aianbarat i?attl&iXavly among the Craat 
Pouara* and had fco avoid the danger of onoe aore preaenting a 
apfictaole of utter impotanoe aa had the pravioua emergency 
39 
aeaaiona of the Security CounoiX and the General AssMibly* 
The risaoXutlon 242 rectains the only inatruaent of international 
authority uhioh oan a t i l l be oonaidered a point of departure in 
the search for a solution to th i s uarisofne oonfl ictt uhioh 
contifuies t o Jeopardiae the peaoe of the uorld* 9ut the 
reaolution at the aame tine a t i l l refers to the problem of the 
Palaatiniarw aa a "refugee problen''t and i t doea not give Juatic 
to the people of %leatlne« The General Asaeebly by i ta two 
reaolutiona 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 
correeted thie niatake in the Security Council reaolution 242^ 
but uhon the later tr ied to follou the Cgnaral Aaseably to 
recognise the atatua of the people of Paleetine» the United 
Statea vetoed the draft rosolution of the Afro-iAaian group 
though a l l the mosbera of the Security Council voted in favour 
of the reaolution* The pouer of veto in other uorda ia a t i l l 
renain to rob any reaolution of the m&tal force that conea of 
39, The apeeial aeaaion of the council held from Piay 24 
to 3une 14 uaa auapendad sine die without having beer 
able to agree on a eolution to the conflieta other 
than a ceaaefire reaolution and ona other concerning 
the treatment of priaonera of uar V^/i^ea/232t 233)* 
The Caneral HQaembly aat in urgently convened 
eotergency aeaeion fron June 17 unti l 3uly 14 without 
taking any aignifleant deeiaion* 
• • • 107 
(107) 
unaninity* On« nay question uliether th«r« i s any praotioaJL 
diffsranos batwaen a vasolution which saoures 14 votas out of 
15 but f a i l s of pasaaga baeauae tha fiftaanth i s cast by a 
Great Pouey, and a raaoXution whieh pasaaa by 14 wotaa to 1? 
Doaa not the f i r s t rapraaent as s ignif icant a nobil isat ion of 
-40 Opinion as tha aacond" 
Thus, one can a«y that tha United Nations and 
particularly the S«QUrity Council can play a v i t a l role on 
many ocoaaions Just t o dafuae and de-escalate the problen 
brought before i t * The Security Council in practice can 
functi(»i successfully only uhen the great powers and {Mrticulad 
the United States and the Soviet Union are in tern of cenplete 
agreenent* Qbviouely* the relexation of interr»tional teneion 
by any tn&n9 contributes t o the general search fov peace in the 
world, and i t i s t o be hoped that the effect of great powers 
detente wi l l have an inportant influence in areas of special 
United Nations concern* euch as disarwiiiient, although the 
achievement of po l i t i ca l detente i s no automatic guarantee of 
progreee in th i s f ield* Quite a part from the peril which the 
continuing world wide eacalation of arnaaents preaents to world 
peacci isankind w i l l continue to be deprived of vast hunan and 
oatsr ia l reaoureea urgently required for Kcnre conetructive 
purposes unices real prograsa can be made in disarmanent* The 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continued to hold 
40* H.G. Nicholas, Xoe. C i t . . p. 92. 
Seel Hana Kelaen, XiMTMirf pf tht MnUfld Xf^ionif (London, 19S3), p. 754* 
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aeries of neetlnge In 197S giving priority t o the question of 
the prohibition of the developnentt prcMlyetion and stook-piling 
of eheMieai ueepons and to the question of the cessation Qt 
nuoXear weapon l i s t s * e f fect ive e n s u r e s relating to the early 
oessatitvi of the mielear arns raoe and to raiclsar disariMiaent as 
41 
well as general and oonplete disareament were a l so considered* 
The dissrmaaent issue i s the oldest one under discussion in tho 
General AMOMbly but the pr(H}ress i s very slow* The real 
disarnsMsnt diseussicm usually done sscret ly between the two 
super powers in Helsinki and Geneva where the Saeurity Council 
hss no nuoh role in th i s respect* However^ b i la t er s l and 
regionsl negotiations are no doubt very iiM3ortant for achieving 
42 
the larger objective of a aoral general process of disarmanent* 
Conplete and General disarmanent i s s t i l l a drsan speci«l ly afte 
Coeminist China became a nuclear power when i t exploded i ts f i r s t 
atcNB boiib on October lO* 1S^* Chins eeen» to have blocked 
further progress towards disarsMnent* India after having 
exploded i t s f i r s t atom bonb four years agOp i s a l so beeoning 
41* Cenaral Aaetmbly Res* 26020 (XXXV) of 16 Dec* 1969 
General Aesembly Res* 3261 r(XXIx) of 9 Dec 1974 
General Assesibly Report of the Connittee on 
OisarMMsnt 0*/97O8*OC/237) and (A/i0027*OC/238). 
See a l so Official Records of the General Aeeeinbly 
LlflifltynAnttl Hwkmt SUPP* HO. 27 ( A / 9 6 2 7 ) and iden, 
Thirtieth Sesaiont 3upp* Ko* 27 (A/1Q027). 
See A Al«^«wv. 'Vital Problems in Oi8armiiient*» 
<ffilHirnfttl.ffnf4 ^.ffalW o^ 9 September 1976 (All Union 
Society ZANiyC), pQ, 30-3S. 
See* Daniel S« Cheever* *Tfm UN and Oisarmament" 
In^ffgnflUonaA oggftntoatiffin* voi* i9» i96s, pp. 463> 
463* 
42* Clark H* Cichelberger^ loc . Cit*. p, 56* 
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very important in thia fiold» though the Indian ieadarthip has 
roaffiriBod i ta ain to ttao nuolaar technoioQy for peaooful 
purpoaea cmly* Hoyaver* tha apl i t batyaan tha major poMira of 
the uoridt that iSf batuaan tha Soviet Union and Communist China 
on tha one aidot and tha United Stataa, Britain and France on 
the otherf has alao prevented the progress on the most erueial 
iaeuea of international aecurityi the international control of 
military and of nuclear weapons* The danger of nuclear 
proliferation net only a t i l l exiats* but has inoreasedl nuclear 
teating eontinueet ueapona are inoiraaaingly sophlatioatad and th 
technological arms race continuously promises new and more 
horrible developnents* 
The fact i s that* while the develoiMent of new 
ueaponat nuclear and o(mventional« ewitinuea unabatedi die* 
armament negotiations in the United Nations framework have not 
led to any aignifioant rw»w agreement in recent yeara* Die-
armament negotiationa outside the United Nations are alao moving 
very slowly in eoerparison to the obvious per i l s of the world 
situation* The Hsview Conference of the fort ies t o the Treaty 
on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Ueaponat ^old at Geneva in 
i^yt I974t demonatrated the d i f f i c u l t i e s of reconciling the 
pol ic ies of the nuclear and non-nuclear states* It ia a matter 
of aatlafaotion that additional atates became parties to the 
43« for detailed studies^ see George Zadorozhnyt 
'Progress l\ibl 
9P* 177-205. 
gg^BBfyl PogxtotanmiJ^y g  ^iblisher, Mosoowt 
First Printing, 19«e), - -
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TreatYf raising th« tota l t o aors than ninety* ^ithough a l l 
ar« agrMd on tha deairabil i ty and signlfioance of preventing 
both the vavtioal and horixontal pooliferation of nuclear 
uaaponsf the conference demonetrated ttm fundanental divergence 
of visy uhieh s t i l l persJbts in regard to the inplesientation of 
the Treaty* 
One can only conclude that the role uhioh the 
44 United Nations ia playing in disarmansnt i s far fron adequate* 
As Dr Kurt UaldheiB» the Secretary-General of the United 
Nationst ono© stated, "But the uorld ia a t i l l uaiting for a 
eore decisive breakthrough in reaching an ef fect ive agreeiMint on 
the limitation of strategio weapons and in particular at present 
concerning the urgent question of tnjltiple independently 
targetable re«entry vehicles*" 
A part of the issue of disarnareent uhioh as 
already notified that i t works not in the Sgourity Council 
but in fact outside i t though the role of the United Nations 
in principle cannot be ignored* a part of t h i s , the United 
Nstions during two and a half deoades has developed a body of 
44« Heport of the Secretary-General cm the work of the 
Organisation 16 June 1974*15 <3une 1975 Official 
Records SUP,J» NO. ('^/iJJJi;, p. 21, Chapter IW* 
45. UN monthly Chroniolai tfol* XI, Number 8, August* 
Septenber 1974 (United Nations Office of Public 
Information), p* 129* 
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ruXetf principlst ami practical experionce in the establisKftenti 
organiaaticm and control of peaeo-kaeping operationa* Thia 
wealth of exparlanc* haa anabled i t t o reapond rapidly when tha 
fHied for p««08 keeping ariaea* Thia uao particularly tho caaa 
in the uak« of tha Octc^r uar in tho f^iddlo ^aatt whan the 
United Nations uaa once again« in a aituation of mxtwmm 
46 gravity called upon to aet up a new peaea'-keeping force* The 
aituation also uaa aerioua in Cyprua when the coup d'etat took 
place on 15 3uly 1974> and in reaponae t o the requaat of the 
Preaident of Cypruot Arohlsiahop makarioat the Council at once 
adopted a reaolution uhioh called ttxt a ceaaefire and laid the 
baaia for negotiationa deaigned to reach a aett le«ent of the 
Cyprua problwo*^ The United Nationa peace keeping force la in 
Cyprua ainoa fighting between Creek and Turkiah Cypriote atartad 
while the United Nationa efforta continue towarda mdiation of 
tha prc^leiB confronting the laland Hepublic* Hence the Unite 
Nationa peace*keaping oparationa are very aignificant for the 
proceaa of peace aaking in the worlds and i t i a worthwhile to 
46. Security Council Rea« 338 of 22 October 1973. 
47. Security Council Rea. 3S3 of 20 3uly 1974* 
48. Security Council i^ea. 186 of 4 Haroh 1964* 
Seel \lm Yelixarovf *The ^roblen of tha UN 
Budget* in International Affairs , of 7 
July 1976 (ATT-Unlon Society "ZNANIYE"), 
pp* 68-74« 
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traoe b r i e f l y t h i s nay ro ia of the Organiaatian t o uork 
mora a f f a c t i v e l y i n naintaining i f i te rnat iona l paaoa and 
soouri ty* uhioh i a i t a prinary taai(» Immediately a f t a r 
axanining the varioua typaa of in te rna t iona l diaputaa* 
UNO AND iHTfcRWATlQNAL DISPUTES t 
Tha United Mationa t raatnant of an intarnaticHial 
diapute <aay f a l l i n t o three categoriea uhara tha United Nationa 
inter faranca tiaa bean sxtanaiua» roininal os n i l * The t h i r d 
category i s ael f -axplanatoryf by i t s meaning ainply that the 
matter haa e i ther not been re fer red t o the UN or whieh« having 
been re fa r rad i gave r i a a t o a diacuaaiun u i t h i n UN organs uhieli» 
i n any foroa l senast uaa ao perfunctory that for a l l p rae t i ca l 
49 
purpoaeOf i t i a afforded to ignore i t * 
Tha United Natiems trsatwent of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
dispute nay be dsaeribed aa extensive whsn the queetion has 
been More or less eontimiously before a UN organ or isrgane for 
a period of t i i i e extending i n t o Months m years* ot uhsn one or 
more d e f i n i t i v e reeolut ions hss been adopted u i t h a view to ths 
peaeeful solut ion or adjuatnent of the dia{»kite» or when aoae 
th ing i n the nature of a UN preaenoet i n the fo r« of peace 
keeping forooy an obaerver group, faet**f inding or nadiatory 
niasion has been despatched t o the s i t e of the disputs or uhsn 
49* Disputes aa of Poland 1944-45 IriDU-CHlNA 194S-S4. 
Ber l in* t9S8-61 , AXQ»ria-«orocoo 1959-63. 
Chinese minority i n Indonsaia, 1965, N iger ia , 
1966-73. Hongkong, 1967. 
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UN organs or rdprosttntativaSf as for instance agents of ths 
^oorstar ia t haws bssn Mors or less aetivsXy engagod in exchangs 
twtusen ths par t iss with a visu t o s paaoefuX solut ion bsing 
SO 
a r r i v s d a t * A n i n i a a l Unitstt Notices in tervsnt iont on ths 
other hand fnay i3o dosoribsd as ons i n uhieh an issue was 
rs fsr red t o a \iU organ uithout being disoussed ox without any 
substantivs act ion being tskent ot uhsrs sn inadequste conssnsus 
existsd anong ^enbsr««tatss for anything i n the nature of a UN 
posi t ion on ths par t icu la r isaus t o bs ft»rasd| howsver» 
i n f l u e n t i a l or otheruiss suoh a pckaition night have been for the 
51 
parties conosrnsd had it in foot bwin rsaehed* It mist bs 
50. Oisputea a s J -
Indonesian Indspendancsy l94S<-49. 
Palestine 194S-49. 
Kashmir^ 1947 ( including the Xndo*%ki6tani war in 
1965 and I 9 7 l ) . 
Korea 1947-53. 
South f^fr ioa, 1346 to praaant ( including the two 
issues of apartheid and ^outh-Uest Afr ica (Namibia)* 
Chinas Tiuan, The Un, 1953 to 1971. Indonesia and 
Usst I r i a n , 1950-62. Cyprus, 1954-59 and 1963 to 
present. Suez (Piiddle Cast) 1956. Congo, 1960-63. 
Rorocco-insuritania, l95a-^9 . Yemen, 1962-67. 
C i b r a l t e r , 1963 - to present. Indonesia 
f^talayaia, 1963-66. Hhodesla, 1965 to present. 
A r a b - I s r a e l i C o n f l i c t , 1967 to present. 
5 1 . Disputes as>-
Greeee, 1944-49. H u s t r i a , 1945-55. South T i r o l , 1945. 
T r l e a t e , 1945-1954. S s r l i n , 1948-1949. Ths Anglo 
I ranian Oi l Company 1950-53. T i b e t , 1950-59. Vietnam, 
1954-1975. Hungary, 1956. fsuacat and Oman 1957-59. 
A nolo- Icelandic F isher ies , 1956<-61* i a o s , 1957-65. 
United States and Cuba 1959-61. Sino- Indian Border, 
1959-65. Somalia, 1960-65. U2 Plane, i 9 6 0 . Kuwait-
I r a q , 1961-63. Cuba f^issile C r i s i s , 1962. Adsn (South 
Venen> 1963-67. (%nama Canal, 1965. The Dominican 
Hepublic 1965. Czecholovakia, 1968. 
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noted that in distinguishing between 8xtenaiv8« miniaal and 
n i l rolee of the organisation in the resolution of the referred 
internatiorwl disputes» i t did not based on the success or lack 
of i t in effecting a peaceful outeone» as to the nore extent of 
the United Nations participation in the proeese of resolution* 
As for the factors uhich account for the discussion 
of posit ive UN intervention in internatitmal disputes into 
extensive and mininal groups rcGpsctivelyt these are naturally 
(Quoh nore d i f f i cu l t to isolate* H i s obviouS|» however* as in 
the case of the "nil role" disputes that the non-representation 
of one or other of the parties concerned weighs heavily against 
any active UN intervention* The Tibet problen, the Vietnain 
conflicty and Sino*Xndian border disputes are examples of this* 
the strong global interest» of a ooral as well as of po l i t i ca l 
nature aroused by the f i r s t and second of these questions and thi 
fear excited in Xndia^ uhich anjoyad for Dany years the status 
of being a highly respected UN De^ber, by China's pressures 
against her northern borders* may be said in each case to have 
offset to some extent the absence of Chinese Coinmunist 
representation at the UN in bringing these c^uestions to the 
Organisation's attontion at a l l * Again* as in the case of the 
"nil role** disputos* tho super Power type of conf l ict i s by i t s 
vary nature not anendablo to effect ive treatissent by the General 
rtssewbly* uhlle the existence of the Great Pouor veto on the 
Security Council neans that any discussion of super potmr 
differences in that organ must be largely rsotricfced to 
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propaganda function only* ThuSf In t^ t« Creak o i v i l war, tha 
i^uatraln cHJeation« tha Berlin or ia ia , tha U2 incident of i960 
and the Cut» niaai la oriaia of I962t ware neeaasarily beyond any 
s ignif icant UN intarvantion ainea tha u l t i iu ta daeiaiona lay in 
tha handa of tha auper ^owera* 
Thua^ many disputed are raftrrad to tha 
Organiaation» remain on i ta agenda» aimply bacauaa under 
exist ing oonditiona there ia no way in yhieh they can be raaolva 
The Organiaatitm haa to a large extent becomes tha depoaitory of 
tha yorld'a Xcnit causesi what other neana of peaceful reaolution 
cannot aohieve tends to be relegated to the UH aa a place of 
laat reaort* There ia a l so the point t l » t the iiore venti lat ion 
of a dispute before a UN organ and the sxiatenee of the 
Organiaaticm ae a neeting place for the world's diploMits 
provide an opportunity ftxt other neane of peaceful aolution 
as bi lateral and multilateral diploMacy which takes place while 
the public argument at UN proceeds» and i t may be that i t i* 
those other Hwana which reap the otedit ttm any successful 
termination of the disfHite which may be reached* The United 
National by interposing delay through public debatea and the 
"letting off steam" in a c r i s i s through i t s missions of inquiryt 
by i t s ca l l s for a oaasefirs when h o s t i l i t i e s have actually 
broken out and the provision of tsams to establ ish an agrssd 
casefiret and by organising and sending peace keeping forces, 
can render a useful service by "de-fusing" a tense s ituation of 
"kaeping i t on ice"* But the Organisation's record ia far l ess 
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inpressivo when i t oameu to aetualiy working out the torno for 
an cgrsed oolution* It i s also argued ttmt the publio forn of 
debate at UN i« a hindrance rather than a help to nake the 
partiee to agree psaoefuliy* It hae heen arQued alao« that the 
United Matione» by keeping international diafMitee "on ice" rathe 
than Making an effective contribution towarda reaolving the«» 
tende to oonoeai the reai nature of theae problesHi* Thia ia a 
atricture which eouid be paaaed on the United ttationa Cnergenoy 
Force in tNi diddle Caat at the ticm when i te withdrawal waa 
denandad by the late Praaident Naaaer Juat before the outbreak 
of the aix-day Arab-Israeli war in 3iine 1967| the world aeeaed 
up to that noRient fmvs forgotten about the Riddle E^ aat conflict 
owing to the appearance of quiescence atiiMJlated by the presence 
in the areaa of the United Nations emergency foroe for the 
preceding ten years* Secretary General U Thant» aurveying this 
incident wrote that the "tendency for peace keeping operationa 
originally set up ae tanporary expedienta to assume a aeni* 
pernanent character becauae no progreaa ia wide in aettling the 
baaic oauaea of the c»if l ict ia a aerioua reflection on the 
capacity of the UN to set t le disputes*"^ The United Nationa 
teuttaX m tim MfflrK pf %tm %OTn4gflti9n> 16 Jung l?fit 
laJiflUUiii l (Ooeunwnt A/fi7Ql/ Hdd. 1). It hae been 
argued that t ^ total withdrawal of UNCF froai Cara 
and Sham al-Shaikhf as well as frosi the laraeli-
Egyptian bordera waa Aore than Preeidant Naaaer asked 
for» and hence that the six«day war of Ourw 1967 was 
partly touched off by UN action* 
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in nany r»9paot« has not proved as an affeotiva instrunent for 
i^lntaining world ordar aa yaa hopad in 194S* Tha auddan cmaat 
of braaoh tuitwaon tha yaatarn ^ouBf and tha Soviet Union ended 
anfaabiad an ^rganiaationt the Charter of uhioh gave suoh 
primary enphaaia to eooparation batwaen the Great Powara« 
Sub8aqiientiy» uith the rapid axpanaion of the Organiaation'a 
sianbarahip raaulting front decoloniaaticmt reaolutiona of United 
{tfationa organa tended to ioaa much of their forcet baaed aa they 
were on the equality of the voting pouer of the grweiteat uith 
that of tha smalleat atatea* But uith a l l tha ahortocmingat the 
Organiaation doea not lack Aaohinary or prooedura for the 
peaceful eolution of diaputaa i f the parties are diapoaed to 
naka uae of then* Undoubtedlyt there ia an intention here and 
there to inprova the praoadure* but aln<»[it a l l propoaals for 
auoh improvenenta aa for instance the advance fornation of 
partaanant "stand by" forcms ready to be rushed at a aoMsnt'a 
notice to a s i t e of a dispute during i t s c r i t i c a l phassst 
sneountar a fatal stumbling block in the form of an inadoquate 
consensus aiiong fienbev•states to inplsoent then* 
HcMever» although the Ssourity Council seldooi 
operates in the imgisterial inannsr provided fat in the Charter^ 
i t haa adopted i t a e l f to the r e a l i t i e s of the t i«es by providing 
a forun where the most dangsrous and aerinonius disputes and 
conflicta can be openly discusasdt and where tisie and oppmrtunit; 
can be gained for the prooeaa of concil iation* ThiSf of courasy 
in the nuclear ags | i s an indiapensable function* The Council 
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nay not aXuays ba abla to aoXva pcobloflMi* 8yt uhan probXaaa 
ara by thair vary t»tuT9 not ayaoaPtlbJla to jUmadlata aolution, 
a ptooaaa of cooling offf adjuatnont and eontalnnant of actual 
oonflXot ia eortainXy tha naxt boat altarnativa* Tr»a Unltad 
Nation* playad a Xittitaci rola in tha affair* of tha Arabian 
P9nin9ula eapaoiaXly in Suraini Qaaia laaua iin Arabic Uahat AX« 
fJuraimi). Tha Oroaniaation did ao»a afforta to oooi off tha 
eonfXiot betyaen Saudi Arabia and Britain* but thia rola uaa an 
ordinary ona beoauaa ona of tha Si^ o^wara iiaa involvad* Tha 
Unitad Nation* CanoraX Aaaaably gav* auoh attantion to the 
affaira of indapandant Movananta in norooeoy Tuniaia and Aig«rifl 
Soth noroooo and Tuniaia oohiavad Imi^imtviMmQm and b9t»em nambai 
Unitad 
in thau^tiona on %2 Nov*»bar» 19S6. In eaaa of Aig«ria» tha 
queation uaa raiaad for tha firat tin* at tha tanth aaaaion of 
tha GanaraX AaaaabXy in 19SS on tha raquaat fro» 14 Afro-Asian 
Stataa undar artioXa It and t4 of tha Chartar* Theaa atataa 
ooapXained that tha Franeh authoritiaa had iMian auppraaaing by 
tha uaa of forea tha novanant of tha AXg«rian oaopXa f<» aaXf* 
datarninaticm and that tha aituation in AXgaria uaa a "poXitiea 
90utc9 of intarnationaX friction and of conoarn to intarnationa 
eomnunity"* (Ooo. 19/2994 of 29 JuXy, l9SSt and CAOB iQth 
aaaaion)* Aigaria aehiavad ita indapandance aftar a Xong 
atruggXa againat franoh impariaXiaa and baeaiM a seabar in tha 
S3 Unitad Nation* on 8 Novanter* 1962*'^ 
53« for noroeoOf aaa C#A, Hea« 812 (XX) of 17 Oeooffiber 
1954. Saa aXaoi M.S. Raian. UnUttf »fitiffni fRti 
g?.qWfftJ.B ^WF^ dJlBtLffiBt TQriont Longtano, 8oirfjay,l96« 
pp. 201*2ia« For Tuniaia, aaa J^IMM PP» 2ig«234. 
Tor AXgeriat aae i£yUU.» 99* 247-259, 
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Ttwvw haw bmtn nany loeaX eonf Uct t nineo 
134S but nam h»9 led t e a uaarld uav* This i» Iieoau0» 
thmm ntmf li6t* twv« not ••oaljitadf i s dus to s oonsitisrabls 
sxtsnt to ths sxistsneo of ths ignited Nations* ^nd sspsoisXly 
of ttis ^oeurity Counoiif as a ^iaoo of appeal^ and to tho t irs lss i 
efforts of ths ^Isiiibsrs to disohatgs thsit sxaotifiQ duties*^ dut 
ths Unitsd (iatiofis i» in iMwd of Qrsat sffoorts to bs iaprovsd or 
in ths t#ords of Bro Ir«$ira Gamlhif tte forasr Indian f^tiim 
^•iniststf **if the United Hatioms yere to disinte^ratSt i t would 
be neoeasary to establish another internetiiinal Urganisstion with 
ths sans objsetivss* let tiSf thsrsfors« breathe new iMMninci and 
purpose into ths Or^nisotion so that i t oan oimats »fi order 
where the ties of fores will defeat i t s own puraoas** 
Apart from ths United Nations pea€W«4ceeping 
operatism in igypt in l9&6y the ^Organisation wndsrtot^ 
S4. See< Introduotion to ths 'Annual j^sport of ths 
Seerstary General on the yask of the OrganisMtion* 
m Wftnlftly ghywttotit ^^ oi* vn» ^o. 9, uetober 1973, 
SS« General Aassebly ConseiRsration Sesaiont i*icNitino 
1081/23 Oetobert 1973* for ths tsitt of ths spssoht 
see UM fie»t> l^v Chronicley tfol« VU, no* i 3 , noveiiber 
197a» i>pm 79«B9* 
S6« ^ee Basis l^sots (2Sth Anniversary Cditiont Unitsd 
r^itians)t P<« 15* %s ^.Uti* dur<^, "The withdrawal 
ef UHCf and ths fytyrs of %ioe Keeping** fntagnatior 
aa||£j3§l, tfol« I3t 1967» p* 1* !>eo alsos MaxwsU Coh« 
*Ths Ossiss of U«£r", Iittsrnatiensl Jpurnal, Wol.23t (1907-68), p. 18. aee) Uuteroaoht, ^.TTm tfRittd 
• • « 12: 
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oany operations in cMiirtain areas to presorts peaoe and order* 
four of these operations are very s ignif icant for analytical 
studies* These are in Mibanon in t^SS, Congo i960, Usst Irian 
1962 and Cyprus 1964« It i s in the opinion of ^.B, Haas that 
the operatioTM were based on the conoepte of orQanieational 
purpoaesf tasks* task parfornance and task type» i t i s an 
innovation in the context of both the Organisational fornal 
objectives as stated in the Charter and the empirical r e a l i t i e s 
57 
of UN practices in th i s sphere before ISSSa*^  However« the 
algnifioance of the etated fbur United Nations operations should 
be considered an exanple of organisational task expansion* 
The four operational oaaes which the United 
Nations peace keeping forces undertook Mire unique in type 
because the United Nations supposed to perform in this respect 
the fundamental duty of any c i v i l government* The United Natior 
57. E. Haas, f^g/fflti m HUm-^t^U* i^oio Alto,l964) 
it* I» see also* Stanley HoffmanOf 'In ssaroh of a 
Thread* The UH in the Congo Ubyrinth* Intarnationsl 
gyOffliaftfeioflt Xtfi (1962), pp. 331-61* See Richard 
J* K i l l e r , flfto ijinPttiakiffAd m<A gc^a l^ff Q^plpwaoy 
(Mew York J Ooeana Publication, 1962)* See a l s O A.L* 
Burns and H* f%atheote, Pg^gj Kftfipj^ nffi bY MtNt/fflTBag 
tXW ^Wtl ttO %tm f^fPflg* CNew York, Praeger, 1963^* 
See also* Sidney 0* aai leyi The SaQyattt*yliftt gf ^hl 
Ur i^t^ d Natior^^ (New York, Carnegie tndouAent for 
International Peace, 1962)* Soe Annual Heport of the 
Secretary General to the General Asaonbly, June IS 
1961 {see alsot Hanmarskjold, *Two Differing concepts 
of the United Nations ^^ssayed*, Intarnatiowal 
0^ ?Qffin;i^ Ptl.9n» V^ (1961/, 549-63. 
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eg 
Chartar while ea l l a fot ufiivaraaX ooliftctlvd aocuri ty but 
a l ao puts l i s i t s for t h s int«ruant ion of th« orQanisation t o 
na t t e r a which ara not eventuaily within the d o m a t i c Ju r i sd i c t i on 
S9 
of the nember Statea* The United Nations in te rvent ion in the 
countr ies already referred about uaa done without invoking Chapta 
\IH of the Charter and the pre&ent^ of the United Nations forces 
was sanctioned by the host governtaent uf the oc3uniriea thesselves 
The Securi ty Council agreed t o t a l ^ such ac t ions which are beat 
described as inatanc(3^s of preventive diplofiiacy* 
The foain raasc^ of the 1^56 c i v l i war in t-^banon 
was the uide '^pread and growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of the Plusiin 
papulation with the governnent of President Chamaun» who hiiasslf 
36« C* Haaat '^aoie uperat iunal Concepts of Collect ive 
Security** ft,ieg4B?n PgUttoJ^ Sflj^ noa ft«v^aiii» voi.49» 
>iew York t^S5>> PP« 40-43. See aXsoi K, Thompson 
•Collective Security «e-£xain4ned% JMsSjuf «ol , 47,195: 
59* Ar t i c le 2, para 7» Sea a l s o I.Claudei *The United 
twations and the Use of Force ' , Inte)ffm1«i9nil 
Cppni l ia t ion . Mo, 532 ( l 9 6 i ) , p . 326. See» yi l l iam 
RVTrye, «^  United r^iatiana Pteace for<^ Uew York,1957J 
60. Sees the Chapter, "Preventive Oiplomaoy as an approao 
t o Peace," in I . Claude J .^wggtiff Ant ft PtOtfffH^gflg, 3rd 
e d . , Wcw York, 1964;. Soo a l s o t S, Hoffman, Qa. c i t . . 
P. 357. See a l s o (CAOR) t s t h Session. Supplement lA 
( A / 4 3 9 3 , Add* l ) . See a lao Stateisent of the Secretary 
General Oag Hasmiarskjold before the Ceneral Assembly 
on hie Beappointnent t o a Second Term, (United Nation 
Department of Public Infornation Preas Release SG/616 
p. 2* 
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is a Chvlsiian naronits* The tabanonoas govarnnent whan 
cal l ing the United Nations fox* aaaiatanoe did not appeal for 
support to defeat i t s d<»estie opposition* I t claiaied« rather 
tli^t armed confl ict had been ror«»nted by the interference of the 
United Arab Republic in the a f fa i re of Ubanon* The United 
States on 14 nay announced that i t was sending a saal l arns and 
police equipnent to the Chamoun Governmnt* The Sixth-f leet in 
the Hediterranean waa reinforced and on Ray 16 the US announced 
that i t was ready to send tanks and men i f requested to assist t i 
restore normal conditions* The Soviet Union* for i t s part* 
uarned that i t regardsd the Utbanoneae orisia aa an essentially 
dofliestic iiiatter* Thus* when the Security Ccxincil took up the 
Lebanon eonplaintf the Big Powers had already taken opposing aid 
on the ieeue* In the debate of the Security Couneilt the United 
Statesy United Kingdon and France sided with Lebanon, ttm Soviet 
Union with the United Arab Republic* Some of the menbere notabJ 
Sueden» expreaaed uncertainty as the nature of the evidence of 
61* See F« Qubaint Lebanon in Crieie« (Uaehingt<m, I96 i ) 
Chap* I I I * However» tirm main reasons of the c i v i l m 
of 1958 also repeated i t e e l f in the c i v i l war of 197! 
and when this Chapter ie under drafting prooeast the 
c i v i l war in Lebanon is s t i l l continuing for the las 
eleven eiontha* I t is said that wore than f i f t y 
thoueande people were k i l led and More than sixty 
thousands are wounded* The whole of Lebanon towns 
specially the Capital Seruit were destroyed. 
62. See J Nw ^ogH T ^ B J , ^f 1?» 19S8, p. 1 . 
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forsign intsiitirenca In Lebanon* Mr tcKlgOf the Unltad Stat«8 
Rapressntativo aaaarted that "thia intarferanoa haa baen daaignati 
to pronota olwii a t r i f e • . . . - " f lna l iy t a f ter a hot and long 
datsata the Saisyrity Couneii tm 11 ^ime iMiasad a Sv^diah reaolutio 
whioh oalled ror the ureant aatabliahnant of an obaervation group 
whleh QOuXd prcmaed to tatc^nan "ao aa to inayra that thara ia no 
i l l e g a l i n f i l t r a t i o n of peraonnel or aupply of arms or other 
natar ia l aoroaa the Lebanon bordera*" The Sooratary General 
y&a authoriaed to aaKe the neeeaaary arrangenenta and to inform 
the Security CounoiX of the obaervation group*8 aot iv i t iea* 
HoiMitfery the wcnrding of the reaolutiwi uae done 
in auoh a way that i t poaeeaaad both broad and narrow interpre-
tat ion* for both Lebanon awi United States atrasaed that the 
obaervation group waa to inaure that i l l e g a l i n f i l t r a t i o n of ara 
Ac 
or peraonnal took place* Thia nieana that the United Nationa 
Obaerver Group in Lebanon (UNCKIIL) oan act ta prevent auoh 
i n f i l t r a t i o n by arreating auapeotad in f i l t ra tore t confiaoating 
£3. Of f ic ia l ftaoorda of the Security Council {0RSc)|823ri 
Meeting9 p* 47* 
64* Sea the text of the reeolution in ORSC, 82Sth aeetin 
p* 7* doth Lebanon ami UAR accepted the reaoluti<M« 
Thia reeolution uaa eupported by Colo8ibia» China»fra 
Iraq* 3apan« Panamat Syeden. Canada» the United ^ing 
and the United Statea* The soviet Union abatalned* 
65* See Gerald Curti8» "The United Natione Obaervation 
Group in Lebanon*** tottnatignftl Pyofflni§fl^ limi ^oi*i 
No, 3 (l964)t PP« 738*6S* 
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arnot and «o on* The Secretary ConaraJI«ilr HanmarakjoXdt 
houevmtf took tha narrower view* He made i t olaar that he 
enviaaged UNOCXL ae an ohservation group designed together 
inforaation and not a police force* Its task not to take 
action against an alleged aggressor* It uas rather to determin 
yhether or not the dispute should properly be taken a dOB»stio 
natter* Xtm ohasrvation grcnjp uaa headed by a three een 
Executive CoiuDittim ooapoaod of f^ r Galopleza (Norway), Pit Oayal 
(India) and General Bull (Noruay) who euperviaad the obaervatic 
66 
operations* But while the United Nations doing beat efforti 
to implement the Saourity Council Resolutiont the s ituation hac 
bean transformed by the landing of United States narines in 
Lebanon on 3uly 15* The United States intervention a i l i t a r i l y 
levered by the revolution in Iraq and feared that thie night 
take place in pro-western Lebanon and Jl03:dan» oonpletely 
transfomed the nature of UNC£IL*a poeiticm* 
The Security Council iRet from July 15 t o 22 to 
fifl 
re-evaluate the s ituation but fa i led to take any aotitm* 
66* Jit^xt* 
67* UNQGIL 3rd Report S/4085. 
See a l s o : Quiney Wright "United States Interventioi 
in Lebanon", ftffigyXc^n Pffwnal ff,f. infetynati..fflnffA y y i 
Vol. 53, 1959, p* 112* 
68* nr Lodge, the USA Repreaentative explained the US 
intervention, renewed retol 8uspici«)s abcxit the U 
role and caused to lose ground in i t e efforts to 
preserve fi^ eedom of am^enent acroes rebel held are (ORSC), 827th Meeting; see a l so l New York Tiaaa^ 
3uly 1958, p* 1* 
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The Soviet Union reeoltition eai l ing both the United States 
and the United Kingdom to cease their i l l e g a l arned interventior 
in Lebantyi and Gordon and the withdrawal of their troops 
immediately fa i led to tm adopted^ and the ea»e a l so in case of 
the United States resolutitm cal l ing to establ ish United fiiationi 
oommand» s in i lar to Korean force* the resolution fai led when thi 
Soviet Union oast a negative vote* The Japanese draft 
resolution requeeting the Secretary General to take additional 
Asaeure necessary to f u l f i l the general purposes of the June 
11 resolution and to proteot the t err i tor ia l integrity and 
po l i t ioa l independence of t^benont the Soviet Union, however, 
vetoed the resolution beeauec i t fai led to condemn the United 
70 States and United Kingdon for "aggression acts** 
At th is c r i t i c a l Juncture when tfw Security 
Council kwcane inoperativet the Secretary-i^eneral invoked 
the doctrine that "the Secretary General should act to f i l l a 
vacuum in the systen provided for the safeguarding peace and 
71 
security", and made clear that he would continue to develop 
the United Natione Observer Group in Usbanon (UiJOGiL) in a 
ffianner consistent with June 11 resolution unless instructed to 
69, Ooo. S/PV. 829, p. 21-
70* See the text of the Japanese draft resolution in 
UH Doc* (S/PV 83S), p* 6* 
71. (GAOft) 15 Session lA ( H / 4 3 9 3 . Add, i ) . 
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the contrary by the Security Council or in other wordo he 
proposed to act as though the 3apanese resolution had iseen 
adopted* The Soviet Union in his part did not object to the 
72 
continuance of UNQCXL in i t e original forn* 
The General Aaeambly at th i s stage took UP 
the Lebanon issue from August 8 -> 21 but no decision uas 
reached} Mowever* the ilaergenoy ^esfiion then began* The Soviet 
Union emphasised on the withdrawal of Uestern troops while the 
United States stressed the need for a long term policy and 
consolidation in the region* However* the outcoBtt of the 
debate was prinarily influenced by events in l^banon when 
General Chehab» the Ariay Chief of staff and the person accepted! 
to the najoxity of both sides in the dispute* uas elected 
i^resident by t i^e Chataber of Deputies on ^uly 31* The intensity 
of the confl ict diminished and artaed fighting became rare* The 
73 UNOCIL reported that no instances of in f i l t ra t ion were found* 
The General Assembly owing t o considerable diplonatic act iv i ty 
atsong the Arab States produced a resolution which the Gerraral 
Assembly passed unanimously on August 21 oallinc) the Arab 
States to l ive together in a s p i r i t of outual tolerance and 
good neighbuur*linea6 in pursuance of the Charter of the Arab 
League* It called thd Secretary General to f a c i l i t a t e the earJ 
72* The difference between th is att itude and Soviet 
actions during the Congo c r i s i s i s striking* 
73. UNOGIL 4 t h Report (S/4110) . 
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withdrawal of foraign troopa. At tha aaiRa time Laisancm withdrew 
i ta original cemplaint about th« Unitad ^rmb Bapublie intexflirence 
in i ta doneatie affairs* TNi tatsanon criaia onded whan Mr Rakhaai 
Karani fomed a coal i t ion govarneant at tha and of Ootc^r* On 
14th Novambert tha Saoretary Canaral announoad the withdrawal of 
the United Nations Obaerver group in Lebanon* The United States 
atarinea alao departed Lebanon fma aonth before* 
The rola played by the United Nations through 
UNQGIL denonatrated the unsuooessful attenpta exerted following 
ttie doctrine of preventive diplomacy which iapl iea the prevention 
of direct intervsntitMi of the Big Powers by the aethod of United 
Nations intervention* The intervention of the United States 
obviously neant that the United Nations fai led in one ot i t s 
ncMit important aims* The United States f s l t that the coup d'etat 
in Iraq was not aubject to UN control* Out one can not deny that 
the United Nati^ina Observer Group in tebanon was moat e f f i c i ent 
in services though i t was upset by tN? United Btatea interventiw 
The Secretary Generalii fr Hansjaarskjold acted his role as "Foreigr 
Plinister of the UN** and emerged in th i s c r i s i s with acre personaj 
75 
prestige and pov^r in his concept of •preventive diplonacy*" 
The presence of the United Nations certainly helped to miniaise 
74* Curtis, auf Qi%i9 p« 761* 
7S* J* Laah*. *Hanfl»rskjolds* uonoeption of his Offiee*i 
MigrMiUpnaX Qgoanli^tign* voi, i6, (i962), P. 547* 
Oag HafliRKirskJoldy *The Charter and the Future of the 
United Nations Secretary-General", Maarican 3airnal 
8f lntigr»ti9mJL I^ Wt Wol. 56, NO* I , January, 1962, 
P* 28* 
^sei ^nnys4 f^fvAsM pf ^M%M4 fi^%im9 ^ffs4gi 
(New York! New York Univ»Press 19S3), . . . 1 2 8 
PP*22 to 30 (overall,HamoarskJold*6 views). 
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the level of intensity and i t e neutral bet^viour infused nore 
trust and confidence that the rion<Kiligned Statea and the Soviet 
Union nay remter their support for future United Nations peace 
keeping operations* The uisdon of the Secretary General to l i e i t 
n i l i tary intervention oonbined with po l i t i ca l non'interference 
through tmxiimX oompliance uith %tm domestic Jurisdiction clause 
uaa highly appreciated* 
The Deaoeratio Republic of the Congo, a former 
Belgian Colony* became independent on 30 3ime I960* In the 
days that follouedt disorder broke out^  Bel^iurr sent military 
troops t o the Congo, stating that i t s al» was to protect and 
evacuate Curopeans* The Congolese Coverranent on 12 3uly asked 
for United Hatiams military assistance to protect the national 
territory of the Congo against external aggression* The Security 
Council tQBpiOivimd by authorising the Secretary General to provide 
the Congolese Covernaent with such sii l itary assistance and called 
7fi 
upon Selgiun to uithdrau i t s troops* Briefly speaking, the 
primary objective of the United Nations in the Congo was to 
76< K. Gordon, The UN ^n tlW gflngq» (W«u fotk, 1 9 6 2 ) , P . B . 
See o l sot A* Van Bilssn, *Smm Aspects of the Congo 
problem*, IntogmUfffffl ^^fNUftt ^oU 38, (l962) notes 
that before independence t^ w Belgiane always favoured 
a centralised government etructure for ttw Congo* Hou 
thB fortune of yar lead one to change one's tunes* 
Bore seriously the change in policy was not indicative 
of new Belgian interests rather Katanga's secession nc 
came to be aeen as the test uay of preserving Belgian 
economic interests* 
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pravant a diract confrontation of the Soviet Union and the 
United States , or of Belgiua with some of the ^fsit»n Stata»* 
(lore than thatf te to expel tho Belgians^ the laaintenanee of law 
and order, the unification of the ConQO, fa i t and equal treatnent 
of a l l domestic f ict ions* The intention uaa to achieve a l l 
these aime uithc^t Intervention in the Congo's internal 
p o l i t i c a l confl ict I ')t f i r s t the uae of f'3rce uas not arised* 
«B Hoffman statedf that the tneana were sinply not cwomeneurate 
>r 
79 
78 
uith the end99 But due to uorst s i tuation happened later on. 
the Security Council passed i t s resolutions of February 11, 
80 
and November 24, 1961 authorised ONUC by the end of 1961 to 
resort to the use of forcsi i f absolutsly necessary, to avert 
c i v i l war and to expel unauthorised fonelgn personnel from the 
Congo* 
The United Nations f inal ly yas obli^eu to lioal 
uith the donestio issue by t(w wee of force, supportinQ the 
central goverrasent against both Tshotnbe and l>i:;enga* ' Thus 
77* E-9 Haas, loo, qife.f p* 125* 
78. S. Hoffman, ^Mt, SUtf P« 338. 
Tor eore detai ls concerning peace keeplnn forces, 
see Hahoatullah Khiin, laflJAatf ^MSaM • tlW UnitiiA fip^tii^^ (Vikaa f^Jblloation, Delhi, 1970;, op. 41-73. 
79. ON Doc. 3/4741. 
80. UN Dae. S/53Q2. 
81. A Burns and N. Heathoots, loo. Cit*. pp* 154-160, 
and 136-137. Katanqa's aeoeasion. 
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tanporavy peaoa and order u«ro iaposad by tho abandomwnt of 
th« non-polit ieai approach davelopad by HamiarakJoJld* Sut» th« 
politic^X aoJlution ean« whan th« graat poyara, no iongar oouXd 
support trie aana central governnant* The oaaa of OOtUC, despite 
i t s faiiuraSf auet therefore ba taken as an inatanea of 
organisational growth relat ive to previous UN operationa* 
The SQopa of ttm Mi l i tary ae t iv i t ias undertaken 
by the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) without 
invoking the CNirter*s anfar(»Mant prooedures certainly 
represented the assuMption ad hoe of far greatsr reaponaibilit iM 
by the United Nations in the mil i tary f ie ld t but did not lead to 
the creation of stronger United Nations structures» i t is in the 
contrary* FurthariROraf the policy of non-intervention and 
po l i t i ca l neutrality was never t ruly observed because ONUC did 
not refrain frcHs taking action to preserve hunan l i f e and public 
property* 
In eoKparison to the ac t iv i t ies of the United 
Nations Observer Croup in Lebanon (UNQCIL), the ONUC were 
less specific and i t s achievemints were not peroanent for one 
reason is that the aaae situation was repeated when foreign 
aaroeneries again serve Tshonbey while Afro-Aeian radicals 
particularly the United Arab Bepublic reportedly uere supplying 
and training the reiMils* The United Nations in i t s turn under-
took a policy of "wait and see" but never intervened again* 
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yhsn Iftdorwsia aohisvvd i t s indspftfidono9 in 1949 
fron Nathariands* th« future of y»st Neu Guinea or U«ct Irian 
raiBairaid unaattXad* Xndoneaia broufiht the iaaua before the 
United («iatione in 19S4 olai«inQ that West Irian belonga to i t . 
The Netherlande maintained that the Papuoua of Unst Now Guinea 
were not Indoneeiana and therefore ahould be aliouad to daoide 
their ayn future* The United Natione General Ass^nbly dieeuaeed 
the orieie on four ocoaeiona between 19S4 and 1961 without any 
progreee* In Oseenber 1961 the reiation between the two 
countries deteriorated when President Sukarno ealled for tNi 
general Mc^iliaation of the ar«y and the population to "free 
West Irian,''®^ 
In the final yaara of the dispute the IHiteh 
beeaiRe increasingly inellnsd to see the United Nations ablss 
to solve the issue* It suggssted first a UN aiission and in 
Ssptenber 196i UN Trusteeship for ths territory» but Indonesia 
refused to consider any UN role whieh was not directly connected 
to her demand* Howevert later due to United States and Units 
Nations efforts an agraeiMnt reached on ^uguat 15» 1962 in uhic^ 
both Indonesia and Netherlands had agreed that a temporary Unite 
B2* f<taaing*fl gpfffeawpgrflgy ^ggh^vMt (1^52), P* 1884S* 
83. n.S. Rajan» IOQ> Cit.> pp. 23S»240« 
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Nations trusteothip over Uest Irian youXd ba •stablished 
beginning October 1» t^2« H uouid be heacted by mutually 
acceptable non*Indonesian adniniatratc^f and the Dutch o f f i c ia l s 
would be replaced by Adeiniatratora drawn fron other nemtMir* 
Statea. The f i r s t phase of UM adnlniatration would expire m 
Ptay 1, 1963 and then the adainiatration of the territory would 
be handed to Indonesia. Uithin seven ysara of the Indtwwsian 
takeover* in 1969 a plebisci te would be held to detariiine uhethe: 
the people of Uest Irian u i s ^ d indepemienoe or joining 
Indcmeeia* It i s a l s o stated that during ttv: pttwiod of 
Indonesian adainisttation the United Nations repreaentativea 
could remain in Ueet Irian, one year before the plebiaoitet a 
United Nations Special Bepresentative would be appointed to help 
in the supervision of i t s conduct* The residsnts of West Irian 
were guaranteed the rights of free speech and free asseably} the 
right to e lect local o f f i c ia l s vma to tw «(par«isd« It was hopsd 
that diploMatic relaticms between the two cCKatriss would be 
retuBied very soon* The agreeeent would take e f fect when r a t i f i i 
by the United H&tim%9 General Aesembly mnd the constitutional 
authorit ies in Indonssia and Netherlands* 
The United Naticxts General f^ssenbly endorsed the 
AgreeMintf and on 1 OctoiMir 1962 the United Nations todk ovsr 
84« It i s paraphrased fran the fu l l text of the 
Agreeaent published in the United Nations Hawi«u. 
Vol* 9, No* 9« September, 1962, PP* 37-43* 
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administration of Uaat Irian fron Natharlands* A aaourity forca 
of 1500 tiaa mtpplUd by Rtkiatan* In faet« houavart ttia Unitad 
Nationa Tanporary Eaarganoy Authority (UNTeA) uaa eonfinad to 
policing aetivitiaat invaaion of Uaat Irian iiaa no longar a raai 
poaailiility and tha only potantiai iarga military opposition to 
UNy a %puen ravoltt navsr aatarialisad* Thua» ona CHin aay tha 
UNT£A*$ security functicvia uara apeolfically high* Thara 
haua haen no raporta of any military aeticrna takan by the UN 
foreaat ^nd nothing aarioua diattirbant^a to law and ordar had 
oeourred and tha Unitad Nationa foraa fiHietionad ita polioa duty 
vary offioimntlY* Tharaforat tha qoaation of tha Unitad Nationa 
uaa of foroa navar baoama an iaaua* 
No graat Pouar waa involvad in UNTLA itaalf* Tha 
Soviat Union ahouad no iMJOh intaraat though aupportad Indonaaia, 
tharafora* Craat pouar inf^rvantion tn tha diaputa waa navar 
imminantf tha W)ly dangar of thia yould hava baen a mjor war 
batuaan Indonaaia and Natharlancto* Thus* tha objaetiva of tha 
Unitad Nationa uaa not to aaa Indonaaia and Natharlanda eoma int( 
uar* Thia objaetiva uaa aohiavad* UNT£A uaa a atruotural 
innovation uhioh helpad tha Unitad Nationa to aaoura a aattlamani 
SS. MnAtftti HU9m «gv4gW» Vol. 9, NO. \0 (Oetobar 1962), 
p. 10. 
86* Very l i t t l e haa bean written of tha Unitad Nationa 
brief truataaship over Uaat Irian* Tha ona full langtl 
article ia by P* Van-dar*Vaert 'The Unitad Nationa in 
Uaat Irian I a Critique*, n^ttirndtJ^ gfWJ. Pggflnigfltiffint 
No. 1, Vol, 10, 1964. 3ae> ^^jmajLHvlWt UniUJ 
r^ fttlona Affaiya (New York Univ. Preaa 1950},pp.61-75. 
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mitualiy aeo«Ptat}X« t s a l l confliet«d partias* Sinca eolci war 
iaauea wars not involved in thia isauaf the great powera 
refrained thaoiaeivea of opposing eeeh other* TNi United Nationa 
in thia reepeot pyramid a polioy of preventive dipioaHiQy« acting 
aa a buffer between mmiber Statea m\ tim verge of arn 
ecmfrcmtation* The role played by the Saoretary GenereX U Thant 
uaa eonaonant yith Hamnarakjold's viewa that the Secretary 
General doea net tmm^ an explicit Mandate froa the General 
Asseably or Security Council to parforn diplomatio aetivitiaa 
deaigned to end threata to internati^Jn^l peace and eeeurity* 
Cyprua obtained ita independence in August 1960 
with a oonetitutitm that waa intended to balance the intereata 
of the island's Greek Cypriot ninority* The Treaty of Auguat 
I963t entered into by Graeee« Turkey and the United Kingdon, 
guaranteed the beeio proviaiona of the constitution and the 
territorial integrity and aovereignty of Cyprua* HowevertaaveraJ 
inoidenta of inter oORMunal violence occurred in 1962 and a largi 
87 
aeala ocmflict arose in 1963* 
On 18 February 1964» the Security Council again 
cGvivenad againet li back ground of renoMid violence on the Island« 
87* «*S* Kagan, oo* ai^*. p* 247. 
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On naroh 4* th« Sacurity Counoil unanlnouely authorised a United 
Nationa p«ae0«kaeping foroa in Cyprus (UNFlCYP) for thraa aontha 
period*^® Tha thraa nontha l imit tha UNFICYP»» oparationa was a 
built in control of i ta ac t iv i t i ea by the Security Counoilt for 
i ta extenaion would require the unaninoua consent of tha Parnanant 
nei»bera» Tha appointnant of a meidiator alao denonatrated a 
recognition that the Foroe*a auooesa depended on a po l i t i ca l 
solution to the crlaia* 
Tha acopea of UUFlCfP*z toilitary ac t iv i t i ea ware 
broader than thoaa of UNQGlt. but nora limited than thoaa of 
ONUC* Its main ccmcarn was to arrange a ceaaefire whenever 
fighting broke out* The procedure folloued in auch cases was 
to confer with the leaders of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
forces and try to convince then to accept a ceaaefire and the 
inter position of UN troopa to create a neutral zona* Other 
iiBportant ac t iv i t i ea of UNFICYP were diaa»ntling lailitary 
fortificatic»)8 and diaarming irregulars* But attanpts at 
po l i t i ca l nediation have ao far fa i led to produce a aolution* It 
appears only to fraexe the po l i t i ca l criaia at i ta original lev/aJ 
The ooomunal tunaion and inoidenta of violence continued in the 
Island t i l l IS 3uly» I974f when an abortive coup d*etat took 
place that obliged Turkey to invade tfw Island in order to extend 
atrong auppcnrt to the Turkish Cypriote* On 20 July, tNi 
88. See United Nations Wonthly Chronicle, Vol* II , No. A, 
Hpril 1964, coniaina a good aunraary of the Security Council debati 
and includes the text of tha resolution^ p* 8* 
89. Secretary General Report (S/ i i336) . See a lso Official 
Records of the Security Council Twenty Ninth year, 1779th and 
1780th fieatinga* 
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Sooucity Counoll nmt at th« rsquett of the 9«pe«sttfitativ« of 
GrMcw to consldat th« situation foilouing tNi landing of Turkiah 
foreas in Cyprua* Tha S«curity Council unanlMoualy adoptad 
raaolution 353 (|974) of 20 July 1974 by uNioh i t callad upon 
a l l Stataa to iraapaot tha aovaraignty* indopandanoa and 
ttrritorial intagrity of Cyprus I oall«d upon the parties oonearnai 
to atop firing and damanded an iniRadiata and to foraign Military 
9l intarvantion* 
Tha Cyprua oriaia as Sseratary Canaral Kurt 
Ualdhain onea atatad "waa a elaaaic axaapla of a problaM 
which Unitad Nationa paa«a kaaping oparatlona always faoa in 
92 timsa of eris is na«aly tha prohlaai of credibility*** Thua« tha 
aaarch for peace ia a t i l l aueh needed and the peace keepirns force 
of ttm United Nationa plays an indispensable role in iiaintaining 
peace and in performing a variety of humanitarian tasks uhils tht 
search for a permanent eettlement goes on thmigh avsn i f i t 
93 
appeara aueh a aolutitm ia a t i l l far away* "* As the Secretary 
General Kurt Ualdheim expreaaedt "The fact remainat houeveri thai 
90* itziitu 1781st neeting* 
91. For detailed report of the eituationg aee 
Security Council reportm (s/l1339) of 12 puly 
1974, CS/11340) of 18 auiy 1974, 3/l1353/Add.2-«) 
of 22 and 2S July 1974, (S/11568) of 23 May to S 
Oeeemtswr (s/iiS68) e^itaina a siMmary of UNFICYP 
operations einee the coup d*etat on 15 3uly 1974* 
92. UN Honthlv Chronicle. Vol. XI Number 8, of 
August-September 1974 (MH Office of Public 
Information), p. 122. 
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a »tittl«««nt emn only b« r«aeh«d through tha poiitlcaX uiXl and 
d»tar«ination of tha fiavtiaa to aottlo thoiv diffovoneeo by 
n«QOtiatlon«**^ 
fmt points aro roquirod hora to bo notad about tha 
axpatianoaa uhleh tha Unitad Rationa found of tha four inataneaa 
in Labanflnt tNi CcmgOy yaat Irian and Cyprua* 
firstly s Tha anfcoreaitant proeaduraa authoriaod 
by tha Chartar yara by paaaad in favcur of tha laaa inatitutiona* 
iiaad and tiora flaxibia taehniquaa of praventiva dipiooney* In 
aaoh eaaa* tha Unitad Nations intarvanad in what uaat to 
oonaidarabia axtentt an intarnal politioal diaputa uhioh aight 
turn into a larga aeaia araad oonfXiot batwaan aevaral atatea* 
Thia ia quita diffarant frCM tha iaaua of tha niddla Cast in 19S£ 
and 1967 batwaan tha ^rab Stataa and IsraaX uhioh was laft for t^ 
laat Chaptar of thia thaaia* 
Saeondiys Ganaraily^ i t aaema to ba a praoondition 
of Unitad ftationa niXitary invoXvaaant in diaputaa of thia 
oharaotar that tha graat pouaroi oainXy %h9 Unitad Stataa and th( 
Soviat Union refrained fron taking an indapandant aotion* Tha 
eooparation of the boat governaantt and tha init iat ives of tha 
Secretary GaneraX to aaeura fron tha naiibar Statest the «an» 
s^tariaX and aonay required to depXoy ani effective UN faroa are 
aXX vary neeassary eXeiients in the functioning process* The 
94. ibi<LL» P* 123* 
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axpffisno* ef UMQGIt and QNUC dunonstcaUd that uhatavor i t a 
mn ptefmt9ntm§ naithar tha Qtw»t Powar can aaeura tha dia* 
nantXaaNHit of a Unitad Natlofui forita whlia i t a axiatanea and 
act i t f i t iaa ava muppoftma by a graat M j o r i t y of tha laaaar powari 
and unooMRittad atataa* But thia doaa not aaan that tha Craat 
Pou9T» my aat indapandantly and uniiatataXly in ordar to bring 
tha outooffia of tha iiimfMittt in thair own intaraat* 
Thirdly! Rare l imitat ion in tha foreaa iiakaa 
tha United ^ t iona laaa in i t a involveaant in non*nilitary 
adiainiatrativa aot iv i t iaat tha laaa oontrovaraial yara i ta 
progra«UK3a and tha graatar waa tha Organiaation'a ab i l i t y * 
Although UNQCIL*S ae t iv i t i aa wara not a lMya aaooth. ONUC*a 
nora asbitioua progranma fa i led to obtain tha po l i t i ca l 
pacification and unification of the Congo* UNQGIL obaarvata 
at no t iaa uaad arnad foroa in tha parforaanoa of thair ^%i»9f 
uhila UNflCYP dutiaa wara mora broadly dafinad and tha uaa af 
forea baoaam aaaantial which inoluda for irmtanoa tha aafaty 
aaauranea of c iv i l i an t r a f f i c on the Kyrinia Road which inada 
greater inroada on tha nomal Juriadiotion of tha hoat 
governnent than waa true in the cKiae of the UNiXIL* 
Fourthly I The ad hoe and inproviaad nature of 
peace keeping eparationa aiao hae praetioai inplicationa* 
Such operationa are uaually aountad at very abort notice in 
reaponae to a or iaia* They depend on fcha imnediate ava i lab i l i t 
of the appropriate national contingenta and| ao fart governaant 
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have not faliad to ir««pc»nci in tli« no«cl«d hout* Sn tha absancs 
of parflttfiant paaea kaoping aatabliahwantat tha log ia t io and 
adrainiatmtion of thaaa oparatlona ara diffarant aapaeialiy in 
tha aarly atagea* TNilr aitequata financial aypportt {particularly 
when tha oparationa o<mtiniJMi for a nunbar of yaara, can alao ba a 
aarioua ptf^laa whiehf i f i t ia not aolvady impoaaa an undua 
burden cm the gfMerniBanta prfHfiding eontif^anta* 
Fifthlyt Tha UN ae t iv i t i ea in tha four ralatad 
inatanoea ravaaled tha inoraaalng oantraliaation of adminiatra* 
t i ve control in tha poratm of tha SecVatary General* Theae 
pouera apiwared at a iiaxifliue in the lenaQaaent of OdfUCi but the 
Congo t r i a l alao aerved aa a leaaan that ttua vary acope of hia 
power can be a threat to the Secretary General* making i t aieple 
for oppaaition to the United Nationa policy to fooua on hin* The 
influeAce of the General Aaaenbly tiiaa a l so at i t a peak in the 
Congo caae* Both major powers energad from the enperience 
apparently more oautiaua of permitting the Afro-Aaian dominated 
Aasembly to enjoy a large role in tha guidance of peaem keeping 
oparationa* The Cyprua quaation i l luatrataa tha pointt wee 
diaousaed only in tha Security Council and by making the 
exiatence of UNflCVP aubjeet t o periodic votea of exteneiont the 
Security Council alao curtailed to aome extent tha Sooretary 
General freedom of action* 
Sixthly 1 It hae been etreaaed that a asnaa af 
mutual truat and confidence betuean the United Natione and 
the hoet government i e very eaaential for emooth function of the 
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United Nation* Fwcos* The UN position in the Congo was 
d i f f i cu l t where the Xegitinate govarnMent of the host oountry 
appeared antiiguoue* Therefore* in ttw atieenoe of general 
principle to guidm the United Natione in euch a eituation* the 
beet ocKJree for the ehiefs of the Force i e to follow tirm Soourity 
Council and the Ceneral Aeaenbly guiitonee* 
It i e vary iiuoh convenient to coneltide by aaying 
that peace keeping operatione« deepite their ehortecaings have 
eo far proved extreRHily very essent ia l and iuseful in certain 
conf l ic t aituatiwie* They are» for exaaiplet an indiepeneable 
part of the laaintenanoe of quiet and search tot a aettlenant in 
Ueet ^eia and Cyprua* Sut one thing hae t o be notif ied in t h i s 
reapoott that i s t the United Naticmn peacw keeping i s s t i l l an 
ad hoc Bxpedientt working only when a l l the parties to a conflict 
accept i t * It i s in no aenee a neaaure for the enforoenent or 
imposition of the deeisione of the Security Council^ nor can 
peace keeping forces turned into Military strength conpetitions* 
These lijaitations in no way detract fron the very great uaefulnei 
of peace keeping operations* They can alao in c r i t i c a l 
situationsy create a considerable degree of public d i s i l l u s i o n -
stent* bsaed on a misunderstanding of the natures of the United 
Nations peace keeping eperatione* But with a l l the disadvantage 
either of the peace keeping cperatione of the United Nationa or 
i t s role in aolving international disputes* no two persons 
diaagree that the United Nationa i s the only useful inst i tut ion 
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for uovXd PBttom and uelfarn iHUst pr«vail« The 
Saorotary Cfin«ral| Or Kurt Uailc!hoiai> statod ** ••• there 
ua« no rational alternative in the international relations 
9S to the prinoiplee and proesduree of the United Nationa** 
95* See 
rioc 
t l InfcgQduotAi 
"I'VIM'VJi 1 »fWii •!«''f il f^Vf for 
the pe od, 16 3une 19?4 to IS 3une t97S, 
Thirieath Session* 
Pjetei For further detailed information 
oonoerning finance of peaoe keeping 
Oj^erationSf aee Reportary of practice 
of United Natione Organs. Supp* No. 3» 
Vol* 1» covering period of 1 Septefl#er 
19S9 to 31 A n ^ i t 1966 United Natione» 
Viou rork 1972)» PP. 240-292. 
CHAPr£K - IV 
yCST A3MW ISSU£ XW TH£ UHQ 
The United Nationa 1» directly concerned In 
the yeet A«lan Xaeue Cor »B i t le now kncn i^ elnoe 1967 
Middle Caet Problea)* the origin of which gc«B back to the 
General Aasefflbly reeolutlon of 29 November» 1947t which created 
larael* Uhlle the Arabe opp(»ed that reeolutlon and made It 
d e a r they would realat from the etart the establlahiBent of the 
Zlonlat aoverelgnty In any part of Paleatlnet the world Zlonlam 
hailed It and oonalderad It a h is tor ic event that llnke the 
State of lerael with the United Naticms ae i t l l luatrated in the 
worde of Mre Golda nelr» the foraer Prise ninieter of Israel in 
her epeech in the oottaenorative Seesiont Twenty Fifth Anniversary 
of the United Nations on 21 Uotober« 1970« "The United Nations 
wi l l always be linked in the aind of our people with Ite toXe in 
the ettergenoe of lerael* Israel cannot forget that the 
1* jil Hgg ffffffiflittflg gf tihfl ^ftlBifcina yyeatlwif ^uii»nary 
Raoord of Reetlnge 2S Septenber (25 Novembert 1947)• 
United Nations Official Recordat the Second Session of 
the General Aasembly (New York, Lake Suceese), p* 43* 
See a l so figMfflr Atgflnty|y ^quynflAt Verbatiea record of 
the Sixty £Ight-Seventy Ninth neetings. First Special 
Sa8sion» (New York» 28 April 1947 • 15 Play 1947, 
A/Py/68-rt/Py-79>, 
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Organiftatiort put the aaal of Intdrnafcional recognition upon 
i t s historical process of return* in gathering» liberation and 
2 
developMent*** 
The United Nations should fe«l regretful by 
creating the State at Israel which beooa^s the sain cause 
of violence and ins tab i l i ty in the regicm and a nenace to world 
peace and tranquality* The United Nations mads i t s greatest 
mistake thirty years ago* If certain examples of fa i t accompli 
have been acoeptedt the a r t i f i c i a l creation of Israel in 
%lsst ine wi l l never be agreed t o . No interimtional problem i s 
more symptcMiatio of the c r i s i s of tha United Nations than the 
s i tuat ion in the Aiddle ^ast* The failure of the United Nations 
to apply the provisions of the Charter against Israel i s one of 
the factors which has encouraged Israel to continue i t s 
occupationt i t s policy of t err i tor ia l expansion and to defy 
United Nations resolutions* 
Israel existenos depends as i t i s expressed in 
the words of the Jauish writer Alfred Lil ienthali 
**Hbove a l l , Israel must achieve complete 
national normalcy by ceasing to be the Jewish 
and becoming the Israel i state* T ^ atate of 
2* See the text Qf the Speech on page 49 in the 
Uff f»fff1tnJly ghrffn^Blg, Vol. VII Number 10, November 
1973 (United Nations Office of Public Information 
New York)* 
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I«ra«l, t o bo nornaly mtst solamniy withdraw 
a l l olaiiRS to th« faalty of anybody but i ta own 
e i t izsna. for unleaa a atata'a aovaraignty ends 
at i ta bordara^ i t la an abnorMal fraud and a 
dangaroua freak* Unlaas tha atata of laraal 
amv9tea i ta uabil ieal t iea with private po l i t i ca l 
and propaganda organisations outaida i ta bardera» 
i t deaarvaa neither the recognition of tNi 
c iv i l i zed world nor the cooperation of i ta Arab 
neighbour a*** 
The expulsion of the i^leatlniana fron their hone*land and the 
eatabliahjwnt of the i^ioniat State was a human disaster for the 
Palestinians* Speoirioallyy Israel aiuat from the outaet at 
loaat ifflplaaent the various decrees of the United Nationa which 
created i t* These resolutions stipulated an econoaic union of 
f^ilestine* an internatiemal rule over tNi c i ty of Perusals* 
which i s the holy hone of three world religione« and a Juat 
solution of the Arab refugee problem* Out larael defied and 
eontimias to defy the United Nations resolutions* It e»barked 
on terrorising and displacing the indigenous Palestiniana and 
3 . Alfred n. U l i e n t h a l , mi P |4B§ hs^aP (The 
Institute for %lest ine Studies^ B«ruit 1969)» p*240* 
4* Robert Stephens, Maaeer. A Pol i t ica l Biooraohv. 
(London* ^Ulen Una, 1971J, p* 83* 
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iKporting In th«lr plao« al ien of 3«ylah faith ftam a l l ovar 
the yorld#® Thua, i t uaa with tha United Nationa raaolutlona 
oall ing for tha partition of Paleatlnet tha eatabliahnent of 
Arab and Jawiah Statea and an international atatua for Jaruaalam 
that the raourring eonfliota between the Araba and larael began* 
The Arab nationa refuaad to accept the reaolutiona and afterward 
none of the Statea involvedf Arab or 3ewish» reapected the 
previaiona* 
The historical eventa which revealed the iiritiah 
inperia l iat io rule in Paleatina that paved the way for the 
4^ioni3t3 with the help of the United States of America to creat 
the atate of Xaraelf are well known and need not be repeated ir 
7 
dflUilat . 
nora^ett 
the 
S* rtlfred FU Lil ienthai, S3t c l t f t P- 87. See alao 
Dr nahaood Badi Shariff, ^tf^nOflyg i ¥ %teat4ne» (The M i 
i^reaat tondmif I973;t PP» 2**25* See alao, t^rooeedinte of ^na
3eruaale» Ideological Conference, jfMMP f9t .%h9 ^9fajLaM gf , 
^^gniaWt j?flMgY ^ng the ^fcile ,q,f, ,|glftiii» '^ (Spring t9S9 n*p*), 
PP» 140'44» At thia ecmference convened by the i^ionist 
Organiaation in 19S7» Ben Hurion developed his original theaie 
6# United Nations Official flecorde of the Saeond Saaait 
S t thg fiinagj^ f^aaBlfaiy (New Vork. take Succesa), ?• 40, Plero satinga of the Genaral Aasanbly Second Session ^pm 13t2f1317 
13S7|136S»1364»1327« Official Hecords of the Second Special 
Session of the General Aeseisblyt Vol* I, Plenary Reetings of 
General Asseably, Ap^ix I6*>nay 14* 1946* Sumiaary Records of t 
Meeting» I72nd neetingt I73rd neeting, 170th fleeting, 283rd 
Meeting* 293rd naeting, 296th n»eting, 298th fleeting, 3Qlst 
nceting« 3Q6th neeting» 3a7th Meeting, sasth neeting, 309th 
Meeting, 3l0 Meeting, J l l th Pteetinga, 332nd Meeting, 333rd «! 
334th Meeting, 335th Meeting, 337th Meeting, 33eth Meeting, 
343rd Meeting, 3S4th Meeting, 3S7th Meeting, 35l3t Meeting, : 
Meeting, 365th Meeting, 367th Meeting, 373rd Meeting, 374th 
Meeting, 376th Meeting, 377th r*eeting, 378th Meeting, 379th 
Meeting, 380th Meeting, 38lst Meeting, 394th Meeting, See a l 
resolutions of the Security Council in 1948-49t - ^7714, Xst 
April 1948; S/723, 16 April 1948; S/727, 23 April 1948; S/77 
22 May, 1948; S/801, 29 May, 1948J 3/902, IS July, I948j i / l 
19 October, 1948; S/1070, 4 November, 1948; S/1O8O, 16 Noveo 
1948; 3/1169, 29 December 1948; 3 / i376, 11 August, 1949, 
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de t a i l s* Tho growth of thd Zionis t novenentf the Balfour 
Oeelaration of Novanber 2ftdt I9t7t tho in tervant ion of tha laaguo 
of Nationat the mandatory period* a l l theaa faotora traced the 
way for tha General AssoRibly and the Secsurity Council in the 
United Nationa t o endorse the baeic Zionist demand t o create the 
B^%9 of Ifffag; Ofi t^ tffT f^Yt 194»f° 
7 . See Alfred ?«• U l o n t h a l t oo, e i t » . PP# 23-47 and 
163<*228* See Or n*S* Houanif *The Great Powers and 
the Pa r t i t i on of Palestine** rtl«4\rab. (Office of the 
Arab League in India* Vol* 11* No* 3* narch* 1972)* 
p* 4* See, Or* Rohd* Sadi iiharif, Cfa« c i t * . pp.2-45* 
S&e Palest ine Hoyal Coomission Beport* Cmd* Paper 
S479* feRfiai fiUailn P'ayilflBintftgy f^psia (London. 1937 
p. 23* Parliaftentary Oebatea, Hcajsa of Coamona iLondo 
1948), Vol* 326, Col* 2330* 
See* Hibert « . Hyamson, BOftlUML* ^ Pftj^ lfiy (tondoni 
fJethuen 1942), P* 11 a. 
See: a*C. Hurewitz, T|w.atgtfOfl4fi fffF ^^Asgfcing (^eu 
York! U.u. Norton, 1953;, pp» 18-20, 
Sees George Antonius, The <^rab Huakeninp (Philadelphia 
Lippincott , 1939;, p?* 2S7-e. 
Saet Naofai Uiencr Cohen, I h i fte^fitjon ^f ^9t9mJu^tiit 
(Publicationa of th? American Jeuish His tor ica l Social 
New York, 3une 1951), p* 365* 
8* NahUB Sokolow, ni.g1iffgy gf ^Aftniflffl (London* Longaan's 
1919), Vol* I , pp* 24«2S* Sea no r r i s Ja s t rou , ^ioi^i^i 
and the future of Palaatina (New York, naeiBillan,l9l9 
P* 26* 
Seel Phi l ip Henderson, TtW U f l Qf Vtmr.^noa QJfc^ ffhftnt* 
TpvaAUBi P,M9mU mti Pyetig (London, Robert Hole, 
19S6), pp. 203-205. 
See Arthur Hertzberg* Thgu^49nA§t ^dg»t a HUtjWiBfll 
'^rmlYffia and togil (New York, Ooubleday and Herri Pr 
1959>, pp. 145-47* 
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The diplcMRatic nanoeuvrse oulninating in the 
Balfour Deolaration uera of otuoial Inportanes in ettablishing 
a fraras work in which Zionian eouXd ttxtand i t e a l f far beyond i t s 
own natural l i« i ta» Couolwd in vague language and short of any 
direct conmitnentt tha Oeclaration implici t ly reoogniied the 
existence of a special Jewiah ocmneotion with % last ins and the 
right of the Zionists to repraeent the Jewish people in this 
g 
regard* Realising that they did not in fact possess the 
credentials to speak or act on behalf of world Oewryf the Zionist 
sifiiply asauiBed the role of a 3ewi8h i^rlianwnt sanctioned by the 
world comMjnity* f^ particular iraportanes in th i s general 
plan was the extension of the Jewish 'Agency to include non<-Zionii 
participation* Chain Uelzmann conceived the idea as a way of 
"drawing into the work of %lest ine those 3ews who are not 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
Sae Albert Haytnson, ir4t49tl Pyft.iggta tfti ths 
iS.^ ^offfHiffn flf ^hg Jgtjfl tp ^^gaUna (London, 
Aaerican Jewish Historical Sooietyt I9i8) jEaill»» 
See Aian f^ * Taylor , *Zionis8» And Jewish Hiatory"* 
^wrn ;^^  Pf P|itotting studiaat voi« i , NO. 2 (Seruit* 
Winter, 1972;, P9* 35-51. 
SeQ Note 6 for United Nations -^eaolutiona* 
See Alfred M* U l i e n t h a l , oo« o i^ . . pp. 48-87* 
9* Sesi The Declaration in Appendix (C). See^ Albert 
Hayi&sQn, ggf, gUnt ^SSM' 
1J« 'At the ^auentaanth ^ilionista Congreas, Chain Ueizmann 
frankly adaitted this* i»ee niohael Ss lzsr , The Wines 
^,t^ f,hB mmi4 (Naw York: riaondUan, 1973), p. 177* 
^ee* Hapheal Patai, trans. Hary 2ohn, The Comolal^ a 
giayJ^ga .gf TfWfftiW ^nilf («»« York, Herzle Press and 
Thomas Yoaelaff, 1963^, 41. 
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11 P«»pat8d to ca l l thamaalvea Zionists*"' 
Ths nattsv of 3«yl8h ld9ntity« which the 
Zionists wsr« at odds to defin« in tho QWitext of thair 
own po l i t i ca l perspaotivst ul t i»at«ly bsoana an iasue in tha 
Stata* Ttm Law of Boturn did not establ ish cr i ter ia of 
^awishnasa though in praotioa thara waa i n i t i a l l y a atrong 
tendency to defer to the orthodox viewt linking nationality to 
re l ig ious a f f i l ia t ion* Thia has gradually been nodified ao that 
now the atate's position i s v is ibly closer to the original 
Zionist doetrinet which stressed race and peoplshood over 
religicNjs o«M&it«ent and 3ewiah tradition* This nay not be 
trouble««Mie to aany 3eus in the l ight of the owiteapcanary 
world's secular orientation* but i t does underline the increasing 
separatist of the Jewish State from the Jewish past and raises 
12 intr icate questions of values and identity for the Mt^ern 3ew* 
11* Chain Ueizmannt Trial and Errpr (New York, Harper 
and Brothers 1949J, p* 307. 
Seel Abraham Hevuaky, ^tug in ^^Xfiltini (««« ^otk, 
aiooh, 1945), pp* 220 -21^See Ben Hecht» Perfidy (Hew York, Julian Rsssner, t 9 6 l ) , pp* 18, 21, 101* 
Smt Hannah Arendt. ^igtfflPnn in JBgtftftXlff ft f^tPPgt..il 
tfW flanffiUtY ffif ^ni '^^ g" yog«<« ^^ K^^ fq Pioas, 1963J, 
PP* 38, 5S, 56* See Arthur Hertzberg, oo. e l t * . 
pp* 14S-47* 
12* The Thirtieth Session of the General Aseembly of the 
United Nations adopted a resolution considering 
Zionisa aa a sort of raois l discriminations* Resoluti( 
3379 (XXX) of ia Nov* 1975* 
3eet norris Jastrou, oo* c i t * . p* 26* 
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ThU8t historioaXly 8p8aking» the s i tuation in 
%X«8tino do«« not ston fron the 1967 war* There was no 
state of XaraeX in 1945 when the Chatter uas drawn upS there 
uae a Zionist iiovenent» dating fron the nir^teenth eenturVf 
which was a po i i t ioa i novenent using Judaism for po l i t i ca l and 
eeonottio entiu* Chriginally, the Zionists in Gerfnany asked the 
Kaiser during the al i ianoe uith OttosMin Empire to persuade the 
Sultan to permit an enclave in Palestine* The Sultan refused* 
saying the Holy Land wae a trust* The Zionists began to work 
uith British* Chaim Weizmann worked uith his Brit ish fellow 
Zionists to bring the United Statee into the f i re t World War in 
exiihange for %lest ine after victory* Weizmann himself describes 
an interview uith Lord Robert (Later Viscount) Cecil of Chelwood* 
the Assistant Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs* in which the 
Zionist pleader stressed the point that a "Jewish %lestine wculd 
be a safeguard to England* in particular in respect to the Suez 
Canal*"^^ In July 1937 Winston Churchillf speaking of the 
Balfour Declaration in the House of Ccmmon^ ^ saidt "It i s a 
delusion to suppose thie was a mere act of crusading enthueiaem 
or qui ie t ie philanthropy* On the contrary* i t was a n^asure 
taken •«••* in due need of the war with the object of promoting 
the general victory of the AHiec , fot which we expected and 
received valuable and important assistance*"' 
13* Ctwtim Waizroann* oo* oi t>, p, 192* 
14. Parliamentary Debates* oa. e i t . 
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ThatB i s much evidsnc* that th« British 
Goverrwiant issued the Balfour Dsolaration for Mors 
practioai reasons than a nere bel ief in the Justice of 
"Jewish rights*" The Suex Canal needed a protective base in 
a nearby territory where as Ptofeesor Temperley s tates in his 
History of the Peace Ccmferenoe "inportant elsnents would not 
only bound to (Britain) by every interest# but would commend the 
IS 
support of world Jewry*** C,P, Scottt the editor of the 
Manchester Guardian^ who became a piller of strength to Zionist 
cau8e» spoke of the "national hone" aa a sscurity measure for 
British Suez.^^ Churehill« in the 1922 Mhite Papert also talked 
of the "further developacnt of the existing Jewish oomounity" of 
17 %lestine "to become a centre*" As Colonial Seoretaryi he 
assured a deputation of 'traba that a Jewish national home did not 
mean a "Jewish Government to dominate Araba. Ue cannot tolerate 
IB the expropriation of one set of people by another*" 
IS* J*y*v. Temperley* HI§1iPry fff th i ^MBa ggnfitftnat» 
(nacmillan Coeipany» New York, 1947)» lU, p. 173« 
t6. See William Z, Cargo, T,hB .griflln fff, tflB 9flifWg Qaelaration. Vol. XXV111 (f^pers of the Hiohigan 
Academy of Scienoe, Arts and Letters 1942), pp*597-6l2 
17* Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, (London, 1922, 
Cmd. Paper, 1700), pp. 12-21* 
18* Albert n* Hyamson, oo* e i t . . p« 112* See a lso Carl 
Balfauria defence of the Mandate in the House of Lords, 
June 1922, reported on page 9S of Haymson* 
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In I945t tlM British were bankrupt and oould not 
sustain the l^ndatey so they threw i t to the United Nationst 
as they threw the f^andate of South Uest Africa (Namibia) to 
South Africa* By early 1947^ events in Palestine clearly demanded 
international intervention* Zionists were more than ever ins is t im 
on a Jewish majority in Palestine in order to secure a Jewish 
oomcnonwealth* the British were res is t ing to respond* The Arabs, 
fighting both the British and the 3ew8» were demanding an 
independent Palestinian State* Britain f e l t that there was nothin 
l e f t but to place the oontroveray before the United Nations* A 
special meeting of the General Aaasfflbly was called by the United 
Naticms Secretary General Trygv t ie* Sunitting the dispute to 
international adjudication (1r Ernest Bevin« Britain's foreign 
Minister sccusad AsMirican pol i t ic ians of wrecking any chance for 
19 
an amicable solution of the Palestine problem* 
The Special Session of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations which convened on April 26t 1947 decided 
to appoint a CocMBittee to investigate the situation in '^lest ine 
and report to the second Regular Session of the General Assembly 
in Ssptembert 1947* The Soviet Unicm proposed t o seat the Big riv 
19* United Nationst Official Asoords of the 2nd Session 
of the General Assembly (lake Success, 1947), I I , 139* 
See J Trygve t i e , n^ thi fiflygj 9f PflaQg* («acmillan 
Company • New York), pp. 158*198* 
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on thia "fact Finding Unitod Nationa Special Coanittsa on 
Palaatina" (UNSCUP), but the auggaation uaa rejectad. Tha Unitad 
States oontandad that the ptaaance of the largaat pouera on tha 
i n i t i a l eonnittaa of inquiry uoi^d raise an c^staoie to a fairt 
inpartial report* So tha Conmittaa waa constituted of eleven 
smaller national Auatraliat Canada» Cteohoalavakia» Guatemala, 
Xndiat Iran» fiatherlandSf Paruf Suedent Uruguay and Yugoalavia* 
20 
with Juatioa Cmile Sandatrom of Sweden as Chairman* The 
Cominittae uaa unable to praaent unanimoiB findings* A majorityt 
Canada, Czechoslovakia) Guatemala, NotNirlanda, Peru, Sweden and 
Uruguay proposed partition of Palestine* ^ tainority, India, 
Yugualavia and Iran proposed a aingla state with a federal 
structure* Australia supported neither plan* her representative 
on the caamitteet Oohn 0«t« uood, contended that a comnittae of 
inquiry ought to present any suggaationa in for« which did not 
prejudice 3udgeinant by the General Assstably, and this principle, 
he f e l t i t m^d been violated by both sides in the Comnittee* On 
September 3 , 1947, the General Assembly designated an ^d Hoc 
Committee to consider the two suggeaticns* AH Member States of 
tha United Nations were represented on this Committse which e l se 
the Australian Rinister for Foreign Affairs, Herbert V* Evatt, i 
Chairman* The new committee held t i i r t y four mestings between 
September 25 anii November 1947* The Jewish Agency and the Arab 
Higher Committee were given an additional opportunity to be heai 
- — - m - • - r - | • - • • - - - • - -I' r • m- i -mi m i n" r>n i» .u i i i i 1 1 iirrr iiiii [ i i . n i ii . i . ijj' i. ui I I I U H H L J I - . U I I U W J L u i u t J i - M J H - L i J U U M W t f i 
20* See? Or fl.S. ^gwani, fl9t gJLU» ^U«Ara^. 
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The Rajority (Partition^ Heport was mainly dsfendaci by Garla 
Cranados of Qauteaala and Bodrlgluez Fabrogat of Uruguay» uhoaa 
atQuiMnia wsra astinlahlngly repleta ylth Zionist philosophy* The 
United Klngdon representative* Arthur Greeoh 3one8» clarif ied at 
the outset that hie Gouernffient had no Intention of Iraplanentlng 
any U*N« plan ulth iSrltlsh forces (.mless both s ides to the 
eontentlon aooepted the plan* Sir nohd* Zafrullah Khan* Foreign 
Minister of Pakistan» bore the brunt of the Arab fight against 
Partition* Ha sfflphaslzod that the right of Palestinians* 
1*203*300 Arabs to ehac^e the form of gouernment under which they 
wished to llvie was guaranteed by the Charter of the United 
Nations* The United Nations could effect lusly prescribe* Sir 
Khan pointed out* tho conditions uhlch uould secure for the 
country's 625*300 Qeus complete re l lg lo i»* l inguis t ic* educatlona 
21 
and social freedtm ulthln the Independent State of Palestine* 
In November 1947* the Ad Hoc Cotamlttee started 
voting* It f i r s t turned to the resolutions of the Sub«>oonmlttee* 
Two which contained the ^rab vleu point* By a vote of 25 to 18, 
ulth 11 abstenslons* tha ful l comslttee rejected the proposal ths 
the s ix questions concerning the Balfour Declaration and tho 
21* "^d Hoc CoauBlttee of the Palestine Question** 
Suaaary Becord of Meetings* 25 September - 25 
November* 1947* United Nations* Official Records 
of the Saoond Session of the General Aasambly (New York Suoceas)* p* 40* 
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nandata ba aubnittecf to tha Xntarnational Court of Justiea* By 
the 9V9n eXosar vote of 21 t o 20 tha Ad Hoe Cosmittaa diamiaaad 
tha quaation for oonpotency of tha Unitad Nationa t o anforcat or 
racomaand tha anforoanent of p a r t i t i o n without tha conaant of the 
o a j o r i t y of tha People of PaXaatina* On both thaaa iaauaa 
Argentina! S r a i i l f Coloabia» £l«3altfador» Craaoat H a i t i i L iber ia 
and India aupportad tha Arab Statea* 
Tha ooMsittaa then adopted raaoXutiona which 
raqiiaatad a l l nainbara of tha United Nationa t o take back 
thoae Jewiah rafugeea and diaplaoed paraona \JA%Q belonged to thea 
and deeire te f i a t t i a t ion t and to aNiorb othera in proportiona to 
tha area and econoiiie reeouroee of eaeh country* Thaaa were only 
reeomiwndatiQne» but they advocated abaorption of re fmeea in 
eountriea other than in % l a a t i n e * But the United Statea voted 
againat thaaa raaolut iona* The ictoa waa defeated by 18 to 15* 
The aatabliahiient of a unitary Paleatine waa voted down 29 to 12 
with 14 abatantiona* The p a r t i t i o n plan i t a e l f eaa i ly paaaed by 
a vote of 25 to 11 with 17 abatantiona* On every a ingle 
reaolut ion oonaidared by the ooiw»itteet the United Statea and th( 
Sc^iat Union had voted together* 8ut deepite that auapeot harao 
the p a r t i t i o n plan going before the General AaaeiBbly uaa ao tua l l 
a Minori ty propoaal* A majority of 32 had e i the r voted nay or 
abatainadf or were abaent including three of the Big f i vo t franc 
China and the United Kingdon* The delegate froio Sweden^ the 
country which had headed the Spacial Coimittee of Inquiry admitt 
• . . I S ! 
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22 that the plan "has Ita weak sides and SOBMI dangeroua omfalpslon*""" 
Th« Canildian daXagats supported ths partition plan on tha grounda 
that i t uaa ths "baat of four unattractive and d i f f i cu l t 
altarnativaa*" New Zwealand*6 aabassador talkad of thg "grava 
inadaquaciaa of tha praaant prapcutaly'*^ Uhila SalgiiMs's Foraign 
Hiniater Van t^nganhona aaid th i s of the partition Plan* *^9 ars 
not certain that i s conpletaly Juatf u« doubt uhathar i t ia 
practioali and \jm are afraid that i t involvea great risk •••« 
But uhat ia the alternative? The aolution propoaad or no aolutio 
at a l ly that ia to 8ay« s t i l l nore aerioua troublaayif not utter 
ohaoa* Ue do not uant to asaiMe ttm reaponaibility for that« 
either by a negative vote or even by an abstention* That ia uh] 
ue are reaignad to voting with the majority*** Of a l l dalegatf 
heard in thia diaouaaiont the Belgian alone hit at the vary ide 
of Zionist Ssgregationt "The Palestinian Qt^ation i s particular 
disturbing for the Belgians* They have to nake an effort to 
understand Zionisa* The national hone of our 3euiah patriots 
in delgiun* ito ana has treated then in suoh a way as to sake 1 
uant to find another hosw in f'aleetine*'* But s t i l l » Selgiu 
22* iklttlt.* P* 1312* 
23. MsU» ^P* 1317-1319. 
24* iluLilM P« 13S7* 
25. ilLUU.i P* 1365. 
26. itULGb.t P* 1364* 
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vot9d for partition* Hersohel Johnson for tho Unitod Statos 
tried to eontond that thio was not partition in roalityt boeauso 
of tha proviaiona for aoonovio union and for tha intarnationaliza-
tion of ^aruaaian* H« naively enviaaged that the boundary between 
the two new statea "will be ae friendly ae the boundary which rune 
27 for three thoueande Bilea between Canada and the United States*"* 
On the Morning of Novenber 29« Or Qawaldo Aranha 
of Braziif General Aaaeebly President told reportera he was 
optinietio that two-thirda majority vote wotild be obtained for 
the najority Report* Ae the Session opened* the Zioniata 
oonfidently announced iMrtition was the absolute irreduoible 
niniiai»t i^ilo the Arabs nee-kly pointed (Hit they wight accept 
a Cantonal State euoh ae the Minority UN Seop-Heport had 
reoOM»ended« Howevert the vote was taken and partition wee 
decreed by 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions and one absent* The 
ehifted poeitien of Liberia was astonishing enough} but truly 
sensational were the effiraative votes of Haiti and the 
Phillippines» who (»ily twenty fc j^r houre ago had been fiercely 
attacking the najority propoaal* In the tunult noaenty the 
declaration of the Arab States that they would be not bound by th 
decision of the United Nations was eoareely noticed* But the 
breaoh between the Ueat and the Arab«>f1oale« world had atarted* It 
repercussion was to be turnoil in the Riddle Caett and Ancrioan 
preatigei together with that of her Aixiooi haa eunk to ita louei 
ebb in history* 
27* Ibid*» P* 1327* 
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Ttm pa r t i t ion ing of ^ l o s t i n a was t lw f i r s t 
and only major issue on u^ioh the U*S, and the USSR had 
worked together i n hamony since the inception of the United 
Nations* The Soviet Union had pressed the United Nations for 
the e a r l i e s t possible withdrawal of the Mandatory Powert and 
for ofovioiw reasons} the e a r l i e r the evaeuationy the sooner the 
QOllapse of law and authori ty and the greater the ehaos in the 
lutst i f l i period between the two adMin is t ra t ivea , the bet ter the 
ohanoas for oomitunist sehening in the area* The Soviet Union 
Bade January I t 1948 the date for the B r i t i s h departure* 8ut 
the l a t e r was f i n a l l y s a t i a f i e d with nay 15*^ 
One oannet help saying that the United Nations 
deal t a asvera blow to the prestiQa of the Charter by i t s 
hastyr f r ivolous and arrogant treateient of the Palestine issue* 
The General Aesaably turned tioun the only tuo reasonable 
auggestions * a referendufl) in Palestine and submission of the 
l ega l prcAleois to the In ternat ional Court of Just ice* The 
Oiaplaced Persons Problem uas handled with outraQsous 
thmightlessnass* The nearly unaninotj» reconiBendation of ths 
28* The General AessMbly s t ipu la ted a data "not 
l a t t e r than 'August 1** for the termination of the 
flandatet but the Mandatory Pousrt anxiotm to 
re l i eve i t s e l f of the burden-some responsibi l i ty» 
withdrew even e a r l i e r * 
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UnltAd Nations Speolal Com«Ute«f that no sctt lenent of the 
Palttotino probioB oould bm oonsidsroei a solution of the 3euiah 
problant yas oOMPleteXy neglsoted* The United Nations flouted 
the pvoteetive injunction of the Balfour Oeoiaration» the 
nandats and the reoootacndetions of the ^nglO'^mevitan Comnittee 
of Inquiry* that Jewish statehood uas not to be granted eo long 
as hos t i l i ty existed tjetueen Jeus and Afabs* The United Nationc 
conneotod the formation of the 3eui8h and Arab States to the 
acceptance of an econonic Union and the internetionalisation of 
3eruaalea>* But s ix yaara after ttw fateful deoisionf there i s 
no Arab Palestinian Statet there i s no acononic Union* there i s 
no international city of ^erusalenf there are no boundaries* 
there i s no peace and s tab i l i ty in the whole area* There are 
nou almost laora than one and half a i l l i o n ao*calIad *Arab 
refugess* and the United Natione later on (22 November* 1974) 
sxpresssd "Its grave concern that the Palestinian people has 
been prevented froffi enjoying their inalienable rights* in 
particular the right to s e l f determination*" The United 
Nations further corrected i t s grave error when in 1974 
recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the 
legitimate and so le organieation representing the Paleetinian 
29* General Assembly «es* 3236 (XXiX) of 22 November 
1974* See Official Records of the General Assembly 
Tusnty-ninth Session* Plenary Meetings* 2282nd 
neatiiig* Paras* 3«83« 
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P0Opl8t anci i n v i t a d tim ^ l e s t i n o t ibora t ion Organisation t o 
par t io ipatv in ttm «tt8«ian and tho work of the General Assembiy 
30 in the oa(>aoity of an obearvar* 
33« Canarel AaseMbly Rae. 3237 (XXIX) of 22 fiove«iber» 
t974» Saa aXeo Plenary lleeting 2296* ^eo Genee^l 
Aasaiibly Rea* 3132 (XXtflXI) of 12 Oecenbart 1973* 
Sea Canaral Aaaeobly Rea* 3210 (XX XX) of 14 Ootobar, 
19749 2268th Plenary naating* 
For More Infornat ion scmoaming the ro le of the 
Palaat inian Arab ftaaistanoe novonantf aae tho 
fol lowing a r t i o l e a published by Al^Sayyedf 3a la l« 
'Ai«>Thaura a l - r i l a a t i n i y a a l^^uaa l l ah* ' (The 
Palest inian Arnad Revolut ion)! A^^Kat^f^, X, I I I 
(Cairo* 1970), pp, 54 -61 • 
Sharabi . Hiahan, Tahear f i l a a t i n tJa Al*Tahrur 
Al«Alani* - (The t i b e r a t i c ^ of Palostine and World 
U b a r a t i o n ) %hU*m ^Uaifcinya* ^t 3 (n.P» 1971), 
pp. 113-17* 
Sha*ath, Nabi l t ' F i l a a t i n al-Ghad* (The Paleatine 
of Tuaorrow) §hSi*m fUaflfe^nyat i f 2 ( a e i r u t , 1971) , 
pp. S<»23« 
Sulayoani Nidiammadf "Al^nuqcuMia a l * f i l a a t i n i y a t 
Kayafa faradat Uujuddha* - Hou tha Palest inian 
Reaiataneie A«arted i t e existence Al Pta ' r i fa . IX , 
98 (Camaacus, 1970) , pp« 2S»46« An analysis of ths 
f ^ l e s t i n i a n reaistenoe novaownt in i t s p o l i t i c a l , 
e i i l i t a ry and socia l aspects* 
TlaSf Mustafa, *Al«Kifah a l - t iuaal lah ual«al*nuqawaiMi 
a l * f i l a s t i n i y a * Armed Struggle and the Palast inian 
Heeistanoe, ^JaYftJ i4*ffhaatlf ae»»h a^-aha»h- 968 
(Oamasoi^s, 1970), pp^ 36'^8« 
Al«Khul i , L u t f i , 'al^Tiiiqayama a l - F i l a a t i n i y a 
al-C^usallah bayn a l - I r ah ab a l *Thaur i ua Harakat 
al«>Tahrir al->Uataniya* •> Palest inian Arnad 
iiaaiatansas Revolutionary Tarrarism and the 
National Liberat ion noveaent* f l ^ T ^ l i ^ . IV, 9 
(Cairo, 1968) , pp* S-14* States the main features 
of the ^ l e s t i n i a n Besiatenee a f t e r 1967* 
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Thust a i l ttm aoeunuXation of dispute* and 
oonfliots 8t«ns fron trw partition of ^ l a s t i n e and the 
oethode of i t e realiaation fvoa the 1948 uat* The partition 
and the nergenee of the 3ewiah State exerted a eignifioant 
negative influence over the euoeeqiMint poiioiee of the Arab 
Statee and on their intemationaX oonduet* whieh waa often 
guided etrong raaaon that injuatiae hae been done againet the«* 
Peace uith Juatice ia the cardinal demand of a i l the Afaba* ' 
31* Alw^zm, Sadiq Oalal* * Israel ua al-Tasuiya a l -
Siyaaiya' • larael and the f'aleetinial Settlement • 
ShM*yn ^Uast^liYat if 4 (Beirut, 1971), pp. 78.79» 
Analyaia of the l a r e l i intorpretation of a 
pa l i t i ca l settl&raenta as a contractual peace treaty 
eetabliehing fu l l p o l i t i e a l , eoononio and diplonatie 
relationship* 
A^mi Axlg Ahmad, *Oaulat Filaatin al-riustaqilla» -
The independent ^tate of Palectine - al^Talia. VII, 
6 (Cairo, 197l) , ?p. 1sa-59. 
Makhla, Emlle, *al»illaqut a l -S lyus l i al-Arabiya 
al-^nrlkia f i fiuhtauaha al*Xsraeli ' "• ^rab Ansrican 
Pol i t ica l Helations in the Israel i Context -
t \i*m fUMtitoiYat (Beirut, 1971), pp. 126*36. scussion of American pol i t ioal ralatlons with Arab 
co^ntriae as dcterained by Israel i intereflbi and the 
Palestine probleo* 
3alitn, f^ uhaoffiad Ai«3ayyed, 'Al-Ittihad al -Suf lat i 
wa al*Qadiya al-fal istninya* • The Soviet Union and 
tha Palestine Problem * %l7^i]f^M. iMd^MSIXMt «• 1? (Cairo, 1969), pp. 32-53. Oisouaaion of Soviet 
f'alicy touarda tlw Palastine Problem during the peric 
1917-69. 
Hazzuq, Aaad, »A1-Aqida al-Suhyiniyia Fi Zii 
al-3allam' * litsniat Idealogy and ^ e^ace - Shu'un 
fUaatl^n^Yftt 1» 3 (Beirut, I97 l ) , pp, 35-47. 
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Th« basie faaturt of th« oonfllot between the 
Arabs and Zioniata i s the aoloniaation of Palaatine by the 
Zionists and the subsequent ocoupation of the surrounding Arab 
territoriesf leaving the Arabs with the prc^Xen of liberating 
their OQoupied land* The faot i s that the Arab POOPIB were 
diapoaseesed of their land by force and turned loose aa refugeea* 
Israeli oooufiationiste puratM a poliey of plwider» terror and 
deportation* Hundred thoueands people have been driven froe 
house and hoMet whole villages have been raied to the ground 
since Israeli annexed Paleatina in 1946*''' The new 1967 
refugees spi l l overt and although the United State* of Aesriea 
early reoogniaad the poesibility that disaster here would 
provide an opening for Soviet infliMniMif Ierael*8 unpreeeured 
reeponae to faeilitating the refugees* return i s ' ' l i t t le better 
32* Edward H« Buehrig, Tha W m4 thi Pglgglitoiin 
MfUBtM* <Jildiena University Press, 1971), pp. 
2S-29* 
See< 3an Kiaehe, Ijli, ^>8ffl!d g^flfe ^MftKOTiflflt 
(London a Thoaae k Hudson, 1970) last chapter* 
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than a flaaco*" 33 
33* Suehrig* Ibld«. 9* 42» 
S«8 also Ganeral Aaaaaibiy Ros* 194 ( I I I ) paragraph 
11 of 11 Omomabtit 1948 eoncerning ths rapartriation 
or ooapanaation of Raleatifie refugeea* 
Soe fttp?yt pf m ^nUiri HtUfflB.gflnoUiftti^ 
tha pariod from 30 Sapt««bar 1973 to 29 Saptanbar 
1974 in Purauanea of paragraph 3 of tha Caneral 
Aaaaably ReaolutiOfi 3089 (XXVXIX) of 7 0ee8»bar,l97a* 
for tha prifttad taxtf aaa offioiaJL Racorda of tha 
Ganaral Aaaa«tilyf TwntV^ilntri ^§V^9il^mf Annaxa8» 
Agenda i tan 36* 
^••i Saoratary-Canaral ^ftoor^ (A/97AQ) aubnittad 
purauant to Caneral AsaaiibXy raaoiution 2Q89C (XXVIII) and tha 'Conmiaaionor Canatal* raport for 
tha pariod 1 July 1974 to 30 Juna 1975 Ooo* (A/10013) 
aupp* No* 13* 
Saa Final raport of tha Unitad Nationa CoQnoiiio 
Survay lliaaian for tha rUddla Eaat of 28 Oaoaoibar 
1949 (A/AC»2S/6» Parta I and I I ) • Rap^t by tha 
Saoratary Canaral undat Genaral Asaen^y raaoiution 
22S2 (e«S,tf«) and Soeurity Counoil raaoiution 237 (19S7) (A/67B7 and Corr* I Ooe. S/8124). 
Saa othar partinent G»naral Aa 
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A» on pwvitHM OGoationBt tNi •xt«nBion of 
th« nafidats by th« C«n«tai A«»«ttt}ly was deoidttd "without 
projudieo to tho provisions of paragraph 11 of th« Conoral 
AseanbXy rosolution 194 (ill)*** a ramindar that in aora than 
25 yaars no prograss has tiaon nada in iMpiammtation t^ tha 
rasoXtitian "that tha rafUQoss uishing to rattirn to thair hoaea 
and l iva at Paaca with thair naightiotira shouid ba parnittod to 
do ao at tha aarliaat praoticabia dat«» and that eonpanaatian 
ahouid ba paid for tha propsrty of thoaa ehooaing not to ratum 
and for loas or daaaga to property whiehf undar prinoipisa of 
international law or in aquityt should ba a»da good by tha 
34 
govam«ents or authorities raaponaibla*" 
The Palestine refugees were bound t o be affected 
by the debate on the queetion of idlest ine that took place in 
the Genaral Assenbly at tha Twenty^^fiinth session with ths 
partioipationt at the inwitatitm of the General Assembly, of the 
^ l e s t i n e tiberation Organisation (PLO) as representative of the 
Palestinian ^eoplet and i t was the occasion for widespread 
34* Official Heoords of the General AassMbly^ Twenty 
Ninth Session, Suppl, No* 13 ^/9613 and Corr* l ) * 
3&. G,A. Res* 3237 (XXIX) of 22 Hov* 1974* See a lso 
G*A, Hea* 3236 UXIX) of 22 Nov* 1974* See aleo 
G*A* ftee* 3210 (XXXX) of 14 Oetober, 1974* 
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ctomonstratlons in uhieh th« rofug«<»« vwra proninont* Th« 
As8Mit»Xy*« r»qus«t to the Ssoretary General to •stabliah oontacti 
with th« PtQ on a l i iMtt9ra r«latif>g to th« question of 
%i«8tin«9 prooeded by a daciaion of Stataa of tha Arab teagutt 
acoaptad by a l l tha Arab hoot CovarnMantay that the ^ 0 should 
be regarded as the sole repreaentativa of the Palestinian 
people* were of signifieanca to the United Nations which 
reaff i rae the **inalienable rights of tha Palestinians to return 
to their hones and property from uhioh they have been displaced 
and uprooted* and ealls for their return** The United 
Naticwia recognition that no just solution to the problefli of the 
Middle £ast without the ^ lest in ians is a radical aatter eaueed 
by tha Octc^er war of 1973* The refuaal of Israel to reoogniss 
the legit inate rights of the ^op le at Palestine and i t s oonti* 
nuous atubbornnase to 4mff to inplanent tha United Nations 
reaolutiona since 1946 have already lad to three wars in the 
rcgicm* The 1956 war known the Sues Crisis wNin the Frenoh* 
Sr i t ish and Is rae l i invasion fa i led to overthrow the progressivi 
Egyptian regime heeded by the la te President Gsaal Abdul Naeeeri 
tha result of this war brought tha United Mations foreee in the 
area whan arrangement for trw instal lat ion of United Nations 
emergency Koroea (UitEiF) were Bade between the SeeretaryGeneral 
36* il24fiU.» See alsoi Off io ia l Records of the General 
Aaaenbly* Twenty«^inth Session* Plenary neatings* 
2282nd Pleating* Paras 3-83• See Ooc* ( A / 9 7 4 2 and 
Add* 1-4) . 
• • • 16S 
(l6&) 
and tim Egyptian Govairnwint* Tha yithdrawal of Anglo<pFraneh 
troops uaa aamplatad by 22nd Oecovtwr* Israel forcaai which 
had oceupiad tho antira Sinai Paninaulaf withdraw latar in 
t^avoh 19S7«^^ aut 11 yaara latar Xarael onoa again ralaad tha 
torch c^ war* in tha aarly naming hoyra c^ 5 3una 1967, i t 
attaokad Egyptf Syria and 3ordan and axploitinQ tha advantages 
of 8urprisa» aaizad larga territoriaa* The tsain aln of Xarael 
tsacked by tha United Stataa of A«ierioa ia to overthrow the 
national revolutionary Arab reglmea in order to 9B\f9 tha way 
for i tae l f t o f u l f i l i ta expanaioniat policy in the Middle 
Cast* 
In a l e t t e r dated 13 ^une 19d7| the Riniater for 
foreign *iffairs of the S o i a t Union called for the iMiediate 
convening of an Coargancy Spsisial Seaaion of tha General 
Aasetably* Ha atatad that despite the Security Council's 
decnanda for a oaaae-firGf laraal had seized further terr i tor iee 
balonging to the Arab Statea» accordingly the Assembly ahould 
act undor ^Utiole 11 of the Charter of the United Hationa to 
consider tha s ituation and take a deeiaion to l iquidate the 
oexisequanoea of aggression and secure the inmadiate withdrawal 
^f US^QU. ,f WC88 t?iirt4nd tha agwialriog ilLnast 
37. See> nibert Horden, ThW tfaW ^rt ^tJAf (Warlag 
Zeit I« Slid Oreedeny ODR, I970i» pf>» 136*162 U t 
epeaka in detaite about the eonepiracy of World (^pital against Egypt in which Israel ia taken as 
a naan to execute the Plot)* See> a l so Britaif^ and 
and thg Mn4tffld <^ft1iiflni* IQQ* cit^^. pp* 33«40* 
38* See U*M. Ooo* S/7979* 
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Itm C»n«vftl AasunbXy bsQan Us Fiftt\ Cnergoney 
Sjseoial Stasion an 17 3t«i« 1967 and inolud«d th« USSR X»tt«r 
in it» agvnda* Sotwssn 17 3iin8 anil tH« adJourn»ant of the 
aaaaion on 18 S«p|c«ti«r« i t held a total of thirty fiva •eatinga* 
In tha dabata» atvongXy divarQant v i a ^ ware mxptmaBtid on tha 
origin and davaXop«ant of tho situation and on tha attituda and 
39 
aiaaaurea the CaneraX AeaainhXy ahouXd adopt in deaXing with it* 
Tha Soviet Union rapraaantative stated that IsraeX'a ruXing 
oiroXes had unfortunateXy oonduoted a poXioy of oonqueat and 
tarritoriaX expansion in the Xanda of neighbouring Arab Statea* 
aa the reoorda of the Ssourity CounoiX ainoe 1948 ia ahown» and 
had enjoyed outaide aupport from certain ioiperiaXist ciroXes* 
He stated that the United States and United Kingdon had been 
buiXding up their fXeata in the nediterranean and Red Sea areaa 
before IsraeX's attaek* The United States and United KingdoM 
representatives deeXared in their turn that charges of direct 
participation were faXse and untrue* 
In describing the MUse of events# the 
representative of leresX insisted that the Arab Covemnents* 
Xed and directed by Preaident Naasert had between 14 nay and 
%9. GeneraX AssewbXy OffioiaX Reeorda. fifth lUgBOTBy 
^pagiaX S»a|ian« Ooc* A/l529 to A/A/1549. See 
«ay to Nov* 1967. See SafifiKl «jaiFTrT:nw«^i 
jtaMAaaUab 1966«67* See I«,ff^t 9f thiTttflgataiY 
General en the uQrk of th« Oroagiiaation. 1967^8. 
43* MiisU* 
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S 3ijn«t Methodically prepared and Kountad an aggreaaive aaaault 
deaigned to bring about Iarael*a Innadiata and total daatruotian« 
Egyptian foreaa had begun an 14 nay to ncMfp in atrength into 
Sinaiff and two daya later the Egyptian cOMsand had ordered the 
United Nationa Cmirgenoy Force to leave the border* On IS Ray 
Egypt had oiltd for the total renotfal of UNEF, and the 
Secretary-General U Thanti had aoeepted to that requeat without 
reference to either the Security Counoil or the General 
Aaaeiibly*^^ The leraeliae further etated that under auoh 
eventa* a audden diarepution of the l<^il aeeurity balance 
occurred eapeeially when ^eaident Naeaar blockaded the Gulf 
of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran to leraeli ahipe which waa by 
definition an act of war* 
Repreaentativea of the ^tmh Statea generally 
onphaaiaed that the aggreeaion by laraeli aupported by 
inparialiat powerat waa but the lateet in a long l i e t aoaroely 
interrupted ainoe 1948* The earlier eventa had been followed 
in nay and at the beginning of 2tmm by liilitary threata and 
provocatione by larael* The Arab oeuntriee» while trying to 
take the neceaaary preeautionay had exerted theMoelvea to keep 
mittere uniter oontrolf taking in Sinai and elaewhere a poature 
41* Sooretary General U Thant clarified the matter in 
detaila in hia addreae to the NeiM nedia S^ninar on 
3 Oeeenber 1970* Soe the itetaile in tW nonthlv 
Chroniolii. Uol. VIII, No* 1| New iotk$ 2an$ 1971, 
pp. 99-ias* 
See alaol Afyitfal l^tPfgl gf %tm ^tOWllIY frtfliriil 
3une 1967-15 June 
:i  i i ftnnw i f< i ft   mm 
m %tm.^9Ek ftf thi .JPgflaiiTiillm 16 
1968, Supp* No* t (A/7201; I p. 4* 
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of ctofanea and not of attack* On hia v i s i t t o Cairot tho 
Saorotary Ganaral had boon aaaursd that th« Arab States f i rm 
polioy not t o taka ths offsnsivo* Thsy hsd spared no e f f o r t t o 
avoid any eruption of the s i t u a t i o n and had bean i n sontinuoue 
oonauitatiiMis u i t h many oapita ls in the uorXd* including 
Uashington* But during that t i n e t Xsraei had l e t loose i t s 
treaehery and had launched i t s carefu l planned aggression* The 
d a i a that the blockade i t s e l f consti tuted an act of war and 
ca l led for I s r a e l ' s massive assault was fs lse beoatMe Is rae l 
had already s tar ted i t s war on Syria on 7 A p r i l * The act ion 
taken by Is rae l was not legit iaiatG self -defence within the 
Meaning of A r t i c l e 51 of the Charter because no a m attack on 
her t e r r i t o r y had in fact occurred* 
However* the debate in the General Aaseably 
was so sharp especia l ly between t^w two super powers which 
resul ted with no deoision taken in order to solve the nat ter * 
The seventeen-power dra f t resolut ion sponsored by scm Nan-
42 
al igned States * ca l l s upon Is roe l inmediately t o withdraw 
a l l i t s forces behind the a rn is t ioe l ines aatabl iahsd by the 
General Armistice AgreeMents between Xerael and the Arab 
countries* On a r o i l * c a l l vote received S3 votes in favour» 
42 . The sponsors areS Afghanietsn* Burundit Csylont 
the Congo ( B r a i z a v i l l e ) Cyprust Cuinsa, Ind is , 
Indonesiat n a l i , Pakistant Sonal ia , the United 
Republic of Tanvanist Zanbiay l*ialaysia» Yugoelavia, 
SenegalI Canbodia* 
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36 against with 29 abatantions and was not adoptadt having 
failed to obtain tho raquirad tuo thirds majority* Tho USSR 
draft raaoXution uhioh vigorously eondomp Israel aggrassivs 
aotivitiaa and daiaanding Israal to iMHidiata and unoondititytai 
uithdraual a l l i t s foroes from tho torritory of thoae States to 
poaitions behind tho arsiistiee danaroaticn lines» the draft IIMIS 
rsjeotad in parts by roll-ealX vote* Since a i l the operative 
part had been rejsctad lO vote was taken on tlM draft resolution 
as a whole* The Albanian draft resolution oondenning Israel 
aggression was also rejected by a rol l -eal l vote of 71 to 22> 
with 27 abatensiona* The 3lx*power draft resolution concerning 
oeasuros taken by Israel to ohange the static of the city of 
Jerusalem was adopted by a roll->eall vote tjf 99 to nonst with 
20 absteritionst as a resolution 22S3 (£S^/)«^' This reeolution 
i s the only one the General Assembly in i t s Special Seeeion 
adopted otherwise» no fruitful reeults were gained* The General 
Assembly failed eompletely to adopt a resolution that mako 
Israel to stop i t s aggression and withdraw from the oeoupied 
territoriee* The Assembly oould not take aotion similar of 
Korean laeue* 
43* The sponsors are< i^akistany Cuineay Iran* ftali, 
Niger and Turkey* The draft resolution eonsidere 
that those maasures taken by Israel in the oity of 
3enmalem iMtre invalid and calls upon Israel to 
rescind a l l measuree already taken and to desist 
forthwith from taking sny action which would alter 
the stat ic of Jerusalem* 
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At thm eXosing of th* Ssasiont %Hm P?«8id«ni 
of th« G«fi«ral Asssubly •tatad th«r« had b«an agraaaent 
that tha tiva had eomi whan paaea in tha niddXa £:aat nuat 
te nadat finally and for all %iwm, and that tha long dafarstd 
problaa of tha rafugeea nuat ha aolved* Ha further aaid that 
thara had alao tiuan a broad oonaanaua that thm Unitad Nationa 
oould play a aignifioant rola to astabliah final paaM in tha 
area* Ha alao aaid that thara uaa virtual unaninity in upholding 
tha prinoipla that oonqueat of territory by iiar ia inacMiiaaibla 
in ourtiAa and under the Charter* Virtually all atatananta had 
affirsad that prinoiplet and virtually all had laid down the 
corollary that withdrawal of foroaa to their original poaition 
uaa axpeoted* In addition there waa a broad oonaanaua that the 
polititml aovareignty and territorial intaglty of Statea allowai 
then a rightful freedoM fron threat of belligeranoy* what had noi 
bean agreed upon waa a prooedure and aectuenca by which the 
principle ahould be inplenented* 
During the period fron the Middle of ;3una to 
Qotober I967t the S»aourity Council reoeived a seriea of 
further oOMiunicationa fron Arab oountrias and from larael 
44« Seat Offieial Heoorda of the General Aseenbly* 
fifth i^tffOTngy Spta4«i ^ affii^t Annexea» itev S» 
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oonasmlns violation of th« c«a«efir«t traaiflNmt of o iv i l ian 
populatioRo and priaonora of uar« Tha S«oyyity Couneil in i t a 
taraa paaaad aavarai raaolutiona iihioh hava ragulatad tha 
aituation in alX tha aaetova*^^ Sut thaaa raaolutiona wara 
only of ta»porary baaia baeaitaa thay wata tha raauXt of yat 
anothar aogvaaaion* And thaaa tawporaty arrangaiianta wara in 
turn baaad on tha Arniatiea Agf««M»nta of l949t theaaalvaa of 
eontaatad val id i ty* 
4S. Sttourity Council Boaolutionat 
t33) 6 
134) 7 
auna» 1967« 
Junai 1967* 
i23S; 9 auna* 1967* 
{3fi)l2 Junat 19$7« 
!37)l4 3una» 1967* 
Saa alao eooMMinieationa < 
Uattar datad 22 Hay 1967 Ttm tha Rapraaantativa of 
Xaraal to tha ^aaidant of tha Seoufity Council 
S/7901* Uattar datad 23 nay» 1967 froa tha 
Bapraaantativa of Canada and Oannatk to tha Praaidant 
of tha Saourity Couneil 1Z2SS2* 
Uattar datad 27 Roy 1967 froai tha Rapraaantativa of 
Unitad Afab Rapublie to tha %aaidant of tha S«6urit) 
Couneil |bZ222ZL l^attar dated 29 Hay 1967 froM tha 
Rapraaantativa of Craat Britain and Northern Ireland 
to the Preaident of the Samirity Couneil S/791Q# 
tet ter dated 7 June 1967 from the Repreaentative of 
the Union of Soviet Sooialiat Republiee to the 
Preeident of the Security Couneil S/7938* 
Letter dated 6 June 1967 free the Representative of 
the United Statee of Amrioa to the Preeident of the 
Ssaurity Council S/79SQ* 
te t ter dated 13 June 1967 fron the Representative of 
Union of Soviet Soelaliat Republice to the Preeident 
of the Security Couneil 8/7979. 
See m nmUlXyi Phgfflnj^ ola Vol. VX, No. 1, Jan. 1969, 
pp. 79*92« 
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In « Is t tar datad 7 NovQinbar I9i7« the Unitad 
Arab Rapubiio rtqueatad an urgant naating of tha Council to 
cianaidar th» dangartnja aittiatlon pfavaillng in tha niddla Caat 
aa a raauit of tha paraiatanoa of laraai not t o withdraw i ta 
arnad foroaa fron aXX tha ta tr i to t iaa whieh i t had oocypiad aa 
a raauli of i t a aggvaaaion oomiittad on S 3una« 1967 againat 
tha Unitad Arab Rapublict Jordan and Syria* Tha Security 
Council oonaidarad tha United Arab RapubXio conpXaint at aavanth 
naating between 9 and 22 Nevenber 1967*^* 
Before triu Council were two draft reaolutionap 
under tlw f iret eubnitted by India» flali and Nigeria on 7 
NoveKber* It aaidt the Security Council would ( l ) aff ira that 
a f irat and laating peace in the Middle Caat auat be aehiewed 
within the fraae work of the United Nationa Charter and Mora 
particularly of the following prinoiplea (a) occupation or 
aequiaition of territory by n i l i tary oonqueat ia inadaiaaibla 
imder the Charter and eonaaquently Iarael*a araed foroea ahould 
withdraw fro« a l l the tarritoriea ocGUpied aa a raauit of the 
recent c o n f l i c t | (b) every atata haa the right to l i ve in 
46* See Security Council Oebatea (Proviaional Recorde) 
1987! 
S/PW/1341, S/PV/1343, S/PV/13A4, 
3/PW/1345, S/PV/l34i, 3/PV/l348, 
S/PV/1351, S/PV/1352, S/Pv/l3S4, 
S/PV/13S6, S/PV/1353, 3/PV/l3S4, 
S/PV/13S7, S/P«/t3SS, S/PV/1360, 
S/PW/l373t S/P¥/t379, S/PV/l38l. 
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peao« and ooRplet* umcatityp froe ttom thrtaU or aets of war 
and eonavquantly all atataa in tha arac ahouXd tamlnata tha 
atata or elaiR of balligaranoy and aaitla thair Intarnational 
diaputaa by peaaoful nsanst (e) it la obligatory on all Haabar 
Statea of the area to raapact tha aovaraigntyt tarritorial 
intagrity and politioal iniapandanea of ona anothari (2) affira 
that (a) thair ahould be a jtiat aattlanant of tha quaation of 
Palaatine rsfugaea; (b) thara ahcMjld b« a guarantaa of fraadcw 
of navigation in aoeordanea yith intarnational law through 
intarnational %mteT waya in tha araaf and (3) raquaat tha 
Sacratary Ganaral to da*patoh a apaoial rapraaantativa to tha 
area who wmild oonduet tha Stataa eoncarnad in order to 
eoordinata afforta to aehiava tha purposaa of thia raaolution 
and to aubait a rap(»t to tha oouneil within thirty daya* 
Undar tha aaoond draft reaolution* aubnittad 
on tha aaaa day by tha United Stataa» the Security Couneil 
would (1) affirm that tha fulfilaant of Charter prinoiplea 
required the aehievenent of atata of Juat and laating peace in 
ttw fliddie Caatt enbraeing withdrawal of arned foreea froa 
oeoupiad territerieOf the teraination of olaios or atataa of 
belligerenee and aiftual reeognition and reapaot for the right 
of every State in the area to aovereign axiatenee» territorial 
integrityt politioal independanoat aeoure and reoognieed 
boundariea and fraadoa froa the threat or uae of foreei (2) 
affira for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and 
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politioaX lnd«(>»nd«no« of svary atat« in t\m ar«« through 
MiaaurM ineXudlng th» •stablishMfit of daa i l i ta rUad a ones t for 
aehiaving Just sat t loMnt of tha rafttgea problan (3) raqueat the 
Saoratary CanaraX to daaignata a apaeiaX rapraaantativa to 
prooaed to tha niddXa £aat to aatabXlah and maintain contaota 
with tha atataa ooncarnad (4) raqueat tha Saoratary CanaraX to 
raport to tha Security CoiwieiX on the prograaa of tha afforta 
of tha apeoiaX rapraaantatXva aa aoon aa poasibXa* 
On 16 (lovaMbert 1967 tha rapraaantativa of 
tha United Kingdoa introduoad a draft raaoXution under 
uhioh tha Security CounoiX ( l ) a f f i raa that the fuXfiXmint of 
Charter prlncipXea required the estabXiahaient of a Juat and 
Xaating peaoe in the RiddXe £aat whieh shouXd ineXude the 
eppXioation of both th» foXXowing prinoipXeas (a) withdratiMX 
of IsraeX arned foroea from ter r i tor iea oecupied in the recent 
eonfXiat; (b) tereination of aXX eXaiaa or statea of beXXigeier 
and raapeot for» and aeknowXedgeaent of the aovereignty* 
terr i tor iaX integrity and poXitioaX independenoe of every 
3tate in the area and their r ight to Xive in peace within 
seoure and reoogniaed boundariea free fro« threata or acta of 
force* (a) af f i rna further the nacaaeity (a) for guaranteeing 
freedoM of navigation through internationaX water uaya in the 
area; (b) for achieving a Juat settXenant of the refugeee 
probXaa; and (c) for guaranteeing the terr i tor iaX invioXabiXil 
and poXiticaX independenoe of every atate in the mtB»t througl 
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•easurM including ths eotablishiient of dcniiitariisd tonaat 
(3) roquesta tha Saotatary Ganatal to daaignata a apaoial 
rapraaantativa to proeeed to tha RiddXa Caat to aatabliah and 
maintain oontaota uith tha States eont^rnad in otdar to pronota 
agraonont and aaaiat afff»ta to aehiava a peiaoiful and aeoaptad 
aattianant in aeeordanoa uith tha proviaiona and principlea in 
the reaolutiani (4) tmqiMft* tha Saoratavy QanaraX to raport to 
tha Saeurity Council on tha pvograaa of afforta of tha Spaoial 
vapraaantativa aa aoon aa poaaibia* 
lim rapreaentativa of tha Unitad Kingdon 
Lord Caradony introduoing the draft raaolutiont aaid 
thatt uhiia ha could not guarantee that i t uouXd 130 aecaptad 
in full by aithav aidOf he trusted that i t would be regarded aa 
47 
a balanced and Juat text* 
On 20 Novaebarf tha representative of the USSR 
aubnitted a draft reaolution under uhie^ the Security Council 
would (1) declare that paaoe and final aolution to the diddle 
Caat problem could be aehieved within the frami work of the 
47* for relevant dootffentSf aee> 
Offioial Reocttde of the Security Council Twenty 
Seoond Yaar> Supple«Nint for Aptil, Hay and 3une 
19ft7f ibiikf Suppleiwnt for Qeteber« Noveaiber and 
Oeeeiiberf I967f Jtiiikt Twenty-third yeart 
Stippianent for January § February and Aareh 1968t 
and itUda^ Supplenent fm April, Ray and 3une 1966 
« • • 17(5 
(176) 
Chasttr of th« Unitacf Nations (2) u?g«d that ttia foXXouing 
•taps ahouXd b« taken (a) ttia partlsa to tha eonfXiot ahouXd 
imiadiataXy withdraw thair foreaa to the poaition thay had haXd 
bafora S 3una« t967 in aeoordanoa with tha prineipXa that tha 
aaiiuva of tar r i tor iaa aa a reauXt of war uaa inadniaaibXaS and 
(b) aXX Stataa nanbara of tha Unitad Nationa in tha ataa ahouXd 
iiMMdiataXy raoognisa that aaoh of than had tha right to axiat 
aa an indapandant nationaX Stata and to Xiv« in paaoa and 
aaeurityt and ahouXd ranotmi^i aXX oXaim and doaiat froM aXX 
aeta in eonaiatant with tha foragoing (3) daa* i t naeaaaary in 
thia oonnaction to etmtinua i t a eonaidaration of tha aituation 
in tha niddXa Caat* ooXXaborating diraotXy with tha partiaa 
eonoarnad and miking uaa of tha praaanoa of tha Unitad National 
with a viaw to aahiava an appr(H>riata and Jtwt aoXutien of aXX 
aapeeta of tha probXaa on tha basia of tha foXXowing prinoipXaa 
(a) tha uaa of throat of foroa in raXationa batwaan atataa ia 
ineonpatibXa with tha Chartar of tha Unitad Nationa (b) avary 
atato Mtat raapaot tha poXitieaX indapandanea and tarr i tor iaX 
integri ty of aXX othar atataa in the area (e) thara Must ba a 
Juat aattXaaant of tha ciuaation of tha l^Xaatina rafugaaa} and 
(d) innooant paaaago through intamationaX ti^tar waya in tha 
area in aoeordanea with intamationaX agraaawntat and (4) 
eonaidar thatt in haraony with tha atapa to ba takan aXong tha 
Xinaa indicated abovei aXX atataa in the area ehouXd put an em 
to the atate of beXXigereney» take eeaaurea to Xia i t tha uaaXei 
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and dhistruetiv* arm rao«» and diachavg* ttia obligations 
asaurad by tha» undav tha Chattav of tha Unltad Nationa and 
intarnaHonal agvaaiRanta« 
On 22 Nowa»ba» 1967 tha Unitad NingdCMi d?aft 
vaaaiution waa put to tha vota and adoptad unani«oiiaJly 
by tha Counoil aa raaolution 242 Cl967)» Tha l^aaidant aaid 
that tha Unitad Stataa» tha USSR and tha aponaora of tha thraa 
pouat draft raaojlution had atatad that thay would not pxaaa 
thais dvafta to a vota at that titta* 
Tha rapraaantatiiw of Xndia atatad the poaition 
of tha aponaota of tha thvaa*pOfciar draft raaolution* That 
draftf ha aaidt gava aqual va l id i ty to tha prinoiplea of 
uithdrawalf non«»balligaranoy and aaoura bordaray prinoiplaa 
that providad tha eontaxt within which tha problaa of Palaatina 
rafugeaa and that of fraadoai of navigation in intarnational 
watar waya eould ba aolvad* No daoiaion oeuld im aoeaptad or 
aequiaaoad in that l a f t out tar r i tor iaa oooupiad by Mil i tary 
eonquaat froa tha proviaion of withdrawal* Hia vota wcwld ba 
datar«inad by hia dalagationa olaar undaratanding that tha 
Unitad KingdOM draft raaolutiont atudiad in tha l ight of polio 
•tataaanta of tha Sri t iah foraign Saeratary» oOMiittad the 
Council to tha application of tha principle of to ta l withdraws 
of laraal foreea fro« a l l tha tar r i tor iaa ooeupied by Xaraal e 
a raault of tha June confl ict* That being ao« laraal eould m 
uae the worda "aacure and reeogniaed bounderiaa" to retain an; 
occupied terr i tory* 
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Th0 r«pr»t«ntativ«s of %h« Unit«^ '^rab 
R«publie and Jordan voafriraod that tha aaaantial 
atop towarda paaoo waa tha f u l l withdrawal of tho ZaraoXi 
foroaa f ro* a l l tho torr i tor ieo oooypiod in Juno oenfllct* 
Tho roproaontativo of Syria atatod that hia 
dolooation oouid not aooopt tho Unitod Kingdon draft 
roooiiftion isoeatttiot oMong ethot thingoy tho oontral ioobM 
of withdrayal iiao oado oubjoet to ooneooaiona to bo inpoood 
on tho Afab oountrioOf tMioaiwo i t iiaa a i lent tn tho ayatoaatie 
violation of tho eoaoo f i ro roaolutiona and tho rejootion by 
loraei of roaolutiono eoneoming tlw atatuo of 3aruaaioo and t N 
rotutn of tho now rofugeoo ainoo 5 Junot and alao i t ignorod thi 
variotM raoolutiona on tho ^ ioa t ino quaation and tho right of 
tho Palaatinian poopia to aoif«dotoruination* 
Tho ropreoontativo of laraoi atatad that 
Xaraoi'a poeition roMinod unohangod* Tho oontral 
a f f i raat ion of tho adoptod roaoiution waa tho nood fcv 
ouoh a poaoo baood on tho ooourod and roeogniaed botmdarioo* 
for laraoif tho roaoiution aaid what i t aaid* I t did not oay 
what i t had apoeifieally and oonacioualy avoidod aaying* 
Tho roproaontativo of USA aaid that tho 
roaoiution ia antiroly oonaiotont with hia Covorn«ont*a 
policy on tho Fiiddlo Caotf tho fivo prineiplao of Proaidant 
Johnoon and hia own atataMonta boforo tho Coimcil* 
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Tha ?«pr«s«ntatitfa of USSR said that His 
dvlvQation fu l ly atiaftftf tha intarpratation of tha 
rapraaantativa of India that tha provision vaeatding 
withdrawal Maant wittidraytl of laraal foroaa froai a l l 
oonqiMrad tarr i tor iaa of Arab Stataa. That uaa oonfiriMd 
by tha fact that tha raaolution'a praalrtila enphaaisod tha 
inadniaaibi l i ty of tha aoquiaition of terr i tory by war* 
Tha rapreaantativa of franea atatad that thm 
roaolytion ahotild laava no roan for anbiguity and that 
tha Spaeial Aapraaantativa miat ba givan vary proolaa prlnoipla 
of uhiah to aot* Howavart on tha aaaantial quaation of tha 
withdravwl of tha foroaa of oooypationt tha Franoh taxt of 
{Ktragrai:^ 1 of tha adoptad raaolutioni which waa idantioal wit^ 
tha Cngliah taxt» l a f t no roon for anbiguity ainoa i t apoka of 
withdrawal "aQti tarr i tOf iaa oooupaa*f thua giving a praoiaa 
intarpratation of tha expraaaion "terr i tor iaa ocoupiad*** iUt 
had heard with aatiafaotion of tha rapraaantativa of tha Unita 
Kingdoai strasaaa tha l ink batween that provision and tha 
prinoipla of tha inadniaaibil i ty of tha aoquiait i t^ of 
terr i tor iaa by forea* (for Taxt of tha reaolution 242 aaa 
Appandix D)* 
Saa Off ic ia l Racorda of tha Saourity Council 
TwantySaeond Taar» t341at to 1361 at* 136Sth» I3i6thf 1369th 
to 137lat» 1373rdt t375th, 137Sth to 1382ndt 143lat to I40n^ 
1409th to 1412th» 1416th to 1426th, 1429th aaatinga^ 
« , uTT J^l * * * ! dataila aaal UN flgnthlY Chfgn^ri^pt 
Vol. V I I , Nuiibar 11, Oaoanbar 1970, pp* 16*24« Saat Arthur U 
Tha UH and tha Widdla Caafc Criai^^ 1967, (ColuMbia Univarait] 
Praaa 1968), pp* 220-270, 
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In vaports dafcad 23 Novonbav and 22 OiiQ«Bb«rf 
tha S«orotary G«n«ral informid fch« Caunjsll that Aabatsadw 
Cunnav 3atrinB of SiMid»n had aoeaptad daaignatlon aa his 
Spceial Rapraaantativa to tha ntatilw Ca8t» in aeeordanoa with 
paragl^aph 3 of tha Council's raaolution 242 (l967)« Aftar 
consultation with tha partiest tha Spaoial Raprasantativa had 
aat up the haedquartet of hia nisaion in Cyprus in 10 Oaoaaber 
and by 20 Oeiwmbar had oofliplatad a f i r s t roimd of v is i ts to tha 
Covarmianta eonearnad* Aa nr f l i tehall Sharp» tha Saeratary of 
State for External Affairs of Canada aaid in hia apaeeh in tha 
General Agccably on 24 September 1970» "The United Nations is or 
t r i a l in the niddle £aat» The nenber nations oust aupport the 
efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring and othera to bring peaee 
to that troubled area**** Or barring had a nu»ber of 
exohanges with the parties but his Mission uas obstruetod 
ooapletely when larael refuaed to reply on hia nenoranduii of 
8 Februaryt 1971* The key question of a aettlenent had alwaya 
been and eontinued to be the withdrawal of Is rae l i troops fros 
a l l ooeupiad Arab territ(nriee» and resolving that iaportant 
49* Plenary nesting 1846/24 Septenber 1970* ftaet of 
the Heiiber Statea eupported the idea to reaetivate 
the niasion of 3arring* S M Rf^JfyithlY ChgffnlBllt 
Vol. VII» Nuaber 9 of October 1970 (United Natione 
Office of Public InforiiatiQn)t ??• 63-130* See ala« 
tcrd Caradon Statenent in the Security Council* 
lleeting of 13 ^ayi 1970, the Sumsary of hie stats«er 
pp* 16*17 for More detailed discussion aee PP«8*37* 
1 in yW ftgnltiaY Chgftniailt Vol* v n Nuaber 6t ^una 19' 
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qiMttian on ttm banis of ros|)«et for tor r i torUX intOQrity 
and th« Qtiarant*«ing of tho logit inata fights and tha intaroats 
of a l l atataa, of paoplaa of tha aroat including tho Arab paoplo 
of l^laatina* 
Tha ehangaa of a daMOQtaphiey aeonoMio and 
otltat ehavaetat oarriad out by XaraaX in tHa occupied 
tar r i tor iaa in oontradiotion of alX tha principXaa of 
intavnationaX Xav« not onXy vara XiabXa to prajudiea or at 
Xaaat randar »ora diff ieuXt a daf ini t iva aoXution, but actuaXX) 
andangaring ttia fundanantaX righta of tha inhabitanta of thoaa 
ragionat in aoM eaaaa anounting to ayateaatie eoXoniaation of 
oeeupied araaa* 
OavaXopiMnta not onXy had oonfirMd the 
axiatanoa of tha %Xaatinian faotoff but aXao ravaaXad 
tha utter faiXura of aXX atta»Pts to destroy i t or to eonoeaX 
i t under the eXoek of anonynity by Meana of foroe or 
•anoauvering* The f^Xeetinian poXitioaX »ovenant» as an expr 
aaion ef the Xegiti«ete aapirationa of the %Xeatinian peopX« 
had iapoaad itaeXf aa an aotiva faetor in tNi niddXe Caat 
uithout whioh no dafinit iva aoXution of the probXan waa 
poaaibXa*^ 
50* On 26th nayt 1^76 tha Security CounciX iaauad a 
atataaent reaff iraing the Xegitiaate righta of the %XeatinJ 
peopXe in their Xanda* The Security CaunoiX for the f i r e t t i 
iaatMd aueh a atataaent in order to avoid tha veto pouar ef 
United Statea which fraquentXy eaated to defeat reeoXutiona 
thia type* 
Seat CoXoneX RerriXX A« negate* *IaraeX Bordera and Soourit 
In Foraiqi^ A f f a i g a . tfoX. S4 No, 3 (USA, ApriX 1976) , pp.426 
(182) 
Tda Swoutltf CauneH yhmn mdoptod i i« rssolution 
242 found i t se l f Qtmfrontatt with a doublo prt^lsm fir«t» th« 
probi«ii of ttm ffirtet taaults of wiXitory action9 in itaalf a 
flagrant violation of tha paaea that had baooiMi a Military 
oeeupation of Arab tarritory and ae poaad tha throat of oentinuac 
armid oonfliot; aaoondt tha prcNblan of tha o<»itiniially 
abnonsal stata of ralationa ba%jM9n tha Arab Stataa and Xaraal 
which oanatitutaa tha pornanant oaitaa of inatability in tha 
(liddla £aat and yhioh naada a paaoaful aottla nant* Thaaa two 
probloMOy by thair natura» thair politioal implioationat thair 
international naturoy and tha prooadura thay call for» cannot ba 
treated by the aaee aeana* 
51* See Official Reoorde of the General Aeae«blyt 
TuifllY ,finlh ^ittiBnt ^^ fna^ Y nvetinaa, 2282nd 
aeeting perae 3'<-83« The Speeial CoMiittee on the 
legitiBate riahta of the %leetinian report etated 
on 9 ^une, \9H to the Security Council that laraal 
hae to give the Ueatern Bank and Caia territoriaa to 
the United Natione by 3une 1977 in orcter to eetablial 
a State of l^leatine* The reeolution of the Security 
Council for fto to participate in i te dieeueeion i#ae 
pace V by aaicttity* The United State voted againat 
and Britain^ Franoey Italy uere abeent* lerael boy« 
cotted the Meeting* 
See aleot ^nn9 Tuctceman * A Hay Equation in the 
Middle Caat** In Th«^ Wafcio^  of t4 Feb*» 1976 (Nation CaMpany» Meu York t^ PP* 166«169« 
82* See ¥•&• Mcorthedge and n.O, Oonelany Iwta>iyifciotte3, 
PtoBUtitt* TfaB PBUtlOai/BPtrtB* (Europe Publioatifl 
London I97i;f pp^^ 19B«199, 
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To 8«ttl« a dlsptita b«ttMian statos by nagotiatlon 
0? othsv pssMful Bean* raquivino agraafianta anong th« parties 
eonoarnad mtat not tia oonfuaad ylth aetlon taken to undo the 
S3 
ail itary oeoufiation of territory yhioli ie a faet of yar*"^ In 
a wider aanaey oooupation ia an exterwion of military aotiont 
a continued violation of the peaeof the outoome of uhieh auat 
not be contingent on the goodwili of the occupier* and againat 
tiihioh the Seeurity Council ia not only authoriaed by virtue of 
Artiole 39 to undertake whatever direct action i t deeaa f i t in 
the eireunetaneeat ae long as i t ia conaiatent with the teriia of 
Article 4(3 of the Charter* 8ut the Security Council doea not 
eonaider the aituation anticipated in Chapter VII <- yet in teriw 
and Method i t oorreaponda to non*binding reoonoiendationa provide 
for in Article 38 and 37 of Chapter VI* Thia peculiarity ateaa 
froa the epeeial nature of the oirotMatanoea* 
The Security Ccuneilf however» put forward 
"withdrawal of laraeli fwcea frcn territoriea oooupied 
during the recent ecnfliot" aa a principle to be applied towardi 
"the eatabliahment of a juet and laating poaee''t along with othi 
reoomiendaticna which were to furniah natter for negotiation 
tmder the aegia of the Secretary General S{»ioial Repreaentative< 
In thia mnner» the "spoila of war" beoone oatter for 
negotiation by parties to a diaputOf in contravention of 
international law and the United Matiane Charter* 
83* ittlilu PP* 38-48* 
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Th« Saourity Council in %hi9 manr\9t arrod 
in not diatinguiafiing batiMsn ii«a«usM intttndsd to load 
to tho "ootabliohaont of m Juot and looting paaoo in the Aiddlo 
Caot**! «nd tho "withdrawal of loraol i forooa froii torr i tor iso 
ocGUPiod duting tho roeant eonfliot" oinoo the foroer oeaouroo 
wore Meant to oliffinato tho ooytooo of oonfliot and ao bring 
about a aituation fatfourable to effecting real poaee in tho area, 
tho oubjoet of Chapter tfl of the Chartert whoreae troop with-
drawal io an onorgoney noaauro to eorroot a Charter violation an 
to avert an iUraediate riok etf renewed or oorttiUiued war * the 
kind of oituation dealt with in Chapter VXI, 
Ao already pointed outf tho phraao "aocuro and 
raoogniaed baundarieo** lenda i t s e l f to oonflicting inter* 
pretationa« though thia io not tho only ambiguity which hindero 
tho application of tho rooolution*s chief reoOB»iendatiana« 
explaining hio govoiniiient att itudot tho lorael i ropreaontativo 
declared that Xoroel aooopted ao val id only the original Cnglio) 
text of tho rooelutiont thua indicating that the Cnglioh and 
frenoh wordingo of the provioion for the evaeuation of ooeupied 
ter r i tor iee pernitted varying readinga*^ Inter prating thia 
S4« The d i f f icu l ty ariaea on the abaenoe of the definite 
a r t i c le in the Cnglioh textg which refera to "with* 
drawal of laraol i araed foreeo fron ter r i tor iee 
ooeupied*••"• rather than to "withdrawal of Xaraeli 
forooa froM the te r r i tor iee oeeupied*««««" Unlike th 
•ore opmeifio referenoo in the Trench text to with* 
drawal "deaterritoreo occup ea***" 
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reeORHRttndation with tfm "•vcur* and rseognisad boundarlffs" of 
tha following paragvaph* %tm Cngliah toxt oould bo road aa 
•waning a part ia l ovaeuation* 
I t haa boeoao obvioua that tho Council** 
approach of treating tho Arab nationa aa thougti thoy woro 
united via • via larael waa inadequate and unraaliatio* The 
raaolution atanda aa a whole and i t a proviaiona are conditional 
upon each other* Any aeeord between larael and tNi Arabaf then^ 
depend* upon a prior aeeord anong the Arab Statee uhioh would 
give theii oolleetively to aeauiie reeponeibilityt the eondition 
for roeiproeal undertakinge on the part of larael* Thia ia 
another i l luat ra t ion of the Security Council*e niatake in having 
treated with one inatruMont the diroot coneequenee* of the war 
and the oonditiona for peaee in the Riddle Caat d i f fer* 
In thia reaolutiont the S^Qurity Council a t i l l 
refers to the problem of the Paleatiniana aa a *refugee 
problea** Sut the prt^len of tfw Arab people of F^leetine haa 
gone far beyond ttm bounde of « qiMetion lieraly of rafugeaa* 
In the course of events t the I'aleatiniana have eetabliehed 
organiaatione dedicated to the l iberat ion of ^ l e a t i n e v^ioh 
engage in a i l i t a r y action agaiiwt larael independent of the 
Arab Statea»^ and which put forward po l i t ica l prograatnea 
SS* See* Tlae Auetafay *Al«Kifah al-iluaaaXlah ua 
al«nuqauama al^r i last in iya* - Armed atrugola and 
the Paleetinion Reaiatenoe* ^ayth §l*Shfl^b (Daoaaeuaat 1971/, pp« 30«48« 
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advocating tha eraation of an indapandont atata of their own 
in Paleatina* The Palaatinian raaiatenoa organiaationa 
neither reoOQniae the oeaae-fire nor aooept the Security Council 
resolution* Regardleae of the intarnal aonfliota which rend it» 
and the hardahipe i t Buffered at the handa of the Governiient of 
Jordan, Covernsent of Syria^ the Palaetinian Liberation noveeent 
ia a now factor whoee unexpected eeergence after the Security 
Counoil resolution has radically altered the esaenoe and the 
appearance of the %lestine problen and so invalidated liany of 
the aaeuMptionst as t o bi^dersy tha refugeeey ete*f which l i e 
behind the reeolution*^ 
Originally* the Riddle Cast confl ict was 
l imited to Palestine* The ^rab atates beoosie involved 
in the name of Arab unity and Arab securityi when they 
S6« Hasan Bi la l , *al«fahm al-*Fila8timi l i Hazimat 
Huiayran* • %leetinian Understanding of the June 
Defeat* ^t)U*m ^U%§tMU 1>3 (aeirut» I97l) pp. 
5*19* Critioal disousaion of the rss i s tenee's 
ijiterprotaticNi of the Arab s i tuation after the June 
defeat and the extent of t ^ ^ l e e t i n i a n role in thi 
struggle for liberation* 
97* 3ee Qib George* 'Qarar naj l i s al«Amn al«Sadir Fi 
22 Tiehrin al^thani 1967* • The Security Counoil 
Resolution of November 22« 1967 • ai«»Agabiya. XXXX, 
8»9, (Beirut, 1970J, pp* 266-68* Study of the lege. 
aspects of the 1967 Security Council reeolution* 
See Chasi Kaoral, *nafhum.al«Oola al*>Tahudiya' • The 
toncept of a Jewish State « a l ^ r i P g . VIII, 87 Oamaseuss 1969), pp* 3*30* Oiseussea whether the 
three essentiale oonetituente of a State * people, 
a terr i tory , and legal sovereignty - a r e present in 
the normal form in lerael* 
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int«rv«fied against part i t ion and trta aatabliahiRant of a Jauiah 
Stata* Tha plight of tha Palaatiniana ataoa from thraa oauaaa 
tha Arab dafaat in 1948«49 i,«vf tha oooupation of tha raaaindar 
of Aral) PaXaatina by 3ovdan and in part by £gyptt and tha 
abaancw of any affaetiva ^ l a a t i n i a n a i i i t a r y atruoturat a 
dafiaianoy which aiiouad tha Arab oountriea to datarnina the 
fata of tha %iaatiniana» But tha 3una war of t967 reviawad 
tha idaa of an Arab 3tata of Palaatina* Thia idea draw atrangt^ 
fron t r« davaiomant of tha i^aiaatina t ibaration novaiMint and 
aiao froa tha po l i t ica l and noral authority i t poaaaaaaa by 
virtua of tha prinoiplaa of hiMan righta and tha aa l f * 
detariRination of peoplaa* A n Araba racogniaa tha lagitinaoy 
of tha %laatinian oauaa and atrugglet and have cownittad 
thaiBaalvaat at laaat for thia phaaa of the atruggla againat 
Xaraalf to the idaa of Palaatinian aalf^datarnination* Thia 
ecHioaPt of %laat inian aalfnfatarnination ia ineraaaingly tha 
central problem of niddla Caat paaoa efforta and intar«<Arab 
relationOf i t oan invalidate efforta to aatabliah a atable and 
laating peace on tfw t e r r i t o r i a l atat i» quo* The Security 
Council reaolution 242 ignorea i t eoepletely* The refusal of 
Israel to iapleaent the reaolution ia eonplioating tha a i tua t i 
Xaraalt tha victor in ^unm wart ia incapable of making good i t 
victory and cannot on i ta ownt even by force, impoaa viaXiLa an 
laating peaoet i t cannot do thia for two raaac»ia< i t lacka 
auffioient troopa and other means to imure tha aaeurity of 
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p«raaii«nt prssvitos In ths oeeupied t8?ritoriaa« and %¥mx9 art 
intatnational fact ova that w i l l not alloii tha indefinita 
continuation of auah a potantiaXly dangaroua aituation* Tha 
Oatobar Ua» of 1973 had ohangad a l l hopaa and plana of laraal* 
Tha raault c^ tha war i l l i tatratad tha Arab capability to itofaat 
Zaraal* Tha idaa uhieh laraal inaiatad to kaap tha cwoupiad 
tar r i tor iaa to aaintaln i ta aaeurity provad a fai luva* Sinoa 
Octobar Uar» tha ^aleatinian cause gained aaioh in tha world 
58 
apaelally in Uaatarn Europe and the United i^tatoa* In tha 
United Nationa* tha Paleatiniana for the f i r a t t iee in i t a 
hiatory got juatioe uhen the general Aeeewbly paaaed by 
majority vote on 22 Novenber 1974 two reaolutiona reaf f iming 
the inalienable righta of the ^ leat ln iane to return to their 
hoeea and property« and invitea the Palaatine Uiberation 
Chrganiaation to participate in the aeaaion and work of a l l 
international eonferencea convened wider the at»pieee of the 
General Aeeenbly in the eapaeity of obaervet. The 
58« Tht ^gWUltH * Pifliiima lUuatrated that no peace 
could be achieved in the Middle Caat witht^jt eolvim 
the Paleatinian iaeue* See the Egyptian Neue paper 
Al*A>^r^iy. Vol* »o« 3294 of 28 NoveRfoer« 1976| P« 3« 
Sae alaot Irene t* Gendtiert *The la rae l i Debate 
Ue never hear». in T t e f f a U m of 14 fab, 1976 (nation Coeipany, New forkT, (tp^ 169-172• 
S9* C»«A. fitte, 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX), 
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%X«»tinian leaelev Ya«««r Arafat was raovivad warmly t>y iha 
Unltad Nationt »aiib»x>a whan ha waa Irtvitad to addcaaa tha Tiianty 
Ninth Canaral Aaaanbly Saaaion* Ha waa traatad aa Maad of 
Stata«^^ Tha Unitad Stataa of ^nariea in i t a turn took tha 
aituation vary aarioua for tha f i r a t t iaa aa a raault of Ootobar 
Uar ifhioh eayaad tha fuai eriaia in tha yorid* Tha Unitad ^tata 
Saoratary of Stat* for foraion Affaira* 6r Kiaaan^art piayad a 
good rola in hia "atap by atap" poiiey whic^ provad to aoiw 
axtant a auoeaaa whan intar ^graananta wara aignad batwaen 
laraai and Cgypt and alao batlMon Xaraai and Syria in whieh a 
par t ia l withdrawal of la raa l i troopa uaa motd^ in Sinai and 
Qolan Highta» Tha new Intarin Hgveeaant batwaan &gypt and 
laraal on 18 January 1975 within tha frami work of tha Canava 
fHiaea ConfaraniMi eonatitutad a f i r a t atap towarda a Juat and 
durabla mtaott aeoording to tha proviaiona of tho Security Coune 
raaolution 33d (l973> of 22 Ootobar» 1973*^^ Tha Oetobar Mar 
6Q« Saa Off ic ia l Bscorda of a l l General Asaanblytluia^ 
Un%\\ HMkmf ^'loiwfy «aatinga, 22a2iid «oating para 3-83. Saa 
Prof* S»A,H« Haqqit *The Tourth Arab Xaraall Uars New Challangi 
and poaaibi l i t iea'> In InflltoQ j W n a i | f .PgiaAj i i i §|lUnBai| V 
X, No*i3une 1976, (Oept» of Pol i t ioal Scienci9|AfiU.tAligarhtInd 
Pfi9 76*9Q« 
61« Saa tha Agraaaant in i^ oo* (S/i iai8/Add. I» aae alao 
^^ fgnthiY CngftntoU Ayguat -Sapta»bar l97S,yol« X l l NuKbar 8 (Unitad Nationa Offioa of ^ublie Inforaation)* 99* 17 and 18* 
9«« Al«Ahra« U^u^ PaPfli»> Vol* 32683 of 4 3una» 1976, an ArtioJ 
writtan by tha editor Hr A l i Handi Ai-Ca«aal, "^^ftar Nina yaai 
of tha Oafaat and After Thraa faara of Victory*" I t daala witr 
the radical ehangaa whioh cMmiirred in tha Unitad HatiorM and 
tha United Stataa and Uaatarn Curopa aa a raault of October Ui 
of 1973* Seas Noan Chatiaky, 'The tntarini Sinai AgraaMant** i a 
Mau Pol i t i tyr Vol* XZ, No* 3 iFmb» 1976, New York), p^i* 4-33* 
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orciatod a noy • i tuat ian that fotood the two sypar pouot«9 tha 
USA and USSR to ax^rt won itipXotitic efforts to bring the 
parties in confl ict into a round table in Ceneva tinder the 
auspices of the United Nations* The two pousrs also shared the 
ohairnanship of the neetinge. Qut the f ina l settleoent seeas 
s t i l l far* This is tsecause both Israel and the United States 
are s t i l l refueing to recognise the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation to attend the Qeneva Conference* ^ersistenoe on the 
part of Israel in naintaining i t s aggression uould render peace 
nore and aore reaiote fran realiaation* Immediate and un* 
conditional withdrawal of Is rae l i forosis frost a l l the occupied 
Arab terr i tor ies was the f i r s t and the only step that could 
psve the way to a pcaitioal solution* for achieving a real i 
Juet and lasting peacst the Palestinians nust obtain t h e i r 
inalienable rights* 
The United Nations withstanding i t s recognition 
that no peace in Uest '^sia be established without recognising 
the legit iaate rights of the Palestinians to determine their 
future and to establish their oiim State in the Uest Sank and i 
CaiBf i t s Security Council had fa i led on 29th 3w%m» 1976 to ta 
62* See ^r Sen Statamenty Ambassador of India to the 
United Nations* Security Coi^cil Meeting of 26 3ul) 
1973. m ^mtlDf htmUlU WoX- X, No* 8, PP*17.1I 
See MtisUt Atibssssdor Halik USSR Statsiaenty pp.22«*2 
* • • 
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aotian in ard«v to «pprov« th« raeoMwrnlatian* of thm 20 
l^mbrnt ConaltUa whioh r«oOMi«fid0ci cuoh rights for th« p«opla 
of %l««ti{i« anil urgva l9ra«l to withdraw fron tha tot r i tor iaa 
ooeupiad in 2\mm Wat 1967 within a dafined pariod not lata? than 
3tmat 1977* Tha Comittaa aiao roeowMmdad that tha ta»ri t«r iaa 
whieh laraai withdraws fra»» should ha handad to tha Unitad 
Nations whieh than ha givan to tha Palaatina Uihoration 
Organiaation to aatahXish a Paleatinian Stata* Butfimforttmatal 
tha draft raaoiution fa i iad daapita tha support of tan aaMhara 
in tha Saeurity Cotmoii dua to tha vato powar usad by tha Unitat 
Stataa of Aatriea* four yaatarn eountriaa abatainad* Thay wan 
Britaint Franeat I ta iy and Swadan* Tha Unitad Stataa by uaing 
aXwaya i t a vato powar ia trying to ignora tha faet that tha 
Paloatiniana ara oonatituting tha oora of tha Uaat Aaia problaa 
No paaoa in tha araa> and no Juatif iad soiutiim oan 1» Msda 
without thaa* Thia faot w i l l ranain atarnal and tha Unitad 
Statos of Amrioa w i l l raaliaa ona day this faot aa i t did in 
tha OAB* of CoBMuniat China and South Viatnaa*"'' 
Undoubtadlyt tha paaoo kaaping oparations of 
the Unitad Nations play an aaaantial rola both in Maintaining 
63* for wora informtion aaa» tha Egyptian daily nawa 
PaPsr Al-Ahr^^ laaua No. 32704 l25 3una 1976)| p«3* 
Saai Cantiart .Iffjt o U t t PP* 170-72. 
S«e alaof Tha Wau Ara^ ^^  Vol. U I , No. 6 of 0ao«l976 
* laraai and tha UN*, pp* 11-13. Soa alao PLO 
Statamant in tha Security Council in UN Wocithly 
fihgoniaAl ««• 1 Wan 1976), pp. 19-20. 
. . .192 
(192) 
tranquality in the area and in oraating an atnoapiiers eondueiva 
to uaaful nagotiationa* But thair future effaotivanesa can 
eaaily be put in queation by a failure to oaintain the nonentuw 
of nagotiationa* There i» an ineteaaing danger thatf in the 
absence of progreaay praaautaa will mount for iiore draatio 
eauaea of action and the opportunity f «r aohieving a aettleaent 
will onoe again be loet* It ia expected that the United Nationa 
ahalX face new oriaia unleaa negcNbiationa for Geneva i^aoe 
Conference be brought through the wiiX and apirit of aeoORmoda-
tione of the partiea conoernedf a auooeaaful ooncluaicn which 
ahouid open the way to the next atepa fc«ward to a oonprehenaiv 
aettXeoient including a aatiafaetory readution of the 
Paleatinian queation* TNi United Itatione Socretary-Caneral 
Kurt Ualdheia atated in the introduction to the Report on the 
work of the Organiaation for the period 16 3une 1974 to 15 Juni 
1975* 
*! an deeply concerned that thia vital 
area of the world ehall not once again 
beeoMe a theatto of wart with unf(»eaee<» 
able and wideepread ccmaeqtMineeai and 
that the United Natione will be able to 
continue with inereaaing effectiveneaa 
the eonatructitte role which i t »»a played 
in the Riddle Caet for eo long*" 
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C«rt«lfily» ttm mt^Uymnii of a niddit Ca«% 
t«tt i»a»nt ! • • d i f f i e u l t tetk« but quit* «n attainabit 
ona* A raaXiatio baaia uhieh can anaava aolution oonaiata of 
thro* eloaaly eonnaotad p^opoaitiona< f i r a t f uithdrayal of 
l a raa l i tvoopa f?oii a l l Arab tar r l tor iaa oeoupiad during tha 
1967 uar* Saeondt aatisfaotion of tha jtagitiiuita righta of tha 
Arab %opla of ^ laa t ino t inoluding thair inalianabla right to 
forn i ta own atata* Third' tha aaauranoa of tha aaourity mna 
inv io lab i l i ty of tha frontiata of a l l niddl* Caat eountviaa and 
thair right to axiat and davalop imdar intamational guarantaaa 
Tha aolution of tha atatad thraa oardinal probleaa in thair 
intaroonnaoflM ia tha aola and tha only faet(» to opan the roat 
to a Juat imd laating p«aoa in Uaat A«l«« 
A aattloMant aehiavad on tha abova atatad baaia 
oartainly yould anaura tha raturn of tha oceupiad landa to tha 
Mrab Stataa* An aquitabla aattlanant of tha t e r r i t o r i a l aapae 
of the niddla Caat iaaua would ra«ova a aarioua iaaua froii tha 
Arab laraal i oonfliot* Suoh a aat t lamnt would avart tha 
throat of a fraah aggraaaion hanging over tha Arab Stataa» am 
laavaa thair governMinta to eoneantrata thair efforta and 
raaoureaa on aeononie and aooial taaka* I t would enable tha 
Arab people of ^alaatina on the other handf to axaroiae their 
r ight to build their own aovareign StatOf fu l ly in oonforaity 
with international lau> and take their r ight fu l plaee avong t 
other peoplsa in tha region* 
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tmt «»i»t»ne« in statiM of p«ac» and • •eur i ty and within 
h«» vaQogniaad bordara* Mo sora te raiMiin a garrison atata 
0(if»08ing tha Arab neighboura* 1% it alao very iwporiant for 
Xaraai in oaaa a aattiaaant ia aehiavad to nomaiiaa ralationa 
y i th othar oountriaa and atrangthan har poaitiona aaang tNi 
oountriaa in tfia world* Intarnationai guarantaaa to anaura tha 
aacurity and inv io labi l i ty of the bordara of a l l ftiddla Caat 
GC»intriea ahouid eonpiata tha aattiamint agraeSMintf 
Tha raaunption of tha Canava P^aea Confaranoa 
with tha participation of a l l tha sidaa dirset ly in¥0lvad 
including t ^ Palaatina Uibaratian Organiaation aa tha 
raprsaantativa of tha Arab %opl8 of ^ l a a t i n a ia tha aola 
intarnationai aaohaniaa to work in this raapeet* Tiw agraaMini 
to Gonvana tha Canava %aoa Confaranoa raached at tha and of 
1973 waa baaad on tha balisf that i t would ba an affaetiva 
inatritiaant for anauring %aoa in tha niddla £^aat* Although one 
fact ia tharat that ia far tha Caneva Confaranoa has not baan 
raoonvanad aftar auafMinding i t a work onora than three yaara age 
Tha attituda to tha confaranoa partiaularly on tha pert of thi 
USA and laraal ia oartainly of t iaa aarving natura* Tha Sovi« 
Union oonaiatantly ealla for tha raaumption of tha Ganava Paai 
Confaranoa* Tha UN Saoratary Ganaral Kurt Ualdhaia In hia pa] 
asphaaiaad that ha would ba in oonformity with tha Unitad 
Hationa Canoral Aaaa«bly raaolution HO0 337S of Novaabar 13* 
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197S» stating triat %X8«tin« Liberation Qreanivatian 
repraaentativsa ar« to tNi invitad to partieipato on an aqual 
footings with othav parties in a i l afforta formaehing a 
oattleMent for niddlo £aat diaputa*** Tha afforta to aolva 
the fliddla Caat isatia away froii tha original road of aolvlng 
raain problam through orocM(ad lanea c^  l»aok«ataga intrigues will 
fis 
alyaya bring fruitleaa raaults* 
Israel frequently apeaka about i t s security 
but at tha sane tine oontinuea launohing viar agalnat tim 
Arab Stateey i t rejeote to uithdrau i t s military forees froti 
the oooupiad territoriest i t Ignoree the presence of the 
^leetinians and their legitinate right f (^ self«deteriiination<» 
8ut eueh a policy which lerael insists to adopt proved a failur 
when the ^rab atates launehed the Ootober war of 1973 agaifwt 
it* 
Thua« Israel's seourity depends on the return 
of a l l the Occupied territories eaptured in 3une war of I9i7* 
64* See ^ntiffliUfmii ^ t f i t o j Ouly 1976 (All Union 
Society "Ziianiye't Hoe cow)» p» 1Q2« for details 
concerning tho Aasenbly set up Palestine Rights 
CosHsittee. Seel Mf f^ ffllthlY ghfqiAcli of Deo. 1975 
Vol. XII, Ho* II, pp. tO-14 and also p# SS« 
65* itUfiijuf Pf^* 5<-7 (The brief apaeoh of Qadoni, the 
Chalrian of PLQ delegation to the Security Council) 
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I s r a e l ' • Main pvobia« in this rsapeet way gtadually aulMida 
as tha f^loatlfiiana ooae to aee«pt whatavar po l l t ioa l arrafiga* 
Manta ava werkad out in thai t bahaif• Strong govafniiant in tha 
faturnad tarr i toviaa aXao miana that Uraa l miat aoeaPt tha 
Pt9»9ntm of Arab foteaat vagular Jordanian foreea» and aiao 
Cgyptian foreaa in Caia a t r ip i f eontrol ravarta to fc^aar Arab 
authovitiaat ragulat f^laatinian foroaa i f a aaparata Palaatini« 
ant i ty ia forwmii haa aiao to ba thara* But aueh foreaa naad net 
thraataning laraal i f thay ara i in i t ad in aixa and in aquipnant* 
Hara i iaa tha aaeurity M t t a r foeuaaa not on tha axtant of 
tar r i tory raturnad but tha natura and dagraa of dani l i tar iaa* 
&fi t ion* laraaX in thia raspaet doaa not poaaaaa atrong oaaa 
eoncarning i ta own phyaioal aaourity naada for rataining any of 
tha OQOUPiad tar r i tor iaa* Indaady tha raturn of a l l oooupiad 
tar r i tor iaa by laraai to tha Arab oountriaa u i i i undoubtadly 
opan tha proapaet of paaeai taraai aaourity intaraat broadly 
dafinadf uould naad thia atap* 
Butf Xaraal*a approach touarda paaoa ia i l l o g i e 
and unraaliat iei i t iRaintaiiHi a policy of Mi l i tary aupraiMoy» 
axpanaioniat aiaa and non«nraoognition to tha Araba of ^ l a a t i n i 
Suoh a poliey fa i lad to dater tha Araba* Tha queation of how 1 
dafaat tha Araba haa tman anaiMirad four tiii8a» tha quaation of 
66. Saa fffyiAafl ftffftjglt (Now York, Apr i l 1976), pp. 
434-3S. 
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67 hOti t o dotsr thoa awaits an ansusr* 
I t U obvious that dsttoronoo n««c} not roXy 
aololy on mil i tary stvongthf nueisar or oonvofitionai* for 
th« niddio Castf tho boat dottoront Moaauro at hand ia tho 
oatabliaruMfit of dofliiiitarixod loneat aannad by nsutral 
obaorvorSf through uhieh oithor aido uouXd bo axtraMily 
reluctant to attaek* * Tha Unitod Nations Ssourity Couneil 
rasolution 242 oeknowXsdgsd ths rsquireaant for doailitariaatiOF 
floroovort thsro is wido aprsad agrssnont that dsni l i tar iaat ion 
provisions aight sndurs i f bs plaoed in an intornationai psaM 
ksoping oontoxt and supportsd by appropriato guarantoos* Suoh 
dotaiXsd iRattors oan bs diaousssd in Consva Pmatm Confsronos if 
IsraoX and ths Unitod Stataa ara sinosrs for poacefuX ssttXsasni 
of tho BiddXs £ast issus* But ths stubbomneaa of IsrasX not t 
withdraw fron ths oeeupisdtirritoriss or not to roeogniss ths 
^Xsstins Libsration (^anisat ion is an obataoXs for rsocmvsnin 
ths Gsnsva fViaes Confsrsnos* By doing soy i t Xsads ths iasus 
up a bXind aXXsy* "IsrasX vowsd"i sxprsaesd i^rriXX f^ opsak* 
^7* Ibid»• p» 43$* 
Sss aXso Robsrt U« Tuoksrt "IsrasX and ths Unitsd 
Statsss from Ospsndsnos to NucXsar ysapona" 
Cep^ntaryf, (NovSMbor* t975t Nsu York)* 
60» Sss :)ohn CaMpbsXXt *Ths Arab^IarasXi ConfXiott 
An AMriosn PoXioyS fmmlm ^ffgAffff (Now York, 
Ootobsr, 1970)* 
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**fl9V»r to X«av« any of thoao plaeos and i t i s by no Moana 
eartain that i t ean tm induiwd to foraaka this vow*" H« 
oontinUM aayiftOf *For i t to do ao uouid roquira at a ainiwMi 
both Qteat atataaoinahip in Zaraal and oonaidarabXa prootuva fron 
tha Unitad Stataa.-**' 
Tha Unitad Stataa of A»ariea oartainly oan 
play a good rola i f i t uiahea to aolva tha Uaat Aaia 
iaauo poaoafuliy* Tha United Stataa auppliea laraali arny 
with aophiatieatad waaponat including aiaailea eapabla of 
carrying both eonvantional and nuelaar war haado* Tha Unitad 
Stataa auppliea larael with a l l namaaary requiraMmta inoludint 
food atuff* It ie in tha ability of tha Unitad Stataa to exert 
atrong praeeure tm larael i f peaee and aeeurity haa to be 
eatabliahed in the region* f'reaident Carter laat atateisent 
that the ^aleatiniane miet have a hoMey ia a new Aeerioan 
approaeh whioh eertainly will lead touarda peaoe with juatiee* 
The thing whieh a l l Arabe wieh* But i t depends on Resident 
Carter*a waya and Methode to sake hie auggeation truly be 
fulf i l led at a tine when the rightiat tikud Party aeerged aa t^ 
cmjntry*a leading foroe in the reeent general eleotione* 
69* Seet i l l i fU.* ^ P r i i 197^1 Vol* S4, »o. 3» pp. 442-3. 
See Thf T^wei of Jntfiat NO. 76, voi . cxxxix of 
$9 Hareht 1977. p. Itt eonoerning ^reaident Carter*( 
auggeetion that the Palaetiniana be given a hoanilani 
It ia a new ^ aerioan approaoh towarde tNi Uaat Aaiai 
problae* 
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Rr Hikhl 3aip8lf India *a P«riian«nt Rapraavntativa 
at tha Saottrity CoimeU imiUng on ^una 19$ t97S atatadi 
"Noihing eouXd ba mmtm daaaging than aUant 
indiffaranoa to tha vighta of tha paopJta of PaXaatina by 
tha only Organisation tihioh eouXd daXivav ttio gooda*** JaipaX 
raoaXXad tha PaXeatina qtiaation uhieh a rasa in 1947 and had ain( 
ranainad unaoXvad and aaid **it uaa tha raaponaibiXity of tha 
70 CounciX and tha CanaraX AasonbXy to aoXva*** 
The Unitad Nati ana roXa in thia raapaet uiXX 
eontinua to raoain aa i t ia Xiaitad ynXaaa a draatio turn 
of poXioy ba dona by tha Unitad Stataa uhieh continiiaa to randa 
fuXX poXitiieaX and «iXitary oupport to IsraoX* Suoh eontinuoui 
polioy fron tha United Stataa undoubtadly obatructa any idaa 
for finaX aattXeiiantf ftr ffad H» Rioharda onoa atatad> 
"A hiatory of tha Arab UorXd and of Zioniaai and 
i t a raauXtOf Xaading to tha ctmeXuaion that tha noraX and 
poXiticaX heart of tha Arab*XaraaXi probXais rosta in aatiafyin 
tha Xagitiaata griavaneaa and aapirations of (tha) diapoaaasaa 
Araba • • • • Tha intaraat of the United Statea uilX ba aervad nc 
70* Sea "India Urgaa UN aotion am PaXaatina*" 
ttM ffgM ftyab of 3uXy-Augu«t 1976, Vol. H I , Ho. 3, (PybXiahad by tha League of Arab Statea ftiaaion in 
India.) Sea* m Pc^thXy gteftniflXg fjo. 1 of 3an.l9 
and of to »ov. 76, ReaoXiftion 3376 (XXXJ on Oeo«l9 
p. 13. 
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by opcwting 2ioni«M but by ••rvlng th« fwsds of a l l th« 
fmopXm of th« r«giont througb « politieal ftysttai granting nqtial 
71 
rights to a l l inhabitante sagatdlaM of raligion*" 
Th« faot io that ana of tha ft«i^«antal 
ctiffioultiaa haa always baan tha aybatanea of history 
and tha oharaetar of tho iaaueSy to say nothing of tha raquiait< 
of a solution* But thara ia ana point on i^ioh agraaaant appaa: 
frOM a l l raaaaroh atudiaSf houavatf i t ia that tha Uaat Asisn 
conflict has now raactwil a stags of unpraoodsntad dangsrt and 
that a aattlsnant haa baeoiia vary Muoh proKPt than to ba ignort 
for Miors longar tiow* Ths oraation of an indapandant Palastini 
Stats aa anvisionad in ths original Unitad Nationa partition 
plan of 1947 ia vary nuoh aignifleant for cooling down tha loni 
hiatorical conflict and i t ia vary urgent to ba fulf i l lsd i f tl 
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world should llva in paaea and tranquality* But i t ssaas 
final aolution ia a t i l l rsMOte because of Iscaal's continuous 
arrcranes and dsfisncs of tha United Mationa resolutions* 
f u *«• fflindii ^ftMfnai» ^ug. i/i5, iSTsi, PP. •osr, 
72* 8alduin« Hogart *UHat i s Wrong tins?" Tha Hwaniat (N.P. July/AUQ# 1975), PP» 11-13. ^ssidsnt 
Bourguiba of Tunisia pointed out thia point in 196 
He reiterated recently during ttw ^rab Haada and 
Kinga Suflmit Conference held in Cairo on 25th 
October, 1976. 
• » • d 
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%if)«]pi pointed out that "Th« raaX Uaue Tot IsMal U not 
••eurityt but l^gitiiiaey** H« ehatgM that Ura«i la axiHiotad 
to iiaka a l l tho oonoaaaiona yithout tha Arab Statao Making any. 
8»«t-«sin»ki agtaaoy but uharaaa Avlnati would havo aaeurity 
COM firat» h« thinks tha a«ttX«i*ant imat oo«a firat and this 
will yiald oaeurity* Duehana aooa no oonfliot in thair viawa» 
but agvaaa with Brzaianaki about tiaing* Parlanittar in hia tui 
rajoota Ulliian'a viaw that providing U.S. troopa aa baek up 
aupport (^ lavaal ia aaaantial* ^rlwuttar aUo quoationad 
Ullnan'a viaw that nona of tha Arab Stataa want war* Raturn of 
the ooeupiad tarritoriaa »aana daatvuotion of Xaraal* Tha 
Unitad Stataas ha atatad cannot ba counted on the protect 
Xavael'a intereate* The United Statea ahould apply praaaure < 
tha Araba to bring about peaee* Ullaan in hia reply atatea 
thatff beeauae there ia no aettlenentf tharefore» he feela the 
United Statea ahould explicit guaranteea to Xarael* Ullaan 
thinka that a olear Anerlean oomiit«ent would eool the Arab 
nationa* 
73. Avinerif Shlonot Brxezinaky, Zhigniew. Oueheney 
rraoia* Perlflttitter* Anoat UllMBnt and Biehard' "^ n exohange i 
See alaol Attia Aheedy ffw .fftftg |,atfc gffnfAJBtf. *^?ifflia| fgg 
and Pjaw C^uropa-Arehiv, Vol. 30. No. 6, 1975;, P. tSJ. Sae 
alao Gofctliabt Cidon» *PBleetine> An Algerian Solution*. iM 
PsiUfil v^ ow York, yinter» 1978-76)9 pp. 198-211. (Gottlieb 
applied the Cvlan terna to the eituation in the Riddle Caat. 
Sae I •tfanoe trail* in Tha .laORffltiat of 26 Feb. - 4 Wareh, IS 
London, SUIAING, pp. 16<.17. 
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Uhst«v«r tho tfiatM of popular writers and 
scholars srs fruitful to find a solution to ths problsn 
of ths niddls Cast9 ths truth i s thsrs that Israsl for aors 
than ton ysars oooupies Arab tsrritoriss of sovsrsign nsnbsr-
Statss of ths Unitsd ftations* Ths Israslis ars systsnatiisally 
colonising thsss tsrritoriss in ordsr to intsrgats ths« 
8oc»io»ioally so that thsy would gradually bsocMw a {xart of 
Israsl* Opprsosion of ths Arati population of ths ooeupisd 
tsrritoriss« racial diseriiiination and rsprsssion havs tioooas 
s nosm of Israslis conduct in thsss ooeupisd lands* Such a 
stats of affairs certainly intolsrabls* This was pointsd out in 
ssvsral resolutions adopted by ths United Nations Comnission on 
Huaan Rights which eephasisss that Israeli Military occupation 
of the territories of ths Arab Statss i s s ssrious thrsat to 
world peace and ssourity and a eovplete violation of the United 
Nations Charter and the OeelaraticKt of HuMan Rights* Israsl 
continues stubbornly to prsvsnt the Palsstinians to exercise 
their legitinate right to S8lf«^sterninatian and the creation 
of their own stats* This right which ths Unitsd Nations wss 
acknowlsdgsd as far back as 1947* The internaticmal recognition 
of the righte of the ^lest inians to national inctopsndsnos and 
sovsrsignty were reaffireed in reaolutions adoptsd by a eajority 
vots at ths last two sessions of ths United Nations General 
Aassably*^^ The Palestins Uibsration Organisation (PtO) has 
74* Scccion Tusnty«Nins and Thirtisthf i se footnote 
No* 59* 
Sac Prof, S.A^H, Haqqi, Ice, aittf PP* 87-88* 
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won ecwwidorable p o l i t i c a l p r a t t i g t f i t eulninatsd i n Ara fa t ' s 
app»arane« a t th« Unitad Nationa i n Nov«tttiet» 1974* ^ I t i s 
widsly rseognisod as ths I s g i t i a a t s rspressntat ivs of tha ths 
Palestins-*Arabs and anjoying f u l l support of ths nasaes in ths 
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s * But in sp i te of a l l these rad ica l ohangsi 
I s r a e l continues t o adhere t o obviously i r r a t i o n a l poeit ion of 
refusing t o recognise the Palestine t i b e r a t i o n Organixat i»i 
(PUO) hoping of obstructing i t s par t ie ipa t i tm i n the Geneva 
Peace Cevtferenoe* I t is t h i s fac t that c l a s s i f i e d tim lack of 
desire t o set the Geneva Peace Conference in noticm* The 
problen w i l l renain as i t i8« threatening uorld peace and 
secur i ty t i l l I s rae l and the United £itates show s i n c e r i t y for 
sett let tent* The Geneva Peace Conference a t t h i s stage w i l l 
be hopeful for reaching f i n a l solut ion in accordance t o a l l 
United Nations resolutions and recOixmirKiatione* 
The "step by etep" approach policy i n i t i a t e d 
by Or Kiesenger in the a f ternath of the October war of 1973 
i s now no »ore workablsi l e r a e l has therefore« two options to 
do i f she wants t o see her secur i ty i n the region realy ex is ts* 
7S* Fouad Ajaiii» *The Arab Uorld and the New Sett leaent* 
f W l i c n A f f a U g t («•« York, A p r i l 1976, Vo l . 54, 
1^ 0* 3/ pp* 444<-46l* 
76* Robert y* stookey, ^.igir^ca and tfw ^rflb stataa» 
(New York» Uiley, 1975), PP. IS-aS* See alsot 
A ion Bon-neirt T|w "iLtitlig feaat* IffiPflifativta and , 
ChoiiMia i (mount Verasiii N.Y* Decalogue Booke, 1975) 
PPm 25-70* 
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Tho f i r s t ons la to attsnpt to reach a eoaprehensiva 8«ttl«mint" 
involving withdrawal to th« pro- 5 3uno 1967 bordare and tha 
aooond i s to f a e i l i t a t o tho ereation in parts of evaeuatad 
territory of an indoponctont Palastinian Stats* In eass Israol 
i s s t i l l arrogantly rsftMing to aeoapt such options thsn "sho 
must gird horsslf for a f i f th round of fu l l soalo h o a t i l i t i s s • 
a round that nay inf in i te ly oosplioate the entire oanfliot« 
77 
conceivably Making i t entirely inseluable*" 
Israel 's delay and postponement are obstructing 
oonpreNineive settlement to the long issue of Palestine and i t 
i s a tantamount to national suicide* ^iece moal arrangements 
without solving the original issue are only uaste of time* For 
nearly thirty years the policy of "reconciliation through 
superior strength" adopted by Israel} proves:it ia fru i t less and 
Israel ' s security beoomes more insecure* The October War of 
1973 destruoted such a theory which Israel remains long time to 
ohurish* Israel in fact as Oan Gilon stated "required to day 
i s not an 'aot of expiation* but an act of'expediency* for 
without such an act i t s day as a sovereign etate must surely be 
77* Oan Gilon^ 'Israel optione for Peace** Asian 
Affaire of Qune l976, Wol, 63, Part II (Bill ing 
and Sons Limitedt Cuildfordf Loidon), pp* 149-15S* 
See alaot Inder Aalhotra, 'Towards Peace in Ueet 
Asia* in Trfdiit 9f r^^ diia or December, 9, 76, p. 8. 
• • • 
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78 
nu«tMir«d«" 
78* Oan Gilon| go. e i t* . p* 155* (nr Dan Gilon i s 
an Israoli Journalist and a fatmat adit or of iha 
Hew nXddla £aat» ^ haa Bad* a apeelaX atudy of 
tha Arab«>Iaraell. oonfliet and ^Xaatina^^rab 
NationaXiaa* Hb la now working aa a ftB0 journaliat 
and a broadeaatar a^ei^lisl^ig in l^iddla £aata»n 
Sea Zahurul Qari» *Touatd8 A Peaoefui Settleaent 
in Meat Aaiat Zniernationai Hovea and Regional 
Heaponaea: tS>67-7S« Intikfl JpygnflX fflf P<aJl4UM» 
tfoi. X No, 2 3uly*0ec. 1976 iOepartoiant of PoXitioal 
Soiance^ Aiigarh nuaXioi Universityt Aiigarh| India), 
pp, I7*3e« 
yhile sore than thirty years of continuous 
efforts have revealed envious liKitationSf there are* 
in faetf aany sound achievenents uhioh the United Nations 
has to i t s credit* The danger of a total and nuclear K»r has 
been reduoed» but peace remains precarious* flost colonial peoples 
have achieved independence! but colonialism has not been conpletel] 
elininated* The Universal Declaration of Hunan Rights oasts a new 
l ight over the globOf but racism exis ts* International cooperatioi 
for developmint has progressedt but the gap between the wealthy 
countries and the leas dev/eloped has widened* The s c i en t i f i c and 
technological revolution opened up the unexpected vestas for 
progreasy but diseasoi hun§er» and i l l i t r a o y continue to plague 
humanity* 
The United Nations Organisation needs» thereforof 
more efforts from a l l the Pbmber States especial ly the "Big Five 
Powers'* in the Security Council in order to enable i t to perform 
i t s duties for establishing peace* security and progress 
e f f i c ient ly and sat is factori ly* Too oftehf the Security Council 
appears to ignore major threats or use of force and to be content 
with temporary ceasefire* The Security CouHicil must assume i t s 
fu l l responsibi l i t ies* While attempts by the Big Powers to s e t t l t 
regional confl icts are uelooiM, they should supplement and not 
supplant t ^ role of the Council* Negotiations can be euccessful 
only i f the nations concerned are allowed to decide their deetiny< 
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Coapulsiont if premoted by a desire to share influence and 
prestige in an areat cannot lead to lasting peace* 
What is really needed is genuine rsdedioatiQn» 
not so nuoh in words as in deedst to the Charter* While 
there is need for political uillf such will sonetines cannot 
express itself because of deficiencies either in the Charter, 
the Organisation or the procedure within the United Nations 
systen* The Charter contains provisions which are not only 
useless but could give unintended Justification to gross 
violations of international peace and security* particularly 
Article 107 and also Article 53» both of which should be deleted 
at the earliest opportunity* The use of *veto* has been dictated 
by clashing national interests and has unduly crippled the 
Organisation* Rueh as one should like to have the *veto' 
abolishedt ^t cannot be easily wished eway; it represents the 
hard realities of • divided world in which the United Nations 
Organisation has to function* To amend the Charter is certainly 
essential for a better and effective United Nationst but this aim 
cannot be reached tmless all the Big Powers agree to cooperate 
with the najority in the General Aasenblyt which is in favour of 
revision of the Charter* 
For a better and safer world in which every 
nation« large or SRiall» developed or developing would be 
master of its destiny* it is imperative to have a strong and 
effective United Nations* The United Nations is now helpless to 
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tak« adoquats action againat an aggraasor* tlio Intarnatlonal 
Court of DiMtioo alao finda i t a a l f in a aiiiiJLar condition* So long 
aa auoh conditiona axiatt thare w i l l b« no affeotiva Unitad 
Nationa* and tha attainnant of real peace in the world would 
remain a renote aapiration* 
The world oomnwiity haa witneaaed aeveral deliberate 
violationa of the Charter auoh aa aggreaaiona in Kiddie Caatf 
Hungary» Cieohooolovakiai Vietnan, Southern Rhodeaia, Cyprua and 
South Africai and yet the United Nationa haa been unable or un-
wil l ing to act with epeed&r reaponaibility in theae oaaea* The 
fa i lure of the United Nationa ia due to the unuillingneaa of 
certain powera to cooperate with i t when their own intareata are 
not iamediately affeotedf and the exiatenoe of double atandarda 
within tha Organiaationy raaulting in individual national 
intareata over-ruling the collective Intareat* 
The problen of i^leatine could cauae a holooauat* 
The principle of aelf-detarnination uaa not applied in ^^leatine 
af ter the Second yorld Uar» Not only doea the United Nationa 
refrain fron deploring the expulaion of the Arab people of 
Paleatine» i t secepta the eatabliatMMnt of a Zicviiat State in 
ootnpXete denial of the righta of the majority» and in violation 
of the le t te r and ap i r i t of the Charter* The United Nationa 
General Aaaembly in 1974 corrected i t a error when i t allotrad by 
najority vote the Paleatine Liberation Organiaation (PLU) to 
attend a l l United Nationa aeaaiona and conferenoea aa an obaerver* 
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But th i s i s not snough bacMUse tha Security Council i s s t i l l 
rsluctant to aduit the fact tht t tha Arabs of f^laatine ara thm 
cora or the confl ict in tha niddla £aat« The vato» which ia uaad 
by tha United States againat any reaolution which reoogniaaa tha 
l eg i t iaa te righta of the %leatiniana» or oondanna larael for i t s 
high*hanctodnaas« Anerican refusal to andorae the participation of 
the f^leatiniana in the Geneva Peace Conference on equal footing 
with other partiea in tha conflict* are oertainly nore than an 
obstacle* They ref lect the ineapaoity of the Organisation to 
'deliver the gocKia' on i t s (Hiin* 
Before and after hie ttHjr to Ueat Aaian countriaat 
the United Nationa Secretary General» Or Kurt Ualdhaiay atatad 
that the preaenoe of the Palestiniana at a resumed Geneva IHiaoa 
Conference was crucial* The Israel i diaregard for tha United 
Nationa ia a known oiatter* The Carter adainistration i s pledged 
to reactivate the Geneva Hatm Conference and the Secretary Vance 
recent v i s i t to the Middle Caat countries u..3 only a good geatura 
for providing a healthy atnoapheret thought to say tha truth* he 
achieved nothing* 
It i s d i f f i cu l t to viaualize peace in idest Aaia 
without coaplete laraali withdrawal fron the occupied territoriea 
and the aecuring of the rights of the Palestinian people* Peace 
then follows aa the logic^il outcooie of theae two nattera and not 
vice<nrersay where peace would be aa i t were standing on i t s head* 
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The United States i s capable of inposing a 
Just peace and i t has the various neans to f u i f i l i t 
whenever i t wishes* Israel in i t s turn cannot withstand 
the seriousness and the deteraination of the United States* 
desire for reaching an overall settlement of ttw problett* The 
fornula presented by the United States Secretary of State* Cyrus 
Vance on tiM eve of his v i s i t to the region* imaely« the eequence 
peace* then withdrawal* and then tha l eg i t inate rights of the 
Palestinian people* coincides with the Israel i view-Point on 
peace* As a matter of fact* th i s i s thf) reverse of t^ Hl sequence 
of Just peace which the Arabs are cal l ing for in accordance with 
the United Nations resolutions* The United States has to change 
i t s attitude and approach to the problem i f i t real ly wants i t s 
mediating efforts to be successful* The Carter administration 
showed recently more imderstanding when i t announced that the 
Palestinians must have a home* though the later announcesMint whic) 
stated that the United States i s not in favour of a separate entil 
for Palestinians i s unrealistic* The United States wishes a link 
with Jordan in this respect* i t i s unacceptable to the Palestiniar 
and a l l the Arabs* One can expect that the Carter administration 
may sooner or later come to admit that Palestine remains the core 
of the whole problem in Uest Asia* For the recognition of PLO by 
the United States as a party to the proposed settlement i s 
essent ia l i f the United States wants s tab i l i ty and durable peace 
ex i s t in the region* Israel has a l so to recognise this fact whici 
i t has been denying for a long time* However* i t wi l l be too 
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early for anyone to predict eueh a change in the attitude of the 
United States towards the ^lestine Liberation Organisation as th 
sole representative of the ^^lestiniansi but the new apparent 
attitude shows good signs for concrete realisation of the 
situation in the regionf if such a situation arises in the near 
futurcf ttmn$ one can say, the task of the United Nstions would 
becone easier and it would be able to play a oonstruotive role fo 
a satisfactory settlement in accordance with its resolutions and 
the spirit of the Charter* 
The United Natione« ae a World Body is the only 
organisation which can deal with the problenw of peace and 
disarnanent* The changing international cliaate gives ttw United 
Nations renewed chances to beoone nore effective in these fields* 
However, the need for action is so great that negotiations 
necessarily nust take place at many levela, bilateral, multi-
lateral and regional within and without the United Nations* 
Now«a-days, there is an urgent need to make the United Nations 
more effective, and this objective should be one of the highest 
priority of each nation's policy and of internatienal negotiation 
It is time for reappraisal and radedieation* The following 
measures should be included* 
1* nore effective use of all available means for 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
Including the procedures of Cfwipter VI of the Charter 
and the International Court of Justice* 
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2» Pronpt agreaoent on offaotivs peace kssping 
flNithods and guidalinaa* 
3* Inplenantation of tha fMiaoa anforoement Provisions 
of Chaptar WII of tha Charter. 
4* New proposals for disarmaRMint and ariM control, 
which should include both l i«i tat icm and reduction 
of arnanentst leading towards general and coaplete 
diearmament with ef fect ive international control* 
5* Accelerated progress towards the ccmpleta el iaination 
of colonialien* 
6* SinultaneojB action on other problems which affect 
world peaca» such as develOfMRent» eeaobedsi huiKin 
r ights , population, the environnent, ocean manageiaent 
and natural resources* 
7* ilajor strengthening of tha structure and prooadures 
of the United Nations in order to deal effactivaly witt 
these changes* 
The changing world s ituation encourages the hope 
that settlenent of many international disputes nay now beoooe 
poesible* Greater uaa of preventive diplonacy by and through 
tha United Nations i s needed I conf l icts in the Riddle £ast , 
South Africa, Korea, Soutf^m Hhodesia, Cyprus require pronpt 
settlement in accordance with the Charter* Chapter VI of the 
Charter provides several methods for pacific settlement of 
disputes} negotiation, imBdiation, conci l iat ion, arbitration^ 
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Judio ia l sat t leaent f resort to ragionaX agencies or arranganantst 
other peaoeful naans of the par t ies* ohoioe» invest igat ion and 
reeoamiendatiQn of the taour i ty Council* A l l inenbera should onka 
greater use of these aethods and seek t o nake then nore e f f e c t i v e 
The United Nations i n th is respect should expand 
the nuBber of var ie ty of s k i l l e d persons^ whose services can i3e 
offered in c o n f l i c t s * These should include the services of 
indiv iduele of outstanding status and experience* In various 
s i tuat ions the United Nations nay need to provide professicmal 
fac t - f inderSf nediatorsy or a rb i t ra torS f s n a i l groups of oareful l : 
selected statesnen to help the part ies reach agreenent through 
conference diploiMicy* I t i s a lso suggested tha t for nore 
effect ivenesst the United Nations should study the fol lowing 
neasures i 
1* A panel of outstanding spec ia l is ts i n c o n f l i c t 
resolut ion should be established promptly by the 
United Nations* This panel should include persons 
experienced i r various s k i l l s nentioned above and 
should neet regular ly* 
2* The ro le of the Secretary General in set t lenent 
of disputes should be continued and expanded* 
nenbers should request the good of f ices of the 
Secretary General nore frequently and nore pronptly* 
3* The Security Council should have a prinary and 
expanding role in c o n f l i c t resolut ionf consistent 
with i t s fundanental reapons ib i l i ty for preserving 
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rHiacMi and securi ty* Ihetm i s nou a nsu opportunity 
t o maks ths Security Council sore e f f e c t i v e for th is 
purpose* The Secretary Ceneralf on the other hand* 
should make greater use of A r t i c l e "99" of the Charter* 
yhich pernits hia to bring t o the a t ten t ion of the 
Security Coitfioil any nat ter which in his opinion may 
threaten the naintenanoe of i n te rna t iona l peace and 
secur i ty* 
4* A United Nations specia l fund for peace-keeping should 
be establ ished* This would allow the advance 
aeouMulation of voluntary contributions so that funds 
would be avai lab le for peaoeHkeeping whenever needed* 
A oajor e f f o r t shcnjld be mads now to iMplenent Chapter 
UlXf ac t iva te the dormant M i l i t a r y S ta f f Conmitteet 
and reach agreea^nta with fleaber States to aako forces 
ava i lab le t o ttw Security Council under A r t i c l e 43* 
The provisions should promptly be made to work as 
envisioned i n the o r ig ina l Charter* 
5* In a l l future peace keeping* i t must be made clear 
that a f t e r a nation* has consented t o a peace-keeping 
operations on i t s t a r r i t o r y i the United Nations forces 
w i l l not be withdrawn without the approval of the 
Security Counoilt oven i f demanded by one or both 
par t ies* T ^ t rag ic events of 1967 must not be 
repeated* 
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6* Ceneral AstenbXy prooadurss and ruXat need 
eubstantlal revision to proi^ide greater effectiveness* 
Baae(Viable l imlte on t ine ai^ d subject ioatter of debate 
are neededf together uith a rule of revaXancy* Earlier 
adoption of specif ic agenda ehould be helpful* 
The United Nations in principle i s an inportant 
machinery and useful to aoen extent (or prcwoting pea«9 and 
progress in the world; efforts are needed for i t s ef fect ive role 
in world disputes* Thusy one can say that the United Nations 
represents a global international Gommmlty^ which can bring i t s 
influence to bear, for good ot i l l * on international problens* 
The existence of the United Nations in this respect i s inevitable 
In facty the world at present i s not lacking 
machinery for peaceful settleaiant of disputes i f the wil l 
on the part of the dieputante to use that Machinery i s there» 
the decision to resort to the United Nations agenciest howevert 
rests with the s tates theoieelves* It may» therefore* be said as 
a general rule that unless and until the parties t o a dispute 
feel that i t i s in their interest t o s e t t l e a dispute* the Mere 
existence of technically adequate machinery of the United Nations 
for fma&iful settlement i s HkMly to have only very limited 
effect* 
Hamstring by the doctrine of sovereign equality 
of nenbertiationst and the doninant status enjoyed by the 
Super iPowersy tfw United Nations has been in i t s own way serving 
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the tuin causes of peace and progress* It has provided 
a useful forum for discussion and oonfiict-*resolution« Though 
recourse to violence in international po l i t i c s has not been 
elininatedf war i s no longer regarded as respectable and» as 
Clauseuitz observed* t^ w ccmtinuation of s tate policy by other 
means* Today, the United Mations ref lects t t e conscience of 
mankind and the col lect ive desire of ttw peoples of the world 
for peace and security* But to be effective* the Organisation 
has to be the representative of their wi l l to eliminate uar 
and to usher in a better world order* which should ensure 
higher standards of l iv ing in larger freedcm for a l l* indudin 
the ^rabs of Palestine* 
fait) 
RFI ) r' A.'DIX -A-
Ri:rORT OF THE AD HOC CONWITTEE ON THE 
CHARTFB OF THE 15NTTED NATIONS 
1. At its 2323rd plenary meeting, on 17 December 197'*, the Genered Assembly, on 
the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, !_/ adopted resolution 33^9 (XXIX), 
which reads as follows: 
"The General Assembly, 
"Recalling its resolutions 992 (X) of 21 November 1955 and 2285 (XXIl) 
of 5 December 1967 concerning the procedure for the review of the Charter 
of the United Nations, 
"Recalling further its resolutions 2552 (XXIV) of 12 December I969, 
2697 (XXV) of 11 December 1970 and 2968 (XXVIl) of ik December 1972 entitled 
"Need to consider suggestions regarding the review of the Charter of the 
United Nations", 
"Takinp note of the observations which were sutanitted by Governments in 
response to the inquiry made pursuant to resolutions 2697 (XXV) and 
2968 (XXVIl) and which are set out in the reports of the Secretary-General, 
"Having heard the views expressed by Member States concerning the need 
to consider suggestions regarding the review of the Charter of the United 
Nations during the cbnsideration of the item at various sessions of the 
General Assembly, including the twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-seventh 
«ind twenty-ninth sessions, 
"Reaffirming its support for the purposes and principles set forth in 
the Charter, 
"1. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of the 
United Nations, consisting of h2 members to be appointed by the President 
of the General Assembly with due regard for the principle of equitable 
geographical distribution, with the following aims: 
"(a.) To discuss in detail the observations received from Govertanents; 
"(b^ ) To consider any additional, specific proposals that Governments 
may make with a view to enhancing the ability of the United Nations to 
achieve its purposes; 
"(c^ ) To consider also other suggestions for the more effective 
functioning of the United Nations that may not require amendments to the 
Charter; 
1/ Official Records of the General Assembly^ Twenty-ninth Session. Annexes, 
agenda item 95, document A/9950. 
(2ft) 
etiunierato the pi-opoaals which have aroused particular 
intereL^ t irj the Ad Hue Committee; 
'^'- Invites Governments to submit or to bring up to date their 
observations pMrsuant to General Assembly resolution 269T (XXV), if 
possible before 31 May 19T5; 
"-^ ' Invites the Secretary-General to submit to the Ad Hoc Committee 
his views, as appropriate, on the experience acquired in the application 
of the provisions of the Charter with regard to the Secretariat; 
"U. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare, for the use of the 
Ad Hoc Committee, an analytical paper containing the observations received 
from Governments and the views expressed at the twenty-seventh and 
twenty-ninth sessions; 
"5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit a report on its work to 
the General Assembly at its thirtieth session; 
"6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth 
session an item entitled 'Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter 
of the United Nations'." 
2. Under the terms of paragraph 1 of the above resolution, the President of 
the General Assembly, after appropriate consultations, appointed the following k 
Member States as members of the Ad Hoc Committee; Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, 
France, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Gi^ece 
Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, 
Wigeria, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Spain 
Tunisia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia 
ajad Zambia. 
3. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Nations met at United 
Nations Headquarters from 28 July to 22 August 1975. All the States memberB of 
the Ad Hoc Committee took part in its work. 
k. At its first and second meetings, held on 28 and 29 July 1-975, the Ad Hoc 
Committee elected the following officers: 
Chairman: Mr. Bengt H. G. A. Broms (Finland) 
Vice-Chairmen; Mr. Mario Alanfin (Ecuador) 
Mr. Edward W. Blyden, III (Sierra Leone) 
Mr. Bernhard Neugebauer (German D«nocratic Republic) 
Rapporteur: Mr. Lauro L. Baja, Jr. (Philippines) 
5. The session was opened on behalf of the Secretary-General by Mr. Erik Suy, 
the Legal Counsel of the United Nations. Mr. Yuri M. Rybakov, Director of the 
Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs, acted as Secretary of the 
Ad Hoc CcHBcittee. 
(tit) 
Following is the text of the Definition of Aggression: 
DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION 
The General Assembly, 
Basing itself on the fact that one of the fundamental 
purposes of the United Nations is to maintain interna-
tional peace and security and to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 
or. other breaches of the peace. 
Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance 
with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make 
recommen'dations, or decide what trieasures shall be 
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain 
or restore international peace and security, 
Recalling also the duty of States under the Charter 
to settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in order not to endanger International peace, security 
and justice, 
Bearing In mind that nothing in this Definition shall 
be interpreted as in any way affecting the scope of the 
provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions 
and powers of the organs of the United Nations, 
Considering also that, since aggression is the most 
serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force, 
being fraught, in the conditions created by the existence 
of all types of weapons of mass destruction, with the pos-
sible threat of a world conflict and all its catastrophic 
consequences, aggression should be defined at the pres-
ent stage, 
Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed 
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determina-
tion, freedom and independence, or to disrupt territorial 
integrity, 
Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall not 
de violated by being the object, even temporarily, of mili-
tod) 
tary occupation or of other measures of force taken by 
another State in contravention of the Charter, and that it 
shall not be the object of acquisition by another State 
resulting from such measures or the threat thereof, 
Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, 
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of ag-
gression ought to have the effect of deterring a potential 
aggressor, would simplify the determination of acts of 
aggression and the implementation of measures to sup-
press them and would also facilitate the protection of the 
rights and lawful interests of, and the rendering of assist-
ance to, the victim, 
Believing that, although the question whether an act 
of aggression has been committed must be considered 
in the light of all the circumstances of each particular 
case, it is nevertheless desirable to formulate basic prin-
ciples as guidance for such determination. 
Adopts the following Definition of Aggression:* 
ARTICLE 1 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as 
set out in this Definition. 
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term "State": 
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recog-
nition or to whether a State is a f\/lember of the United 
Nations; 
{b) Includes the concept of a "group of States" 
where appropriate. 
'Explanatory notes on articles 3 and 5 are to be found in paragraph 20 
of the report of ftie Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression (Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenly-nlntfi 
Session, Supplement No. 19 <A/9619 and Corr. 1)). Statements on the 
Definition are contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report qf the 
Sixth Committee (A/9890). 
ism) 
ARTICLE 2 
The first use of armed force by a State in contraven-' 
tion of the Charier shall constitute prima iacle evidence 
of an act of aggression although the Security Council 
may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a de-
termination that an act of aggression has been com-
mitted would not be justified in the light of other relevant 
circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned 
or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 
ARTICLES 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration 
of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the pro-
visions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a 
State of the territory of another State, or any military 
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such in-
vasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of -force 
of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State 
against the territory of another State or the use of any 
weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by 
the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the 
land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of an-
other State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are 
within the territory of another State with the agreement 
of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their 
presence in such territory beyond the termination of 
the agreement; 
(0 The action of a State in allowing its territory, 
which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to 
be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry 
(its) 
out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its sub-
stantial involvement therein. 
i 
ARTICLE 4 
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and 
the Security Council may determine that other acts con-
stitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter. 
ARTICLE 5 
1i No consideration of whatever nature, whether 
political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as 
a justification for aggression. 
2. A war of aggression is a crime against inter-
national peace. Aggression gives rise to international 
responsibility. 
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage 
resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as 
lawful. 
ARTICLE 6 
Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any 
way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, 
including its provisions concerning cases in which the 
use of force is lawful. 
ARTICLE 7 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular articfe 
3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-determina-
tion, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter, of people forcibly deprived of that right and 
referred to in the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and 
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor 
the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to 
se6k and receive support, in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration. 
(223) 
ARTICLE 8 
in their interpretation and application ttie above pro-
visions are interrelated and each provision should b^ 
construed in the context of the other provisions. 
A P 9 C I I 0 ) X * $ ^'*^ 
riie Hal four Declaration 
/ ' ^ ' -• *^ . ' f ^' • ^. 
roreigu Office, 
November 2n<i. 19 n . 
Bear icrd KothschlXd, 
1 hav« much pleasure In conveying to you, on 
b«n:*if of His M&^esiy's Oovernfiient* the following 
aeciaration ot sympa^ m^ witn «}«wisb zioRist aspiretions 
•/•tlch nas been sxifemltted to, an<i approved by, tt^e cablntt 
m s Ma^«sty'8 Govormient vi«tv witfe favotar tbe 
.estat>itsliRierit xn Palestine of a national home for the 
Je.viJill people, anc! will u^ e their best endeavours to 
ieoi l l taie the achievement of this object, i t being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may pre^ui^ loe the civil and religious rights of 
existing hon*jewi3h contnunitiea m pale; ilne^ or t.he 
rights and poliitcei status en;joyed by ,K',W8 m any 
other countiT' 
I Should be grateful i l you would bring thle 
declaration to the icnowledge aS the zioniet Federation. 
(m) 
f^f f* & .V :n = X i > 
Resolution 242 (ip^-j) 
Adopted by the Security Council at Its t382d Meeting on 
November 22, 1967 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the 
Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every 
vState in tiie area can live in security, 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of 
the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment 
to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which 
should include the application of both the following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied 
in the recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect 
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of every State in the area 
and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
2. A ffirtns further the necessity 
(a) F'or guaranteeing freedom of navigation through interna-
tional waterways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political in-
dependence of every State in the area, through measures including 
the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
J. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Repre-
sciitativc ro proceed to the Middle luiSt to establish and maintain 
contacts with tlic States concerned in order to promote agreement 
and assist efforts to acliievc a peaceful an,d accepted ^cttl^mcnt in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretarv-CIcncral to report to the Security 
Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative 
as soon as possible. 
(ut) 
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TNi aain •ouroa Mat«»i«JL« for this th«ti« 
is thtt Unltsd Nationa PubUoatlons a» offioiaX doouaantat 
raportat Ssourity CounoU faaolutionat tha Canaral Aaaaabiy 
and othar orgarta in tha Unitad Nationa uhioh ara to ba found 
in tha United Nationa Infortnation Qffiem»<» f^y fraqtiant v ia i ta 
to tha Unitad Nationa alao halpad to gat a l l tha nacaaaary 
oateriala in thia raapaot* 
Thara ara uaaful and axoallant o f f i c ia l 
pubXioationa iihieh traoa a eonprahanaiva aurvay of Unitad 
Nationa aot iv i t iaa ainea i t a ineaption aa "avary flNBn*a Unitad 
Nationa" (8th md, 196S) "Intatnational C^ganiaation**, tha 
Uuartarly publieationa of tha world paaoa Foundationy Boaton* 
U«S,A«, tha Carnegie C^ ndoii^ mint For Intarnationl paaea publioationi 
"Intarnational Conoiliatian"^ a a ^ t h l y * aaoh iaaua uaually 
eonoantrataa on a aingle topic, treated by an axpart in that 
f i e l d . 
Hoiievarp auoh publioationa are ao amny in tha 
different f ialda of U«N« act iv i t ies* I t ia found aore 
appropriate to trace beneath the aoat excellent which thia 
thaaia i9 depended on* 
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e i^wl l»rQ«rt Clark n,« tf^f^t TtW f l M t l Ttwnty YMfa» f'ixwt 
Ifu^iafi edition (Sterling ^tiiislioro 0«jlhi() 19S6* 
Haabr© Cdward and Good riehf Uiand «• Shftgtgl ffif t h i Juagrf 
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KaOf B* Shiva* "Tha dir th of tha U»{l»t S O M raeoiIaotiOfia"t 
.trti i|4tialgitari maHiy flf Imjlat ^^ otobar 22* isai . 
Uatara, «» Tha tfnitai HafclHW («aiS«ilXan, Now yetk» 19«7>. 
yobaatoY* C,K« |.|w f^htoft ^ ktm Qiailtai .gf itm VtN* (tondon« 
Chatto and uinduat 1961)• 
£tfatti H,tf»9 UmJUJH* (iondont a«u*P«, f948>« Rtisaaiit «*««f 
^ tf^ataiY i9f tftaiitftftt Siiailait %tm ftajLe,^ lfm.tftl* (yaahingtont 
Sfookinga Inat i tutat 1930)* 
C^oodriehf t.«rty ortoai iaagiia of Nationa to U«a*y'* in iUm 
ilnfcagnatiflnai jflnaAliflfclBR* ^9^» i^7» 
sriariyt ^ti-* Trw agyananl af tha fihaglag* (^ritian Vaar sook 
of IntarnatiOTMil Uyt 1946t London (^mii^f^*)* 
Ciaud8» i n U , Li Suogda i^to Plouaharfi^ («iau ¥ork« Randan 
Houaa» 3rd tut^ ia64) . 
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27?-293. 
»eoaug3X and &ardn«tt Ttij yjlft fttul lifal JSrwrtttf f ^n ItitaggrataUan 
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9««^n» f?y HiWWK §h.tflit lite gftartai yni ftnil %tm fiitngi yatB Bf 
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